

Antitrust enforcement by the Justice Department;  
Various managerial and technical aids available from the Commerce Department;  
Efforts by the Office of Defense Mobilization to strengthen the productive potential of small firms in our defense program, and helping small business in the housing field.  
These are sound objectives.

#### ANTIMONOPOLY ACTION IN CONGRESS

One continuing threat to the future of small business is monopoly and monopolistic practices. More and more, small business is being faced with competition from chains, merged corporations and big business in general.

As you may know, I am a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Currently, we are examining proposals for protecting the small-business man.

Many people feel that the recent increase in corporate mergers may jeopardize somewhat the freedom with which the small-business man may operate. So, our monopoly subcommittee is considering, among other matters, the problem of mergers, as well as diverse monopolistic practices as they affect the free economy of our Nation.

Our objective, of course, is to determine legislative action which is necessary to provide a fair competitive climate for the small-business man.

#### PROGRAM FOR 1956

Meanwhile, our large job—our overall job—is to blueprint a program that will pave the way for full speed ahead progress. The objectives of this program are to:

1. Provide and preserve a fair competitive environment for the small-business man.
2. Continue to assist the small-business man with access to financing, technical guidance, and other aids.
3. Continue the VA home and FHA loan programs to provide better homes for more Americans.

4. Make a thorough study of reserve material—to avert shutdowns due to shortage of building materials.

5. Assist in "selling" the "Better Living for More Americans" theme to all America.

6. Provide more adequate homes for our elder citizens.

7. Meet the needs of business and industry expansion—relative to erection of more factories, machine shops, service buildings, and other construction.

8. Enact tax relief for small-businessmen. I recently joined in cosponsoring such a bill.

9. Provide ample credit to enable businesses to operate at maximum efficiency.

10. Expand the program of nonresidential buildings, churches, schools, and other construction.

The new Federal-State highway law will be a tremendous boost. It will involve \$37 billion in road work over a 13-year period. And this, in turn, should mean a vast amount of new buildings alongside the roads as well.

#### SPOTTY UNEMPLOYMENT IN UNITED STATES

I said, at the outset, that we have entered into a "golden age." I firmly believe this.

But I am a realist, not a Pollyanna. I do not wear rose-colored glasses.

We all know that there are trouble spots here and there.

In the State of Wisconsin, we have hit a few bumps in the road, particularly in auto-producing centers and in areas where farm implements are manufactured, as well as in some other places.

Coming as you do from the 48 States, you know that here and there, some of your own State's industries have had to cut back, and there is unemployment and shrinking of purchasing power.

Meanwhile, our American productivity is so enormous—our mass producing of washing machines, air conditioners, dryers, and all the other vast variety of appliances is constantly growing to such an extent that, in-

evitably, we must open up whole new markets, if we are to absorb the productivity.

I think we can do so. In fact, we must do so.

#### MORE MIDDLE CLASS AMERICANS

Fortunately, the record of the past few years shows that more and more Americans are graduating upward into the middle class. That means more people who want better home heating and who want air conditioning and other essential features of comfortable living.

The so-called lower income brackets are shrinking in percentage of the total population. And the percentage of our people who are in what we call the middle class is increasing.

But if ever there was a country which is truly "classless", it is ours.

That does not mean that there cannot be a wide difference of income, because obviously there is.

But it does mean that ours is a ladder-of-success society. A man of humblest origin can rise from his shirtsleeves and can accumulate considerable means by his own hard work.

It is my task as a legislator to keep our society this way. I want to keep it expanding, dynamic, rather than to see it become frigid, frozen—with people unable to climb up the ladder of success.

To do so, we must, of course, have a sound tax system, a sound credit policy, sound labor-management teamwork.

And we must have a government which gives overall encouragement to you and your associates in serving America's expanding needs.

#### CONCLUSION

It has been a great pleasure to be with you today. I hope that when you return to your States you will carry with you the most pleasant memories of this convention. And I hope that the day will not be long distant when you will return to the Badger State.

## SENATE

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1956

(Legislative day of Friday, June 22, 1956)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

God of all grace and love, Thou searcher of men's hearts, help us in this opening moment of a new week's council concerning the future of the Nation and of the world to draw near unto Thee, in tranquility, in humility, in sincerity. It is at Thy word that man goeth forth unto his work and to his labor, until the evening. Keep within the grasp of Thy firm hand the threads of each day's words and deeds, that we may not mar the fair design of what Thou wouldst do for us and through us. In times of turmoil may we find Thy peace, and for its tasks yet set before us grant Thy empowering.

Possess us with Thy passion for purity and peace. Purge our besetting sins by Thy cleansing fire, that for this troubled day we may be the faithful servants of Thy redeeming will for all mankind. In the dear Redeemer's name. Amen.

#### THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, and by unanimous consent, the reading

of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, June 22, 1956, was dispensed with.

#### SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I send to the desk the certificate of appointment of the Honorable ROBERT HUMPHREYS to serve as a Member of the Senate from Kentucky. The certificate is signed by the Honorable Albert Benjamin Chandler, Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The certificate will be read.

The certificate of appointment was read and ordered to be placed on file, as follows:

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,  
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER,  
Frankfort, June 21, 1956.

To the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES:

This is to certify that pursuant to the power vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, I, Albert Benjamin Chandler, the Governor of said Commonwealth, do hereby appoint ROBERT HUMPHREYS a Senator from said Commonwealth to represent said Commonwealth in the Senate of the United States until the vacancy therein, caused by the death of Senator Alben W. Barkley, is filled by election, as provided by law.

Witness: His excellency our Governor, A. B. Chandler, and our seal hereto affixed at

Frankfort, Ky., this 21st day of June, in the year of our Lord 1956.

ALBERT BENJAMIN CHANDLER,  
Governor.

By the Governor:

THELMA L. STOVALL,  
Secretary of State.

The VICE PRESIDENT. If the Senator-designate will present himself at the desk, the oath of office will be administered to him.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Kentucky, escorted by Mr. CLEMENTS, advanced to the Vice President's desk, and the oath of office prescribed by law was administered to him by the Vice President, and was subscribed by him.

#### ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may be a morning hour for the presentation of petitions and memorials, the introduction of bills, and the transaction of other routine business, subject to a 2-minute limitation on statements.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PROPOSED CONCESSION CONTRACT, GLACIER NATIONAL PARK, MONT.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a proposed concession con-

tract in Glacier National Park, Mont., which, with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

#### PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

##### By the VICE PRESIDENT:

A resolution of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Finance:

"Resolutions memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States relative to the proposals and recommendations of the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions

"Whereas the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions established on January 14, 1955, under Executive Order 10588, submitted its report, including findings and recommendations to the President of the United States on April 23, 1956; and

"Whereas many of the recommendations contained in this report, commonly called the Bradley report, would drastically alter the general philosophy behind veterans' benefits in the United States as it has evolved over a long period of years and substitute a set of sociological principles wholly unrelated to the peculiarities of the veterans' problems: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the Massachusetts Senate respectfully urges the President and the Congress of the United States to take no action based on said report that would result in derogation of veterans' benefits; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be transmitted forthwith by the clerk of the senate to the President of the United States and to the Presiding Officer of each branch of Congress.

"Senate, June 14, 1956, adopted.

"RICHARD I. FURBUSH,

"President.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN,

"Clerk."

A resolution adopted by the 36th annual convention of the Wisconsin Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., Green Lake, Wis., relating to deepening of the connecting channels of the Great Lakes; to the Committee on Appropriations.

A paper, in the nature of a petition, from the Croatian Catholic Union of the United States of America, Gary, Ind., relating to the enslavement of the Croatian people; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

#### RESOLUTION OF POSTAL TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, DENVER, COLO.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a resolution adopted by the National Postal Transport Association of Denver, Colo., relating to the recognition of organizations of postal and Federal employees.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION OF NATIONAL POSTAL TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, DENVER, COLO., BRANCH, JUNE 11, 1956

Whereas Senator OLIN D. JOHNSTON, of South Carolina, and Senator WILLIAM LANGER, of North Dakota, have worked long and hard for our benefit by their sponsoring of S. 2875, S. 3593, and other beneficial legislation: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Denver branch, National Postal Transport Association, hereby

commends and thanks them for their efforts in our behalf; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to Senators JOHNSTON and LANGER as a token of our appreciation and regard.

#### RESOLUTION OF BALTIC COMMITTEE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a resolution adopted at a mass meeting of citizens of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian descent, held at Washington, D. C., together with a joint statement of Baltic diplomatic representatives relating to the anniversary of the beginning of mass deportation in the Baltic States by the Soviet Union.

There being no objection, the resolution and joint statement were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BALTIC COMMITTEE OF WASHINGTON, D. C.,

Washington, D. C. June 10, 1956.

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to submit the following resolution unanimously adopted by citizens and residents of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian descent, assembled this day at Pierce Hall, Washington, D. C., to commemorate the first mass deportations of citizens from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, perpetrated by the Government of the Soviet Union on June 14, 1941, and to raise our voice in protest against the continuous violation of fundamental human rights, and enslavement of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union:

"Whereas the Soviet Union has arbitrarily occupied and established Communist regimes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and continues to enslave the people of these democratic republics; and

"Whereas June 14, 1941, marks the beginning of Soviet mass deportations of citizens from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to slave labor into the subarctic tundra, Siberia, and the steppes of Kazakhstan, and that such deportations still are continuing; and

"Whereas the Government of the United States has refused to recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union and is steadfastly continuing recognition of their lawful diplomatic representatives in this country; and

"Whereas the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain on February 1, 1956, in their Washington Declaration stated that 'Millions of people of different blood, religions and traditions have been forcibly incorporated within the Soviet Union' and that '... we shall help ourselves and others to peace, freedom and social progress maintaining human rights where they are already secure, defending them when they are in peril and peacefully restoring them where they have temporarily been lost'; Be it

"Resolved, That we, here assembled in prayerful mourning for the victims of Soviet aggression and genocide in the Baltic countries, vigorously protest against the continuous practice of genocide and enslavement of the Baltic peoples by the Soviet Union; and be it further

"Resolved, That we respectfully request the Government of the United States to initiate action by the United Nations with the aim of achieving the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from the Baltic States and complete restoration of their sovereignties; and be it finally

"Resolved, That we express our sincerest gratitude to the people, the Congress, and the Government of the United States for their resolute support and encouragement of the Baltic nations' struggle for regaining their liberty, and that we pledge our unequivocal support to America's leadership in

the fateful fight of the free world against totalitarian Communist aggression."

Faithfully yours,

Dr. D. KRIVICKAS,  
Chairman.

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE BALTIC DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMEMORATION OF THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BEGINNING OF MASS DEPORTATIONS IN THE BALTIC STATES BY THE SOVIET UNION, PIERCE HALL, WASHINGTON, D. C., JUNE 10, 1956

On the eve of World War II, the Baltic States became victims of the Soviet aspiration for world domination. Soviet leaders opened the gates of aggression in Europe by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, signed on August 23, 1939. By this pact, the Soviet Union secured a free hand in eastern Poland, Latvia, and Estonia, and later, on September 28, 1939, by means of an additional protocol, also Lithuania was included in the Soviet Communist sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The enslavement of the Baltic States was undertaken notwithstanding the Soviet's most solemn declarations and treaty obligations to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the Baltic countries and not to interfere with their domestic affairs. All that followed—the forced conclusion of mutual assistance pacts between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States, military occupation, formation of puppet governments, farcical elections—is now a well-established fact.

The occupation and incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union was only the prelude to the whole campaign of territorial acquisitions on the part of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia.

"Millions of people of different blood, religions, and traditions have been forcibly incorporated within the Soviet Union, and many millions more have, in fact, although not always in form, been absorbed into the Soviet Communist bloc. In Europe alone, some 100 million people, in what were once 10 independent nations, are compelled, against their will, to work for the glorification and aggrandizement of the Soviet Communist state.

"The Communist rulers have expressed, in numerous documents and manifestos, their purpose to extend the practice of communism, by every possible means, until it encompasses the world. To this end they have used military and political force in the past. They continue to seek the same goals, and they have now added economic inducements to their other methods of penetration.

"It would be illusory to hope that in their foreign policies, political and economic, the Soviet rulers would reflect a concern for the rights of other peoples which they do not show toward the men and women they already rule." (Joint declaration made by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in Washington on February 1, 1956.)

The same goal of world domination and expansion was recently reiterated at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union follows Lenin's thesis that 'all nations will realize socialism, this is inevitable, but not all of them in the same way.'"

To this Khrushchev added:

"These (bourgeois) politicians do not dare to declare that capitalism will perish in the new world war, if they will wage it, but they are already forced to admit publicly that the socialist camp is invincible.

"It is true," said Khrushchev in his report to the 20th Congress, "that we recognize the necessity to transform in a revolutionary way the capitalist society into the socialist society. \* \* \* It does not at all follow from the fact that we stand for peaceful coexistence and economic competition with capitalism, that the struggle against bourgeois



ideology, against the survival of capitalism in the minds of men can be relaxed."

Soviet imperialism in Europe and Asia has been imposed with greatest ruthlessness, and it has been accompanied with an appalling amount of human misery.

Today we are commemorating the mass deportations which began in our countries in June 1941 and which still continue under one form or another. In those tragic days of June more than 100,000 Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were deported to remote areas of the Arctic and Siberia. Since then our people have been deprived of the most elementary human rights and have been exposed to torture and starvation in forced labor camps. On the testimony of hundreds of eyewitnesses, the Select Committee To Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic States Into the U. S. S. R. of the House of Representatives of the United States in 1954 established the following:

"The U. S. S. R. has been and is now engaged in a ruthless program of sovietization in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, employing the well known Communist tactics of arrest and detention without cause, torture chambers, mass deportations to slave labor camps, population transfer, and wide-scale political murders."

After a detailed analysis of the facts, the committee concluded:

"The evidence is overwhelming and conclusive that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were forcibly occupied and illegally annexed by the U. S. S. R. Any claims by the U. S. S. R. that the elections conducted by them in July 1940 were free and voluntary and that the resolutions adopted by the representing parliaments petitioning for recognition as a Soviet Republic were legal, are false and without foundation in fact." (Third Interim Report, 1954, p. 8.)

The Baltic nations, like the other Soviet subjugated nations behind the Iron Curtain are firmly convinced that as ramparts of western civilization they will not be abandoned by the free world. Therefore, we highly appreciate the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom made in Washington on February 1, 1956, setting forth their attitude toward the struggle between the western and Communist worlds, wherein they expressed the hope of all the captive nations as follows:

"We (of the West) shall help ourselves and others to peace, freedom and social progress, maintaining human rights where they are already secure, defending them when they are in peril and peacefully restoring them where they have temporarily been lost."

At this solemn commemoration, together with millions of other Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians throughout the world, we mourn those compatriots who have fallen victim to the Communist conspiracy and those who are still struggling for their lives in the remote reaches of the Arctic and Siberia, or in their own lands—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

We must again state that our goal has been and will always remain the reestablishment of the complete independence and full sovereignty of our nations, and we have faith that with the help of God, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will achieve that freedom and independence.

#### RESOLUTION OF THE NORTHWEST REGION, ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

Mr. HUMPHREY of Minnesota. Mr. President, the midyear conference of the northwest region of the Zionist Organization of America was held in Milwaukee, Wis., on June 3.

I ask unanimous consent that a resolution dealing with the Near East which

was adopted at this conference be printed in the RECORD and referred to the appropriate committee.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The northwest region, Zionist Organization of America, representing 20 Zionist districts in Minnesota, Wisconsin, North and South Dakota, assembled in midyear conference at the Hotel Schroeder in Milwaukee, Wis., on Sunday, June 3, 1956, adopted the following resolution:

"We deplore the refusal of the Department of State to accede to Israel's request for defensive weapons and we deem such refusal to be inimical to the best interests of the United States and the free world.

"We commend the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General in reducing tensions in the border area of Palestine by securing observance of the armistice agreements. However, so long as the flow of Communist arms to Egypt continues unabated, notwithstanding Soviet assurances of peaceful intent, an attack upon Israel by the power hungry dictator of Egypt and his allies cannot be ruled out.

"The recent debate in the United Nations provides further proof of the arrogant and belligerent attitude of the Arab nations toward a 'mutually acceptable' solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

"We call upon the President and the Secretary of State to act promptly and courageously with reference to the Middle East by furnishing Israel with the American arms it needs for legitimate self-defense. Defensive arms in the hands of the State of Israel will be a potent deterrent to aggression and will thus contribute to peace and stability in that area."

#### CHANGES IN POSTAL MANUAL—RESOLUTION

Mr. HUMPHREY of Minnesota. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a resolution adopted by the Minneapolis and St. Paul Joint Council of Postal Employees concerning changes in the Postal Manual, part 741, be printed at this point in the RECORD, and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

##### CHANGES IN THE POSTAL MANUAL, PART 741

Whereas recent changes in the Postal Manual have been issued to force upon postal workers punitive restrictions which will humiliate and degrade all members of employee unions; and

Whereas a few examples will show that these changes could be designed to weaken and destroy postal unions which are the only groups dedicated to the improvement of service to the public; and

Whereas the first sentence of 741.4 is redundant as it is covered completely by libel laws which apply to all citizens of our country; and

Whereas the second sentence of 741.4 establishes rigid censorship which violates every concept of American democracy; and

Whereas the third sentence of 741.4 is an example of picayunish tactics invoked to demean the position of the postal worker; and

Whereas the first sentence of 741.5 needlessly and callously revokes a policy which has existed since 1912; and

Whereas no valid reason for these changes has been given by any official of the Postal

Department; not one official has contended that these changes would reduce the deficit or improve the service to the public: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Minneapolis and St. Paul Joint Council of Postal Employees urges that these orders be rescinded and that a copy of this resolution be sent to each Senator from Minnesota and to each Representative from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.

THOMAS NOLIN,  
President.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. MURRAY, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with amendments:

S. J. Res. 139. Joint resolution to provide for the observance and commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the first conference of State governors for the protection in the public interest, of the natural resources of the United States (Rept. No. 2299).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 2272. A bill for the relief of Evangelos Demetre Kargiotis (Rept. No. 2305);

S. 2644. A bill for the relief of Hasan Muhammad Tiro (Rept. No. 2306);

S. 2761. A bill for the relief of Fethi Hepcakici (Rept. No. 2307);

S. 2803. A bill for the relief of Max Mazak Terian and his wife, Maria Terian (Rept. No. 2308);

S. 2826. A bill for the relief of Doctor Ching-Lin Hsia and wife, Wai Tsung Hsia (Rept. No. 2309);

S. 2846. A bill for the relief of Don-chean Chu (Rept. No. 2310);

S. 2904. A bill for the relief of Rosalind Chang (Rept. No. 2311);

S. 2955. A bill for the relief of Anna Justine Cakste (Rept. No. 2312);

S. 2958. A bill for the relief of Elisabeth Hollas (Rept. No. 2313);

S. 3016. A bill for the relief of Mayland Township, Carpio, N. Dak. (Rept. No. 2314);

S. 3059. A bill for the relief of No Kum Sok (also known as Kenneth No) (Rept. No. 2315);

S. 3171. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Riva Kagan (Rept. No. 2316);

S. 3194. A bill for the relief of Henry Lappeman (Rept. No. 2317);

S. 3196. A bill for the relief of Helen Mar Stanger (Rept. No. 2318);

S. 3206. A bill for the relief of Saveria Velona Gangemi (Rept. No. 2319);

S. 3209. A bill for the relief of Paul Edward Horn (Rept. No. 2320);

S. 3217. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Thomas L. Davidson (Rept. No. 2321);

S. 3218. A bill for the relief of Joaquin Flores-Munoz (Rept. No. 2322);

S. 3253. A bill for the relief of Chiyoko Tominaga Beckmann (Rept. No. 2323);

S. 3255. A bill for the relief of Amin Habib Nabhan (Rept. No. 2324);

S. 3276. A bill for the relief of Jan Hovorka (Rept. No. 2325);

H. R. 877. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Rose Amoresano and her children (Rept. No. 2326);

H. R. 3960. A bill for the relief of Maria del Carmen Gago Santana (Rept. No. 2328);

H. R. 4031. A bill to consider residence in American Samoa or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by certain employees of the governments thereof, and their dependents, as residence in the United States for naturalization purposes (Rept. No. 2337);

H. R. 4141. A bill for the relief of Vivencia Fernando Raymundo, Bienvenida Raymundo, Lolita Raymundo, Agnes Raymundo, Henry Raymundo, and Fred Raymundo (Rept. No. 2339);

H. R. 4851. A bill for the relief of the Kelmoor Fox & Fur Farm, Inc. (Rept. No. 2340);

H. R. 5041. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Margaret Dows Thyberg (Rept. No. 2341);

H. R. 5635. A bill for the relief of Dr. Wlodymyr Fedyniak and others (Rept. No. 2342); and

H. R. 11499. A bill to amend the Texas City Disaster Claims Act (Rept. No. 2343).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 1847. A bill for the relief of Alecos Markos Karavasilis and his wife, Steliani Karavasilis (Rept. No. 2326);

S. 2022. A bill for the relief of Arnold Rosenthal (Rept. No. 2327);

S. 2882. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Geraldine Elaine Sim (Rept. No. 2328);

S. 3583. A bill for the relief of Mathilde Gombard-Liatzky (Rept. No. 2329);

S. 3650. A bill for the relief of the town of Freeport, Maine (Rept. No. 2330);

H. R. 1761. A bill to relieve certain veterans who relied on an erroneous interpretation of the law from liability to repay a portion of the subsistence allowances which they received under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (Rept. No. 2344);

H. R. 1876. A bill for the relief of Martin M. Sorensen (Rept. No. 2345);

H. R. 9371. A bill for the relief of John R. Henry (Rept. No. 2346); and

H. Con. Res. 221. Concurrent resolution favoring the granting of the status of permanent residence to certain aliens (Rept. No. 2301).

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 1328. A bill for the relief of Doreen Tsung-tao Chen (Rept. No. 2331);

S. 2760. A bill for the relief of Yee Chung Fong Ming, Yee Chung Nom Ming, and Gee Shee Ming (Rept. No. 2332);

S. 2916. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Alberta Bernard (Rept. No. 2333);

S. 3012. A bill for the relief of Richard Rhen-Yang Lin and his wife Julia Lam Lin and their minor child Richard Rhen-Yang Lin, Jr. (Rept. No. 2334);

S. 3030. A bill for the relief of Costantinos F. Agoris (Rept. No. 2335);

H. R. 6190. A bill for the relief of Ens. Charles A. Binswanger (Rept. No. 2347);

H. J. Res. 456. Joint resolution for the relief of certain relatives of United States citizens (Rept. No. 2303);

H. J. Res. 616. Joint resolution for the relief of certain aliens (Rept. No. 2304); and

H. Con. Res. 228. Concurrent resolution approving the granting of the status of permanent residence to certain aliens (Rept. No. 2302).

By Mr. KEFAUVER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 1087. A bill to authorize aftercare payments by the Youth Division of the United States Board of Parole (Rept. No. 2300).

By Mr. DANIEL, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 2891. A bill to amend section 709 of title 18 of the United States Code so as to prohibit the use by certain businesses of the initials "U. S." in the business or firm name or pictures of the Capitol Building and other public buildings of the United States in their advertising, and to increase the penalties for violation of such section (Rept. No. 2351).

By Mr. DANIEL, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 2017. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code so as to prohibit the misuse by collecting agencies of names, emblems, and insignia to indicate Federal agency (Rept. No. 2350).

aliens, which was placed on the calendar, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Senate does not favor the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to section 244 (a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. 1254 (a) (1)):

A-5163473, Henriksen, Charles Emil.  
E-092802, Petrolekas, Christos Ioannis.  
A-9836943, Van Thoi, Nguyen.

#### SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS (S. REPT. NO. 2348)

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported an original concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 84), favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens, which was placed on the calendar, as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)*, That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 244 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 214; 8 U. S. C. 1254 (c)):

A-4402414, Feigenbaum, Lena.  
A-1368567, Guszczka, Konstanty.  
A-5540879, Johnson, William.  
A-2436831, Schwartz, Albert.  
A-1328350, Amado, Joseph Barbosa.  
A-2550952, Baum, Louis.  
A-3065105, Cinque, Luigi.  
A-5448287, Donaldson, John Kelly.  
A-2623371, Ekstrom, Gustav Fritz.  
A-3576941, Gabartus, Joseph.  
A-1418512, Gaines, Raymond Verand.  
A-5981807, Gerber, Pauline.  
A-4180130, Hernandez, Narciso.  
A-3483987, Kolek, Frank.  
A-1534631, Martenuk, Wasil.  
A-1087241, Mendez-Perez, Feliciano.  
A-1258280, Mendez-de la Rosa, Anastacio.  
A-5069154, Monteiro, Anthony.  
A-8281823, Morrison, John William.  
A-5167345, Murphy, Donald K.  
A-1297962, Okerstrom, Olof Edwin.  
A-5038080, Palen, Adolph.  
A-5407196, Rubenstein, Benjamin.  
A-8478270, Russo, Esteban.  
A-2331492, Schwed, John.  
A-5919577, Sikorski, Adolph.  
A-8678037, Stamatopoulos, Andreas Vasilios.  
A-2784150, Tamayo, Maria Salazar de  
A-5574722, Zaks, Aber.  
1300-134264, Castillo, Pedro Contreras.  
A-5991679, Chomsker, Mones.  
A-4722856, Garcia, Eliseo Vasquez.  
A-5237203, Mascitti, Luigi.  
A-3065941, Ruzycki, Walter Stanley.  
A-5880176, Aguayo-Renteria, Felipe.  
A-5543950, Abeson, Louis.  
A-5163391, Briller, Clara Sadie.  
A-4241143, Ceddia, Angelo.  
A-5190234, Duffy, Dorothy B.  
A-5294327, Fellmeth, Martin.  
E-057893, Frumpkin, Paul.  
A-5242017, Golbin, Margaret.  
A-4177923, Gonzales, Louis.  
A-2710779, Gutierrez-Galaviz, Miguel.  
A-4192990, Kaganski, Chaim.  
A-6824870, Kaplan, Morris.  
A-4924358, Kryshtall, Alexander.  
A-5781163, Laro, Francisco.  
A-2513344, Lashuk, Maxime.  
A-3084067, Lysyak, Lucas.  
A-5624182, Marcus, Benjamin.  
A-7142118, Melicharek, John.  
A-4732368, Molina, Salvadora Ozuna.  
A-4338054, Molina, Saturnino Paderes.  
A-8846106, Race, Thomas Frank.  
A-5772133, Radmilo, John.  
A-4385372, Ramirez-Davalos, Dario.

0300-460796, Reisler, Betty.  
A-4098680, Rodriguez-Borjas, Manuel.  
A-3445360, Rubicz, Stefan.  
A-10035249, Sedor, Walter Richard.  
A-4683291, Shadletsky, Esther.  
A-2935218, Silverman, George James.  
A-5998756, Spector, Maurice.  
A-5808720, Springer, James.  
A-5758104, Tuxen, Jean Charles.  
A-5767334, Wong, Man Jaw.  
A-1802172, Zahran, Abraham John.  
A-3807772, Zych, Walter Joseph.

#### BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. KNOWLAND:

S. 4114. A bill for the relief of certain aliens; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GREEN:

S. 4115. A bill for the relief of Chan Wing Cheung; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHAVEZ:

S. 4116. A bill to increase the membership of the Senate Office Building Commission; to the Committee on Public Works.

#### CONCURRENT RESOLUTION—SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

The following original concurrent resolution was reported by Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. Con. Res. 84. Concurrent resolution favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens; placed on the calendar.

(See reference to above concurrent resolution, reported by Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, which appears under the heading "Reports of Committees.")

#### RESOLUTIONS

The following resolutions were submitted or reported and referred, or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

#### ADVANCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Mr. ANDERSON submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 295), which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Whereas the principles which underlie scientific progress are universal in their application; and

Whereas history reveals that all nations benefit from the cross-fertilization of ideas among the scientists of all nations; and

Whereas the great progress of the United States in atomic energy and many other scientific fields has been furthered by the work of scientists of other nations; and

Whereas the excessive isolation of basic scientific research behind rigid national walls breeds suspicion and may tend to divert a disproportionate part of the scientific effort to destructive rather than constructive effort; and

Whereas greater communication and contact and common effort among the leading scientists of the world will produce more intensive progress in such fields as medicine, nuclear energy, weather control, and the solution of the mysteries of outer space which will be of lasting benefit to all mankind; and

Whereas the present year, being the International Geophysical Year in which all nations are cooperating in meteorological research, provides a fitting occasion for the advancement of international scientific cooperation: Now, therefore, be it

#### OPPOSITION TO SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS (S. REPT. NO. 2349)

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 296), opposing the suspension of deportation of certain



*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States explore with other nations, through such channels as he finds appropriate—

1. The means of conferring on an outstanding scientist in each of the major scientific fields, selected annually on the basis of contribution to the good of mankind, regardless of nationality, an honorary world passport;

2. The means of creating a World Laboratory to serve as a center of advanced scientific research and to supplement and facilitate national efforts in this connection; and

3. The means of giving additional encouragement to the travel and exchange of scientists throughout the world and the exchange of scientific information.

SEC. 2. On the basis of such exploration, the President shall make suitable recommendations to the Congress.

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. Res. 296. Resolution opposing the suspension of deportation of certain aliens; placed on the calendar.

(See reference to the above resolution, reported by Mr. EASTLAND, which appears under the heading "Reports of Committees.")

#### MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1956—AMENDMENTS

Mr. SMATHERS submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (H. R. 11356) to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

#### ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. ROBERTSON:

Address on foreign policy delivered by former Senator William Benton before the Union League Club of Chicago on June 14, 1956.

By Mr. BRIDGES:

Address delivered by National Commander J. Addington Wagner, of the American Legion, before the graduates of the 57th session of the FBI National Academy, at Washington, D. C., on June 8, 1956.

Address delivered by George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, before the graduates of the 57th session of the FBI National Academy, at Washington, D. C., on June 8, 1956.

By Mr. THYE:

Address delivered by John Cowles, president, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., before Minnesota State Bar Association, on June 22, 1956.

By Mr. LANGER:

GTA Daily Radio Roundup concerning REA.

By Mr. BEALL:

Telegram received by him from S. Vannort Chapman, secretary of the Maryland Bar Association, transmitting resolution recommending immediate action on the nomination of Simon E. Sobeloff to be associate judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

By Mr. CHAVEZ:

Article entitled "Bolivar Blazed the Trail," written by Bob Considine, and published in the New York Journal-American of June 20, 1956.

By Mr. MANSFIELD:

Article entitled "Foreign Service a Growing Force," written by Gould Lincoln, and published

in the Washington Evening Star of June 24, 1956.

By Mr. LEHMAN:

Article entitled "Israel's Meaning," written by Joseph Alsop, and published in the New York Herald Tribune of June 20, 1956.

By Mr. GOLDWATER:

Editorial on the use of compulsory union dues for political purposes, written by W. P. Stuart, and published in the Prescott (Ariz.) Evening Courier.

By Mr. NEUBERGER:

Editorial entitled "Neater Polling Places Might Get More Voters," published in the Saturday Evening Post of July 17, 1954.

Article entitled "What This County Needs: A National Physical Fitness Commission," written by Dr. H. Harrison Clarke, of Eugene, Oreg.

Article entitled "CIO Plays Vital Role in Oregon and Nation," written by Mrs. Emsie Howard, and published in the June 15, 1956, issue of the Oregon Labor Press.

By Mr. HUMPHREY of Minnesota:

Columns on the Presidency by Mr. James Reston, which will appear hereafter in the RECORD.

#### RETIRED PAY OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE—RETURN OF ENROLLED BILL TO THE SENATE

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. President, I submit a concurrent resolution and ask unanimous consent that it may be given immediate consideration.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will read the concurrent resolution for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 83), as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States is requested to return to the Senate, the enrolled bill (S. 3581) to increase the retired pay of certain members of the former Lighthouse Service. If and when said bill is returned by the President, the action of the Presiding Officers of the two Houses in signing said bill shall be deemed rescinded; and the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed, in the re-enrollment of said bill, to make the following corrections: On page 1 and in the table following line 7 strike out "January 20, 1918" and insert "June 20, 1918."*

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution?

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 83) was considered and agreed to.

#### USE OF UNION DUES FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, on June 8, in South Bend, Ind., Mr. Paul Butler, who as Democrat national chairman, is doing the Republicans so much good that I hope the Democrats keep him forever, displayed another example of his total disregard of the truth when he said that Mr. George Hinkle, Indiana State labor commissioner, and I were opposed to any political action on the part of unions. Neither Mr. Hinkle nor I have ever made such a statement. What we have been saying—and, by the way, it has never been denied by anyone, including Mr. Butler—has been that it is morally wrong for a union to use compulsory dues money for political purposes.

That is the sole issue. It is an issue on which Mr. Butler might well express himself, for such activity has gone on in his home town in Studebaker Local, No. 5, UAW-CIO. If he doubts this, let him visit the local and examine their books for the 3 months ended December 31, 1954, and the year 1954, and for the same periods of 1955. Then he might continue his perusal of those interesting documents by looking at their general fund statement of income and expenses for the 3 months ended March 31 of this year. He will have no difficulty doing that, as I was able to obtain photographs of the documents I mention. He would discover that those statements alone show a transfer to the PAC of \$3,773.88. That money came out of the general fund of the union local. It did not come out of any funds described in the statement as being voluntary. What I would like to hear Mr. Butler say is that he, too, is against the use of compulsory dues money for political purposes.

Mr. President, enough about Mr. Butler. Now I should like to direct a few short remarks to the courage of Mr. George Hinkle, who is the State labor commissioner of Indiana. Mr. Hinkle is a courageous man. He is standing up and resisting the pressures being put on him by the CIO in that State, and is administering his office in a fair and impartial manner. I have great respect for any person who will resist any group whose obvious desire is to have government operated the way they want it operated, regardless of whether or not the rights of minorities are thereby infringed.

To complete the record, I ask unanimous consent that a column written by Mr. Holmes Alexander, which appeared in the Indianapolis Star of Saturday, June 9, entitled "Hinkle Puts Up Fight for Individual Rights," be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks, along with a statement made by Mr. Hinkle on the occasion of the false statements made by the chairman of the Democrat Party and his copartner on the stand, Mr. Dallas Sells, Indiana CIO chief.

There being no objection, the column and the statement were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Indianapolis Star of June 9, 1956]  
HINKLE PUTS UP FIGHT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

(By Holmes Alexander)

WASHINGTON.—George F. Hinkle, UAW-CIO, Local 5, Indianapolis, is the fourth person to be State labor commissioner during the administration of Gov. George Craig, of Indiana. One of Hinkle's predecessors died in office; two others resigned under pressure. Today the young and thoughtful George Hinkle, 37, a former mechanic in the Studebaker plant, a World War II veteran and lately administrative assistant to the mayor of South Bend, is finding out how the pressure feels on his own skin. He made a speech against political use of union dues, and the labor bosses are trying to get him out of there.

This is what a man in the labor movement gets these days for voicing minority opinions. Hinkle is used to it. When he first signed up as a union member some 15 years ago, he found things going on that he didn't like. He did something about it by going in for union politics. He was elected to the

executive board and to the bargaining committee. Then one day he got up and opposed something called a citizenship fund whereby a sum of 10 cents a member a month was applied to politics—in other words, about \$65,000 a month made available to Democratic Party candidates.

"The union bosses and their stooges yelled 'Commie! Commie!' at me," says Hinkle. "Then in April when I made my speech on the same subject before the State chamber of commerce, the same bosses and stooges called me a right-wing, labor-hating reactionary."

Hinkle told me he was in Washington to talk with his Congressman, SHEPPARD (STAINLESS STEEL) CRUMPACKER, of South Bend, about same union welfare legislation now pending on Capitol Hill. "The young commissioner, in his blue flannel suit and Ike button, was also concerned about what's going to happen to some of the minority religious sects (President Eisenhower's forebears in Pennsylvania were members) whose church rules forbid them to contribute to secular organizations like the CIO-UAW union shops. A group of Amish from Lancaster County, Pa., recently called on AFL-CIO President George Meany and asked to be exempt from union dues. They offered to contribute the amount of the dues to charity. Hinkle has also been visited by small delegations of minority religionists who work in the General Motors Allison aircraft engine plant at Indianapolis. In 1955 this plant voted for a union shop; now men with over 15 years' seniority are up against the hard choice of quitting the job or violating their religious creeds and customs. It was something like this that brought the Pilgrims and others to America.

"There's nothing under State law that I can do to help them," Hinkle told me.

Meanwhile the Indiana CIO has demanded his head on a sacrificial slab. One of the union publications, the *Lampmaker*, calls him a phony, and CIO State President Sells says the commissioner is brainwashing the unsuspecting Hoosier public. In the horrendous speech which kicked off the controversy Hinkle traced the American labor movement from Sam Gompers through the confessed Communist Lee Pressman down to the "intellectual radical" Walter Reuther. Hinkle came out against the right-to-work laws, endorsed the principle of union shops, and then soared into this passage:

"Now, what about individual rights and freedoms? Today, there are millions of union members in this country who are being forced to contribute to the campaign funds of political candidates—candidates whom these very same union members are opposed to at the polls. These candidates are the choice of—and are many times owned by—unscrupulous labor leaders."

Hinkle knows whereof he speaks because he is speaking from personal experience. He is one of the 43 percent of union members who voted Republican in 1952. He saw Governor Craig forced by the violence of the strike at New Castle to call out the National Guard to protect public safety and private property. He noted that in the neighboring State of Pennsylvania another kind of governor put the strikers on unemployment compensation with taxpayers' money. He saw that in a third State, Michigan, the CIO pays two-thirds of the Democratic campaign funds. He heard David Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, pledge \$500,000 to political campaigning this year. Hinkle has been a dues-paying union member all his adult life, and he is certain in his own mind that the big wheels of the labor movement are off the track of the working man's welfare and are rolling toward dictatorial control of the Democratic Party. It takes nerve to say the things that Hinkle is saying. This kind of talk cost columnist Victor Riesel his eyesight. Hinkle's

answer to that is a near-quotation from Sam Gompers:

"If we want to keep America as the land of the free, we have to make sure it is also the home of the brave."

STATEMENT OF GEORGE F. HINKLE, COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, INDIANAPOLIS, IND.

JUNE 14, 1956.

Democrat National Chairman Paul M. Butler and State CIO President Dallas Sells are resorting to untruths and distortions in an effort to defend their position on the use of union dues for political purposes. In speeches to the United Auto Workers at their 20th anniversary in South Bend, Ind., last Friday, June 8, 1956, both Mr. Butler and Mr. Sells accused Senator BARRY GOLDWATER, of Arizona, and me of being opposed to any political action on the part of unions. I attended the affair and heard both gentlemen make the statements as I sat in the audience.

At no time have I or Senator GOLDWATER ever said or implied that we are opposed to political activity on the part of unions as long as the money used for such activity was raised and solicited on a voluntary and non-compulsory basis. Compulsory union dues money being used for the support of political candidates is the issue.

The question in point is this, do Mr. Butler and Mr. Sells believe that it is right or wrong to use compulsory union dues in the support of political candidates? I have yet to hear Mr. Butler, Mr. Sells, or any labor union political boss deny the use of union dues money for politics, and I have yet to hear any one of them say whether or not they think it is right or wrong.

I am of the opinion that Mr. Sells and Mr. Butler are not giving fair and honest representation to the CIO and the Democrat Party when they avoid this issue with distortions and untruths, because I know that many union members and many members of the Democrat Party are opposed to the use of union dues for political purposes. I ask them to face the issue squarely and let the members of their respective organizations know where they stand on the issue.

#### SIX-MONTHS VOLUNTARY TRAINING PROGRAM

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, last year the National Reserve Act of 1955, which called for a 6 months voluntary training program, was passed by the Congress. Great hopes were held out that this program would be a success, and would provide our Armed Forces with the manpower pool it must have in order to maintain a dominant position in the area of military force. Reports to date have not been encouraging as to the results of this program. In spite of an intensive, well-directed, and expensive publicity program directed at the youth of this country, the figures indicate that it is not attracting a sufficient number of young men. This is not a healthy situation for any of the components of our armed services, but it is particularly unhealthy for the Air Force, which is the pivotal point around which our military strategy must be constructed in the future. The Air Force cannot in 6 months, train a boy to be a technician. It takes closer to 3 years. Men, not machines, are the problem of the Air Force today. The testimony of such an outstanding general as Curtis LeMay indicates the growing concern of the Air Force over its personnel situation. At the time of the passage of this act, I felt that inadequate attention had been given to the

technical training needs of the Air Force, and I express that concern again today. The whole subject has been eloquently described by Edmund F. Hogan, Reserve affairs editor of the Air Force magazine. I ask unanimous consent that his article entitled "How the 6 Months' Deal Hurts Force in Being," be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### HOW THE 6-MONTHS "DEAL" HURTS "FORCE IN BEING"

(By Edmund F. Hogan)

Last month a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, chaired by Representative OVERTON BROOKS, of Louisiana, convened to hear a report on the progress of the National Reserve Act of 1955. Carter L. Burgess, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, headed a distinguished group of witnesses.

The heart of the National Reserve Act is a plan whereby young men may elect 6 months of active-duty training, followed by 7½ years of service in the Reserve. It is designed principally for the Army and, in the beginning, neither the Navy nor the Air Force wanted any part of it. The Navy has now capitulated, leaving the Air Force as the only holdout.

The Air Force is holding out for the very good reason that it needs large numbers of highly skilled technicians to maintain an effective force in being. You simply cannot train a technician in 6 months. The time factor is closer to 3 years and so the Air Force requires 4-year enlistment periods.

This is why there should be concern that so much effort is being expended toward turning out millions of weekend warriors. It also explains why the Air Force has been reluctant to avail itself of the 6-months trainee. And, regardless of whether the Air Force accepts the plan or not, the fact that the other services are using it threatens to have an adverse effect on the Air Force.

When the program started last fall the Army hoped to attract some 90,000 6-months trainees by the end of this month. But the program lagged so badly that Mr. Burgess and the Army decided that a nationwide publicity campaign should call attention to the 6-months deal.

Whether the 6-months program is directly connected with the recent drop in Air Force enlistments cannot be proven at the moment. Air Force recruiting dipped by 3,000 in March and by more than 5,000 in April.

In terms of annual recruiting achievements, however, these figures are not as bad as they seem at first glance. The present lag is as much the result of a shortage of AF training money as for any reason. Given sufficient funds for facilities and staff, the Air Force could accept many more recruits each month than is now possible.

And the current 8,000-man lag in recruiting is hardly the true picture. For, despite the heavy opposition created by Mr. Burgess, the Air Force recruiting curve is up on technically skilled, prior-service men; on raw recruits with higher I. Q.'s; and even on the number of very low I. Q. recruits the Air Force is required to accept, who pass the minimum intelligence test for the services.

Over the long pull, Air Force probably can continue to meet its annual quotas. Time, of course, alone will tell. There is immediate opposition ahead, however. For Mr. Burgess told the Brooks subcommittee that the "upsurge in enlistments which occurred during March just after midterm of the school year should repeat itself, with perhaps more force, at the end of the school year in June." If he is correct, the Air Force can look ahead to a further drop in 4-year enlistments.



This matter of technicians is of grave concern to the Air Force, particularly to the commander of Strategic Air Command, Gen. Curtis LeMay. At the very time the drums were being beaten across the Nation to encourage 6-months enlistments in the Army, General LeMay was telling the Symington subcommittee that a shortage of skilled technicians is already impairing his combat capability.

To assure that no healthy, young American would overlook the advantages to him of the 6-months program, the Department of Defense recently sponsored Military Reserve Week. It was launched with a Presidential proclamation. Thirty-three State governors followed suit. Radio and television gave abundantly of expensive network time. Brochures by the thousands urged young men to "End draft worries. Join the new 6-months training program."

This program, our youths were assured, would permit them to plan their military service "with the least interference" to their personal lives. They were told that the 6 months of training would be given at the Army camp nearest their homes; that after 6 months "you are free to live your life"; that once back home and in an Army Reserve unit their only obligation for 7½ years would be a 2-hour weekly training assembly and 2 weeks of field training each year.

This, according to one brochure, is the best insurance for America's future. Not the kind of force in being which the country needs, but a vast Reserve composed of men who have had 6 months of basic training. That, as our old soldiers are wont to say, isn't time enough for a man's bunk tag to stop swinging.

A keynote speaker for Military Reserve Week recalled Lord Nelson's warning that "5 minutes may make the difference between victory and defeat." "Today," said the speaker, "this warning should be edited to read, 'the first 5 minutes may make the difference.'"

This may well be true. If it is, a 6-months program cannot possibly be the answer. The answer must be the force in being—the Air Defense Command fighters on 5-minute runway alert—SAC atomic bombers ready to head for targets on 5 minutes' notice.

Six-months trainees may have been useful in the days of the square infantry division, but not in an age when airpower in being is the acknowledged cornerstone of our defense structure. Any military program that will reduce its effectiveness courts disaster.

The 6-months program is dear to the heart of Mr. Burgess. He is pledged to its success, and has never relaxed the pressure to swing the Air Force into line.

Mr. Burgess is clever and persistent as his barrage of 6-months-trainee propaganda will testify. But we hope the Air Force may never have to bend the knee.

#### LEAVE TO ADDRESS THE SENATE AT CONCLUSION OF THE MORNING HOUR

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the morning hour I may be recognized, to address the Senate for 12 minutes on the subject of foreign policy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McNAMARA in the chair). Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PREVIEW OF MOTION PICTURE "WOODROW WILSON: SPOKES- MAN FOR TOMORROW"

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, on Thursday, June 28, there will be presented in the Coolidge Auditorium of the Library of Congress, at

8:30 p. m., a preview of the documentary motion picture entitled "Woodrow Wilson: Spokesman for Tomorrow."

This motion picture is made entirely of film and other documents of President Wilson's time. The main emphasis in the film is on Wilson's activities as President in search of world peace at the Paris Peace Conference, following World War I, in his effort to enlist popular support for the League of Nations.

This motion picture has been produced by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, for showing by Government and private agencies in this and foreign countries during this year, commemorating the 100th anniversary of Wilson's birth.

The picture runs for about 27 minutes, and will be preceded by an address by Governor McKeldin, of Maryland; and a short introduction by Mr. August Heckscher, president of the Foundation.

As a member and vice chairman of the official Woodrow Wilson Centennial Commission, I have been requested to announce that Members of the Senate, including members of their families, will be most welcome at the preview; and I am happy to extend a cordial invitation to all of them.

#### PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS AND THE BALTIMORE FRIEND- SHIP INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, as a supplement to my remarks of June 14, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD three editorials published in recent editions of the Baltimore newspapers, and which deal with the problem of New York to Miami air service, now pending before the Civil Aeronautics Board.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore News-Post of June 21, 1956]

##### SHABBY SERVICE

The cold facts on just how fantastically inadequate is the airline service through Friendship Airport were given the Civil Aeronautics Board yesterday in briefs filed by four Baltimore-Maryland groups.

At the same time the Baltimore interests tackled the hitherto fruitless task of convincing Federal officials that Baltimore is not a bad air city—that a great air passenger and freight potential is bottled up by lack of flights at Friendship.

One brief was presented by the city of Baltimore and the Association of Commerce; another by the Greater Baltimore Committee and the State Aviation Commission. They urge CAB to certify Pan American World Airways for the East Coast-Florida route and to recognize Friendship as a Baltimore-Washington regional terminal.

The Greater Baltimore Aviation Commission groups charged flatly that "Baltimore is being discriminated against by Eastern and National lines (which now fly the route) in favor of the more lucrative Washington and New York passenger traffic."

##### BACK UP THE CHARGE

They backed up the charge with striking facts, including:

National Airlines provide Baltimore with only one flight southbound a day which terminates in Miami. It is with a 2-engine plane and makes 8 stops en route.

This flight takes 8 hours and 40 minutes, in contrast to DC-7B nonstop flight between New York and Miami requiring 3 hours and 30 minutes and from Washington in 3 hours.

Eastern Air Lines has only one flight southbound from Baltimore, terminating at Jacksonville, requiring 5 hours and 8 minutes with 4 intermediate stops. Northbound service originates in Miami and gets to Baltimore in 9 hours and 25 minutes after 8 intermediate stops.

The brief brings out that as a result of service "really tantamount to no service at all" the 2 carriers transported only 1 Baltimore-Miami passenger per 1,000 of population, compared to an average of 43 per 1,000 from New York, Philadelphia and Washington.

By contrast, as of last year, Boston had 6 daily southbound flights, using Constellations and DC-6's; New York had 49, of which 29 were nonstop to Florida; Philadelphia had 10, half of them nonstop, and Washington 17, of which 11 were nonstop, according to the City of Baltimore Association of Commerce brief.

##### ALL CARGO SERVICE UNHEARD OF

Of 98 schedules utilizing modern 4-engine planes, none served Baltimore and Baltimore all-cargo service was unheard of, the brief added.

Concerning all of which the Greater Baltimore Aviation Commission group remarked: "It is academic that without service there cannot be any traffic."

That flights generate air traffic is proved by an increase of 50 percent in Boston-Miami traffic when a single nonstop flight was added, and in National's increase of 67 percent on the New York-Tampa route with addition of only one nonstop coach flight.

More strikingly, when service from Philadelphia to Miami was increased substantially in capacity and quality, Eastern Air Lines passenger traffic increased nearly 6 times, from 1952 through 1954.

The above brief remarks:

"Baltimore will show an even more phenomenal increase in Miami traffic if given proper service."

##### SERVICE LACK HURTS BUSINESS

No, Baltimore is not a bad air city.

Its big business community, its large number of citizens who vacation in the South, its diversity of manufacture of small articles, a large proportion of which are sold in the South and Latin America and are suitable for shipment by air, give the city a vast air potential. But lack of flights from Friendship prevent these facts from being demonstrated to the world.

The CAB will be giving Baltimore the shabbiest of treatment, ignoring the needs of the Nation's sixth largest city, if it refuses to act favorably in the Pan American case.

[From the Baltimore Morning Sun of June 22, 1956]

##### CASE FOR PAN AM

The arguments in favor of allowing Pan American Airways to fly from New York to Florida by way of Friendship Airport are so strong, so clear, and so evident to most Baltimoreans that there is no point in rehearsing them here. They have been well put in the briefs submitted to the Civil Aeronautics Board by the city, the Baltimore Association of Commerce, the Greater Baltimore Committee, and the State Aviation Commission. All that remains here is to urge them on the CAB, by whose examiner the original Pan American application was rejected in April.

Two airlines now have the monopoly of the rich and crowded New York-Florida route. The examiner proposed to let in a third, which would operate out of Washington. It has been admitted and confirmed that Washington's airport is dangerously overcrowded already. To add another service through Na-

tional Airport would add to the congestion and hence to the danger.

The new briefs merit consideration not only for these and other reasons, but because they are filed, not merely by an interested airline, but by four bodies unconnected with commercial aviation. None of the four parties has a special interest in anything but getting better airline service and making better use of the facilities at Friendship. Under such pleading as this, it behooves the CAB to think again about a decision of great moment to the whole Baltimore-Washington area.

[From the Baltimore Evening Sun of June 22, 1956]

#### MORE THAN LOCAL

For Baltimore, the most important point about the application of Pan American World Airways for permission to operate a direct service from New York to Miami using Friendship Airport to serve both Baltimore and Washington is that this proposal would give the city an adequate air schedule to the South.

Let no one think, however, that this is a purely local case. It involves national issues and it involves the interests of other cities. New York City, for instance, has just filed a brief with the Civil Aeronautics Board supporting Pan American's bid. The document, presented by New York's equivalent of our city solicitor, stresses the fact that the Nation's largest city needs much more extensive service to Miami than it is now getting from Eastern and National Airlines. It says that Delta, which the CAB examiner recommended for the route in preference to Pan American, can't provide the service promptly, and that no other line is in position to provide it except Pan American. This is because Pan American has the planes already in service and the pilots and equipment to man and service them. During the summer Pan American employs large numbers of planes on the North Atlantic routes to Europe. In the winter, when travel to Florida is heavy, it can easily transfer its equipment to the southern route. Because of this situation, New York wishes Pan American to get CAB approval.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### FOREIGN POLICY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business having been closed, under the order previously entered, the Chair now recognizes for 12 minutes the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS].

##### I. INTRODUCTORY

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, before leaving for a well-earned vacation on May 27, Secretary of State Dulles stated that he welcomed a "pretty thorough airing" of foreign policy during the fall election campaign. He added that he hoped the discussion would prove "constructive."

All of us can agree that foreign policy should have our earnest consideration; but is it not a good idea to give it a thorough airing under the calmer conditions of the Senate floor, instead of waiting for the heat of a presidential campaign to do so? Feeling a deep sense of the Senate's responsibility in this field, I am proposing to address this body in a series of brief speeches, giving the point of view of one Senator with regard to the pressing and difficult problems which face us in the field of foreign affairs. It

is my plan to ask for unanimous consent to make these brief talks immediately after the end of the morning hour, on dates which I shall specify in advance. No one of them will be over 15 minutes in length, and most of them will be shorter.

I will not presume to lay down a definite foreign policy as being the only right course of action. I would hope to make tentative suggestions as to policy; but I am particularly anxious to bring into consideration all the important factors which, it seems to me, should guide the Senate, the Congress, and the administration in the formation of specific policy.

This first talk is addressed to the general situation. It asks and suggests answers to certain fundamental questions.

What is the basis for our foreign policy? That basis is national self-interest.

How can we define national self-interest? This lies in so directing our words and our acts that we may help to organize a world in which freedom, justice, and peace prevail, and which is thus the kind of a world we would bequeath to our children and grandchildren. This is the basic statement of our national interest, and everything else is subsidiary.

Is this opposed to a general benevolence in world affairs? It is opposed to it as the guiding principle, although our self-interest, defined as above, will in general lead to humanly helpful relationships with the nations of the earth and their peoples. The place to exercise benevolence per se, which perhaps is best called charity, is in the case of severe disasters, such as earthquakes, famine, and pestilence. But even this, though pursued for humanitarian reasons, will automatically fall within the framework of self-interest.

What is the function of armed strength in the support of our self-interest? Since power for its own sake is no part of our ultimate purpose, armed strength is to be used for defense only. What this decision involves will be discussed later in more detail. At this point let it only be said that two great leaders of a former generation have expressed principles which we should be following today. It was President Theodore Roosevelt who said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." This wise advice we have honored more in the breach than in the observance. The admonition to "speak softly" should be heeded alike in the State Department, in the press, and on the floors of the two Houses of Congress.

The other aphorism was set forth by that great master of the philosophy of strategy, Admiral Mahan, who said many years ago, "The purpose of military power is to provide time for moral ideas to take root." Here again, from high authority, we are directed toward a wise use of military power.

Because of their importance in our foreign policy, it is important to define benevolence, charity, and cooperation. This I plan to do in the fifth of these talks.

Through what sentiments shall we work to attain our self-interest? Not through inspiring fear of our own

strength or by fearing the strength of an opponent. Even fear of atomic warfare is not to be used aggressively. It is, however, an irreplaceable deterrent. However strongly the horrors of such warfare urge us on to constructive effort, we ourselves cannot succumb to fear because, although it properly urges us to action, it does not lend itself to the formation of effective policy.

Not through expectations of gaining allies by bribery, because economic benefits which are to be paid for by support of our policies will demand an ever higher price as time goes on, and will gain acceptance only of a shallow sort for selfish reasons. If we seek to purchase support in this way, we open ourselves to the dangers of having to enter into spirited bidding with our Soviet friends. Other nations will join or oppose as they learn who can offer the most and the best on the lowest terms. Let us not get into any auction of our economic assistance.

Should our emphasis be on relations with governments or with peoples?

We must cultivate both. The relations with people are the more important, and we are in danger of neglecting them. In these days and in many parts of the world, dependence on governments is an insecure basis for policy. Governments come and go. Those which were friendly to us become uncertain or even hostile. Those which seem to be hostile through some change, by election or otherwise, show the possibilities of friendship. Governments are overturned, but the people remain. The basis for our relationship with the peoples of the earth should be assistance toward a higher standard of living, better food, clothing, shelter, health, and education—all based on self-help.

Are we concerned with supporting liberty for the people of the earth?

We are, and this is a most difficult problem. How can we show our desire for supporting freedom and not be guilty in some instances of turning masses of people over to a savage anarchy? In all cases we can and must support in the councils of the nations a rapid education of the peoples of the earth toward self-government.

Does this interest extend to the people behind the Iron Curtain whether citizens of the Soviet Union or of the enslaved nationalities?

We can and must maintain the most effective opposition possible to the policies of that government which outrage the dignity of the individual man, train him to be used as an unthinking tool in the service of Soviet imperialism, and deny him and his brothers in the satellite nations the privileges of free men. On this question we cannot compromise. We cannot abandon our purpose of bringing freedom to these people by the most effective means possible. We are stewards for the free world and the world which is to become free. We cannot abandon our responsibilities.

What is the most neglected element in our foreign policy?

To my mind as I observe that policy in action, we have failed most definitely in trying to find out what the other peoples of the earth are thinking about, what



their desires are, what their prejudices are, and what their possibilities are. Again, as said earlier, we must direct our policies more strongly toward people than in the past, while not neglecting the relations with governments.

These considerations lead to the development of long-range policy. It is important that the administrative and legislative branches of the Government and the people as a whole see the new situations now presented to us as an opportunity which we must seize. It is now possible to develop long-range policy which will not be upset and reversed by every incident and accident of the relationships between the free world and the world behind the Iron Curtain. Now is the time for a thoroughgoing but not "agonizing" reappraisal. It is a time to redirect and determine our policies so that they will follow the principles that human experience through the ages has shown to be successful in building satisfactory human relations.

I hope to offer the second of this series of talks at the next session of the Senate. It will deal with the highly controversial questions involved in the rearming of Germany.

#### CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FACILITIES FOR VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, about a year ago I served on a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services which recommended an authorization for a new building for the Central Intelligence Agency, at an authorized cost of \$46 million. I was partly instrumental in convincing some of the other members of that committee, as well as the Appropriations Committee, of the need for such a building. Even though the figure seemed a little high, I thought it was justified. I was influenced partly by the fact that thereby the Federal Government would be enabled to vacate some of the temporary buildings on or near Constitution Avenue.

I agreed to that figure also in part because of special storage requirements for this particular agency.

There is also provision for an authorization of \$8,500,000 to extend the approaches of the George Washington Memorial Highway if the building in question is to be located in Langley, Va. I thought that appropriation would serve a double purpose. It would facilitate extension of the memorial highway as early as possible, and it would also serve the proposed building.

I shall not give the figures as to the number of employees which this Agency has accumulated since it was created in 1947, because of certain security considerations involved in the number of employees. But to me the number was shocking, and it was shocking to many others who heard the proof.

In the face of those facts, I am further shocked and somewhat chagrined to learn that the CIA is asking for an additional \$10 million for the construction of this building, over and above the \$46 million already authorized.

The press has already dubbed the proposed building as a "little Pentagon." I was not in sympathy with that designation when it was coined, but later I concluded that the press was perhaps as nearly right as I was, even though I had more of the facts than the press had.

I feel a certain sense of responsibility in this connection, toward the members of the subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, as well as to the members of the Appropriations Committee, because of representations which I made to them last year. Unless the facts have materially changed, I shall certainly vigorously oppose an increase of \$10 million for this building. The only justification given for this item is that building costs have gone up 5.72 percent within the past 12 months. However, the increase in the request for appropriations is 21.7 percent.

Without going into this subject further at this time, or making an extended argument, I announce that I shall certainly look into the question further, and I expect to oppose the proposal. I strongly favor the construction of ornamental buildings on Constitution Avenue, Capitol Hill, or other similar areas of the Federal Government. Such structures should not be built primarily with the idea of trying to save a dollar, because when we ornament the Hill, it is an ornament to the entire Nation.

However, the proposed construction is away from the Hill, away from the immediate seat of government. I consider the proposed expenditure to be lavish. I think it illustrates the point that at some time the Congress must call a halt on lavish expenditures for public buildings. Otherwise we may make ourselves the laughing stock of those who know the facts.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I know what the Senator from Mississippi is talking about. The construction of every building of this type must be approved by the Committee on Public Works.

I have found, through representations which have been made before the Committee on Public Works, that every agency of the Federal Government located within the District of Columbia has the bright idea that Congress will approve the selection of an area which suits the esthetic ideas of the personnel of the particular agency.

The CIA is not the only agency involved. There is before the Committee on Public Works for approval a great scheme of the Geological Survey. Notwithstanding the fact that there is plenty of Federal property within the District that is vacant, the Geological Survey wants to go elsewhere, not for the purpose of more efficiency, but to suit the ideas of the personnel within the agency.

I think every Member who is listening to me now is familiar with the area of the Bureau of Standards, on Connecticut Avenue. There is no better location in the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, the Bureau wants to give it up and move to a new location, where it can have more lawns, more of this, and more of that.

The Committee on Public Works is asking all the agencies to furnish it with a list of the vacant property which they

now have in the District of Columbia. I know it is the feeling of the Congress, and, I think, it is the desire of the people of the United States that all the temporary buildings on the Mall, on Constitution Avenue, and elsewhere, should be eliminated. Would the Congress be justified in buying property for the Geological Survey or for the Bureau of Standards or for the CIA so long as it has property which it already owns? I do not think the Congress would be justified in spending millions of dollars for new real estate.

Let me give the Senate another example. The property across from the White House, at 17th Street, is occupied, I believe, by the Court of Claims. Do the Senators know who owns that property? It, and also the parking lot next to it, is owned by Uncle Sam. Someone is making money by having a parking lot there. Apparently all the members of the court wish to have a building in the country, with the exception of Judge Marvin Jones. Would we be justified in abandoning that property? For what would it be used? If we should abandon it we would have to justify before our constituents and the American people why we did that and then appropriate millions of dollars to buy land on the outskirts of the District of Columbia.

The District of Columbia is not represented in the Senate or in the House of Representatives. The responsibility for the welfare of the District of Columbia is in the Congress of the United States. Do we not have a responsibility, even from an economic standpoint, to consider these things before we take hasty action?

So far as I am concerned, Mr. President, before the CIA and other Government agencies receive any more money from the Committee on Public Works they will have to make a better showing than they have made up to this moment.

#### EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business, to take action on the nomination on the Executive Calendar.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

#### EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. GEORGE, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Frederick Blake Payne, of New York, to be Director, Office of Economic Affairs, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations.

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

William B. Herlands, of New York, to be United States district judge for the southern district of New York.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further reports of committees the nomination on the Executive Calendar will be stated.

## SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

The legislative clerk read the nomination of James Cunningham Sargent, of New York, to be a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask that the President be notified of the confirmation of the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be notified.

## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

## LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I should like to make a brief statement. I expect to be absent from the Senate the latter part of this week and during next week. It is hoped by the leadership that the Senate will be able to conclude action on the defense appropriation bill today and proceed to the consideration of the mutual security authorization bill. We shall, of course, consider any conference reports which may be available, and it may be that some conference reports will need to be considered tomorrow.

At the conclusion of the consideration of the mutual aid authorization bill it is planned to consider the debt limit bill, the old age and survivors insurance bill, and the military public works bill. Of course it is necessary to pass the mutual aid authorization bill before the mutual aid appropriation bill is considered. We shall also consider the Frying Pan project bill and the Hells Canyon project bill, together with any conference reports on appropriation bills which may be available from time to time.

We also expect to schedule for consideration Calendar 2313, S. 3903, the Trade Development Assistance Act.

I make this announcement, Mr. President, so that Members of the Senate may know of the possibility of various bills I have listed being considered this week or next week.

The Democratic policy committee will have a meeting on Wednesday of this week and will attempt to clear other bills which have been reported to the Senate and are on the calendar. As soon as the policy committee has taken action I shall inform the Senate of its decision.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas subsequently said: Mr. President, I should like to add to the list of bills which I previously enumerated Calendar No. 2315, H. R. 10766, to authorize the payment of compensation for certain losses and damages caused by United States Armed Forces during World War II.

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1957

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 10986) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, and for other purposes.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, I should like to have the attention of the majority leader and the minority leader while I make a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendments be agreed to en bloc, with the exception of three which are, respectively, on page 23, line 17; page 26, line 4, and page 29, lines 14 to 19, inclusive, that the bill as thus amended be considered as the original text for the purpose of further amendment, and that any point of order against the committee amendments be reserved.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent request?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, the request is not an unusual one, but for the exceptions incorporated in it. I presume that there may be some advantage in this type of procedure. I cannot conceive of any Senator changing his views because of a procedural matter. Therefore, to preserve harmony, and in order that we may expedite consideration of the bill, I shall not object to the request, provided the same request, based on individual amendments, is made without exception to all appropriation bills.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request? The Chair hears none, and the agreement is entered.

The amendments of the Committee on Appropriations agreed to en bloc are as follows:

Under the heading "Title III—Department of the Army—Maintenance and Operations," on page 8, line 5, after the word "Government", to strike out "\$2,954,581,000" and insert "\$2,967,057,000."

Under the subhead "Military Construction, Army Reserve Forces," on page 8, at the beginning of line 22, to strike out "\$40,000,000" and insert "\$60,000,000."

Under the subhead "Army National Guard," on page 10, line 10, after the word "aircraft", to strike out "\$306,000,000" and insert "\$321,492,000."

Under the subhead "National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army," on page 11, line 5, after the word "Board", to strike out "\$297,000" and insert "\$534,000."

On page 11, after line 17, to strike out:

"REDUCTION IN APPROPRIATION

"Army industrial fund

"The amount available in the Army Industrial Fund is hereby reduced by \$110,000,000, such sum to be covered into the Treasury immediately upon approval of this act."

Under the heading "Title IV—Department of the Navy—Servicewide Operations," on page 22, line 6, after the word "salaries", to strike out "\$102,472,000" and insert "\$102,435,000."

Under the subhead "Naval Petroleum Reserves," on page 22, line 10, after the word

"law", to strike out "\$683,000" and insert "\$1,183,000."

Under the subhead "Reductions in Appropriations," on page 22, line 24, after the word "Fund", to strike out "\$52,000,000" and insert "\$12,000,000."

Under the subhead "Procurement Other Than Aircraft," on page 23, at the beginning of line 24, to strike out "\$1,100,000,000" and insert "\$1,177,000,000."

Under the subhead "Research and Development," on page 24, line 5, after the word "law", to strike out "\$610,000,000" and insert "\$710,000,000."

Under the subhead "Military Personnel," on page 27, line 18, after the word "enlistment", to strike out "\$3,718,440,000" and insert "\$3,745,440,000, of which not to exceed \$57,853,000 may be transferred to the appropriation, 'Military personnel, 1956'."

Under the heading "Title VI—General Provisions," on page 37, line 17, after the word "than", to strike out "\$31,000,000" and insert "\$53,500,000."

On page 47, after line 16, to insert a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 634. During the fiscal year 1957 there is hereby authorized to be transferred to the Air Force Industrial Fund not to exceed \$40 million from the Navy Industrial Fund and not to exceed \$110 million from the Army Industrial Fund."

On page 47, after line 21, to insert a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 635. Appropriations available to the Department of Defense for major procurement of aircraft and missiles shall be available for expenses of development."

On page 48, line 1, to change the section number from "634" to "636."

## REFUGEES, ESCAPEES, AND EXPELLEES

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I send to the desk a statement and ask that the clerk may read it. My eyes are not in shape to read the statement myself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will read the statement of the Senator from North Dakota.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, as chairman of the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate problems connected with the emigration of refugees, escapees, and expellees, I want to call the attention of the Members of this body to the statement released to the press on June 12, 1956, by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the subject of refugees, and at this point in my remarks I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Dulles' statement printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

### REALLOCATION OF VISA ALLOTMENTS IN REFUGEE RELIEF ACT

I wish to call to your attention an action which the refugee relief program was required to take last week, and which points up in a forceful but unfortunate way the merit of the President's repeated requests that there be a reallocation of visa allotments contained in the Refugee Relief Act.

We were compelled to announce that, effective midnight last night, no more applications for visas could be accepted for Iron Curtain escapees residing in the NATO countries of continental Europe, plus Sweden, Turkey, and Iran—but not including Germany and Austria. Ten thousand visas were authorized for this group of escapees. About 6,000 have been issued. We now have in



process over 10,000 escapee applicants for the remaining 4,000 visas. At the same time, we have thousands more visas authorized for Iron Curtain escapees residing in Germany and Austria than we have escapee applicants in those two countries.

One of the President's proposals was to reallocate visas from places where they are not needed to places where they are needed. Over a month ago, I also testified before a Senate subcommittee urging congressional action to amend the Refugee Relief Act. The present situation confirms that need.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I remind the Senate that the enactment of some refugee relief legislation was one of the very first things President Eisenhower asked the Congress to do and his interest in and very grave concern over this matter is a continuing one even to this day, as there is no doubt in my mind that Mr. Dulles, in his June 12 statement, was merely expressing the President's views.

It is common knowledge that the President of the United States, in asking Congress to pass some refugee relief bill, had several very good reasons and that his first and foremost reason was a humanitarian one. Also that he believed it would strengthen our foreign policy, and increase our prestige abroad. It would be irrefutable evidence to the other countries of the free world that the United States was willing to shoulder her fair share of this burden and it was hoped that it would serve as an example to the other countries to do likewise, that they too, would open their doors to certain numbers of these unfortunate, homeless people.

However, the legislation which was finally passed, Public Law 203, 83d Congress, approved by the President on August 7, 1953, must have been a great disappointment to him, as when humanitarian legislation is enacted there should not be incorporated therein all the obstacles the human mind is capable of devising to defeat the very benefits granted by such legislation. In other words, Mr. President, something is not given with one hand and immediately taken away with the other. But that is exactly what was done by Public Law 203. I was chairman of the Judiciary Committee at that time, and I assure the Senate that we could not get a more liberal bill reported favorably. Many times we were in executive session at midnight in an effort to report any sort of refugee bill.

So, Mr. President, we start with the premise that Public Law 203 is a very difficult piece of refugee legislation, which under its provisions, the Department of State is charged with administering. The Department of State, in turn, had its problems, not the least of which was having to start from scratch. The American consular offices overseas were entirely unable to cope with the handling of large numbers of visa applications. The Department had to employ and train new personnel, engage office space in the various capitols of the world, and at the same time struggle to keep its budget within reasonable limits.

It is now admitted by everybody working with this act, the Department of State officials included, that the refugee relief program was at least a year and a half late in getting under way and it is

my considered opinion that such delay was due to inexperience and perhaps in some instances, bad judgment, but I have found no evidence to support the charge that such delay was deliberate or intentional. So much for the background. Now let us see what has transpired since the operation of the act has at long last gotten going.

Among other things, Public Law 203 provides that visas may be issued to 209,000 immigrants who meet the very strict definition of "refugee," "escapee," and "expellee." Also they must meet other rigid requirements. The cut-off date of the act is December 31, 1956.

Mr. President, the Department of State publishes weekly statistical reports, showing the number of visas issued as of a given date. Early in 1955, it became apparent that little more than half the 209,000 visas would be issued before the expiration date, although many times this number of refugees, escapees, and expellees had been sitting in camps for more than 5 years and were registered with American consuls all over the world.

President Eisenhower took cognizance of this situation, and on May 27, 1955, sent a message to Congress setting forth a number of ways in which he believed the act should be liberalized, if it was to accomplish the purpose for which it was intended. Thereupon, a number of bills were introduced in the Senate embodying the suggested changes. The subcommittee went into action, hearings were held, and reports written, but up to the present time we have not been successful in having any of these bills reported favorably by the subcommittee. Again, it is not due to the lack of effort.

President Eisenhower considered the refugee problem of sufficient importance to mention it again in his state of the Union message to Congress in January of this year. What more could any President do?

Mr. President, I want to dwell for a minute on the incongruous position of the United States Government as concerns the escapees, if this act is actually allowed to expire as scheduled on December 31, 1956. The Government is spending millions of dollars through such instrumentalities as Radio Free Europe, United States Information Agency, which includes Voice of America, United States escapee program—which provides interim aid—and many, many others. All these expenditures have but one objective, namely, to persuade, entice, induce, cajole, and lure the Communist slaves to throw off their shackles and escape from behind the Iron Curtain countries. We tell them, through every medium of communication at our disposal, to risk everything, even their lives, if necessary, to escape, come to the free West, see how people there live, and make new lives for themselves, with unlimited opportunities, and that we will help them.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, as I understood, the Senate was operating under the 2-minute rule with respect to the limitation of speeches during the morning hour. The distinguished Senator

from North Dakota asked unanimous consent to place certain matters in the RECORD, but he did not ask unanimous consent to have the clerk read for 20 minutes.

I make the point of order that since the Senate is operating in the morning hour, with a limitation of 2 minutes on speeches, the limitation would apply as much to the clerk who is reading the Senator's statement as it would to the Senator himself. Therefore, since the Senator from North Dakota did not ask unanimous consent that his statement be read for 15 or 20 minutes, I object to the continuation of the reading of the statement.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Virginia is quite correct. I did not know that the Senate was operating under the 2-minute rule and that the time granted to me under the rule had expired.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair announced before the statement of the Senator from North Dakota was read that the Senate was operating under the 2-minute rule, but no objection was raised at that time to the reading of the Senator's statement.

What is the pleasure of the Senate? Does the Senator from Virginia object to the continuation of the reading of the statement of the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I withdraw my objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will continue to read.

The legislative clerk resumed the reading of Mr. LANGER's statement, as follows:

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, let us assume that these people succumb to our enticements and risk everything to escape to the free West. Then what are we to do with them? Certainly we cannot give them a visa because the Refugee Relief Act has expired and in almost all cases the country of their origin has a heavily oversubscribed quota—some countries are oversubscribed for the next 10 years. So the only alternative is for them to continue to live in refugee camps and if you have ever seen such a camp, then you know it is not a very desirable abode, but there is something else they can do and that is defect—go back behind the Iron Curtain and tell the Communists how they were received and deceived by the so-called free West. So far, only a small number have defected, those who became discouraged and disillusioned by the long delay and endless redtape in trying to get a visa. The Communists, you know, are not asleep. They are continually trying to induce the escapees to return, promising them a full pardon for having escaped, houses and jobs. If these escapees, beginning to realize the futility of spending more years in a camp, returned by the thousands as they are sure to do, then the United States from a propaganda standpoint, will most certainly be discredited—in fact, we will be a great deal worse off than we were before we initiated this program—we will have miserably failed.

Now our promise to take a certain number of these refugees did set an

example to other countries of the world, just as the President of the United States hoped it would. These countries opened their doors to large numbers of refugees, many more than the United States and are to this day continuing to admit them. Many hundreds of thousands of refugees have gone to Australia, Canada, and almost all of the South American countries. This was in reliance on the promise of the United States to do likewise and now we are about to default—to break our promise. What must other countries think of us?

Mr. President, if this act is not extended and we continue to invite these people to escape, through all the mediums of communication available to us, we are guilty of misleading them—badly misleading them—of knowingly encouraging them to exchange bad conditions for worse conditions, and I want to go on record as protesting against this unfairness—this cruelty. Then when thousands of these human beings understandably become disgusted and defect—what a blow this will be to our foreign policy.

And now, Mr. President, let us consider briefly the orphan phase of this program. Under Public Law 203, 4,000 orphan visas may be issued on a worldwide basis, and at one time, it appeared that perhaps all of these visas would not be used. However, I have recently been told that the entire 4,000 orphan visas will be exhausted before December 31 of this year and that the American people are simply clamoring for more orphans to adopt. In my State of North Dakota, approximately 150 applications for orphans have been filed, and at last report only 2 have actually come in to North Dakota.

Mr. President, certainly from the standpoint of their youth, flexibility and lack of ties to any other cultures, these little children will make most desirable citizens. Nobody could object to them on the ground of being a security risk, nobody could raise the objection that they are displacing some American workman from his house or his job. So why are we so reluctant to increase this number?

In view of the anguish being experienced by many United States citizens who want to adopt children and find them in such short supply over here, we would be doing a good thing for our own people and for the orphans if we increased this 4,000 to 10,000 or even more. As a member of the subcommittee on juvenile delinquency, we found by holding hearings, that some of our reputable citizens go into the black market and actually spend thousands of dollars to buy a child. Of course, this is a most reprehensible practice and one not to be condoned, but it just shows to what lengths people will go when they want to adopt a child.

Public Law 203, expires in less than 6 months for all practical purposes, although the cut-off date is technically December 31, 1956. I am told by Department of State officials that any application received after July of this year, or the very latest August of this year, will have little or no chance of being acted upon because, on an average, it

takes 5 months to process an application. Now according to the statistical report from the Department of State dated June 1, 1956, it is shown that as of that date only 112,938 visas have been issued. This means that 96,062 visas remain to be issued during the next 6 months and I submit, Mr. President, that this is a physical impossibility. It is estimated that between 35 to 40 thousand visas will be unused—that is—lost to these unfortunate homeless people.

Mr. President, to me this would be nothing less than a tragedy and it need not happen. There are several bills pending in my subcommittee which would save the situation. As I see it, the immediate need is to pass legislation to extend the life of the act and for the reallocation of these unused visas. I recently introduced a bill, S. 3876, which would accomplish both of these objectives. Hearings have been concluded on this bill and a confidential subcommittee report written and I might also add, that this bill has the unqualified endorsement of the Department of State. It only remains to have it reported favorably by the subcommittee, and I sincerely hope we will do this in time.

#### PENSION PAYMENTS TO CERTAIN VETERANS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I send to the desk another statement which I ask unanimous consent to have read, because of my own inability at present to read it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The statement will be read.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, in January of this year, I introduced a bill, S. 2978, which if enacted, would increase the income limitations governing the payment of pension to certain veterans and their dependents. This bill, was in due course, properly referred to the Senate Committee on Finance and the committee, as a routine matter, requested a report from the Veterans' Administration. This report has now been received and a copy forwarded to me and at this point in my remarks I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Honorable WILLIAM LANGER,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR LANGER: I am enclosing for your information a copy of a report received from the Veterans' Administration relative to your bill S. 2978, "To increase the annual income limitations governing the payment of pension to certain veterans and their dependents."

Respectfully,

ELIZABETH B. SPRINGER,  
Chief Clerk.

JUNE 8, 1956.

HON. HARRY F. BYRD,  
Chairman, Committee on Finance,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR BYRD: Further reference is made to your letter requesting a report by the Veterans' Administration relative to S. 2978, 84th Congress, "A bill to increase

the annual income limitations governing the payment of pension to certain veterans and their dependents."

The bill proposes to increase existing income limitations governing the payment of pension for non-service-connected disability to certain veterans and of pension for non-service-connected death to certain widows and children.

Under existing law (pt. III, Veterans Regulation No. 1 (a), as amended), veterans of World War I, World War II, or the Korean conflict period are eligible, subject to specified requirements, to pension for permanent total non-service-connected disability. The pension rates are \$66.15 per month, or \$78.75 if the veteran has received the basic rate for a continuous period of 10 years or reaches the age of 65. A rate of \$135.45 per month is authorized in the case of an otherwise eligible veteran who is, on account of age or physical or mental disability, helpless or blind or so nearly helpless or blind as to need or require the regular aid or attendance of another person. Payment cannot be made if the veteran's annual income exceeds \$1,400 if he is unmarried, or \$2,700 if married or with minor children. Section 1 of S. 2978 would raise the \$1,400 income limitation to \$3,000 and the existing \$2,700 limitation to \$4,000.

In connection with this proposal, your committee will undoubtedly desire to consider the basic purpose of this disability pension. It was intended primarily to afford a modest allowance to seriously disabled veterans who are in limited financial circumstances but whose condition is not the outgrowth of their war service. It was not intended to provide full support. The veteran who receives \$66.15 monthly pension (\$793.80 yearly), if subject to the \$1,400 income limitation, may receive an aggregate yearly income (including pension) of \$2,193.80. The aggregate of \$2,193.80 would be increased to \$3,793.80 if S. 2978 is enacted into law. If he is subject to the \$2,700 limitation, he currently can receive as much as \$3,493.80 annually. The aggregate of \$3,493.80 would be increased to \$4,793.80 if the bill is enacted. If paid the higher rates of \$78.75 or \$135.45 per month, the veteran's potential aggregate income would be proportionately greater.

Section 2 of the bill is concerned with the annual income limitations which qualify eligibility of widows and children of deceased veterans of World War I, World War II, or the Korean conflict period, for non-service-connected death pension provided by the act of June 28, 1934 (48 Stat. 1281), as amended and extended. The current monthly death pension rates are widow with no child, \$50.40; widow with 1 child, \$63; with \$7.56 for each additional child; no widow but 1 child, \$27.30; no widow but 2 children, \$40.95, equally divided; no widow but 3 children, \$54.60, equally divided; with \$7.56 for each additional child, total equally divided. Section 2 of S. 2978 would raise the annual income limitations governing the payment of this pension from \$1,400 to \$3,000 in the case of a widow without children or in the case of a child, and from \$2,700 to \$4,000 in the case of a widow with a child or children.

As in the case of disability pension, it has been the consistent policy of the Congress to restrict the benefits of the act of June 28, 1934, as amended, to widows and children in limited financial circumstances, the theory of the legislation being to provide some measure of support to those primary dependents who survive the veteran and who are in need. Under the present law, an eligible widow with no child receives \$50.40 monthly pension or \$604.80 annually, which when combined with the permissible \$1,400 income would aggregate \$2,004.80 annually. The aggregate of \$2,004.80 would be increased to \$3,604.80 if S. 2978 is enacted into law. A widow with 1 child receives \$63 monthly pension or \$756 annually, which when combined



with the permissible \$2,700 income would aggregate \$3,456 annually. The aggregate of \$3,456 would be increased to \$4,756 in the event S. 2978 is enacted. In other cases the possible income would vary according to the rate of pension and income limitation applicable thereto.

Section 3 of S. 2978 states that the bill shall take effect on the first day of the second calendar month following its enactment. It provides that no pension shall be paid to any person whose eligibility for pension is established solely by virtue of the bill for any period prior to the effective date thereof. It is assumed in this connection that it is intended that the bill apply to pending and future applications for benefits and would not require an administrative review, without application, of cases previously disallowed.

When the disability pension with which this bill is concerned was established by law (Veterans Regulation No. 1, March 31, 1933), income limitations were provided of \$1,000 applicable to an unmarried veteran, and \$2,500 to a married veteran or a veteran with a minor child or children. The act of June 28, 1934, which created the death pension benefit under consideration, provided that it would not be applicable to any person during any year following a year for which such person was not entitled to exemption from the payment of a Federal income tax. By the act of July 19, 1939 (53 Stat. 1068), that limitation was replaced by the income limitations of \$1,000 in the case of a widow without child, or a child, and \$2,500 in the case of a widow with a child or children. The mentioned \$1,000 and \$2,500 limitations applicable to both disability and death pension were increased to \$1,400 and \$2,700 by sections 1 and 2, respectively, of the act of May 23, 1952 (66 Stat. 91). For the information of the committee, it is noted that for the purposes of the foregoing limitations, annual income is determined in accordance with Veterans' Administration Regulation 1228, a copy of which was furnished your committee with the Veterans' Administration's report on S. 1213, 84th Congress, under date of October 5, 1955.

It appears from the legislative history of the bill (H. R. 4387, 82d Cong.), which became the act of May 23, 1952, supra, that the increases granted in the income limitations at that time were predicated on the increased cost of living. In this connection, it is noted that the Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, for May 1952, was 113 points and for April 1956, 114.9 points (1947-49=100 points), an increase of roughly 1½ percent.

With respect to the following estimates of cost of the bill, if enacted, the latest available income data and marital status data published by the Bureau of the Census have been utilized. In estimating the cost of the bills, it has been assumed that the income level of veterans and dependents of deceased veterans is the same as that for the general population of comparable age and sex and that there will be no significant change in income levels from that indicated by the latest available data.

Subject to the foregoing assumptions, it is estimated that S. 2978, if enacted, would affect approximately 378,800 cases during the first year at an additional cost for that year of approximately \$309,262,000. Of these, it is estimated that section 1 of the bill would affect 334,000 veterans' cases at a cost of \$284,119,000, and section 2 would affect 44,800 deceased veterans' cases at a cost of \$25,143,000. In accordance with paragraph 7, Bureau of the Budget Circular A-19, dated June 14, 1954, it is estimated that the annual cost of S. 2978 will increase by approximately 16 to 19 percent each year, over the preceding year in the 4 succeeding years. In view of

the intangible factors involved, the foregoing estimate may not be considered as firm, but as the best practicable estimate of the cost of the bill.

In view of the fact that the income limitations were liberalized in 1952, and the cost of living has increased less than 2 percent since that time, I do not believe that the bill merits favorable consideration.

Advice was received from the Bureau of the Budget with respect to a similar report on a similar bill (H. R. 644, 84th Cong.) to the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, that there would be no objection by that Office to the submission of the report to the committee, and that for the reasons set forth in the report the Bureau recommends against favorable consideration of the bill.

Sincerely yours,

H. V. HIGLEY,  
Administrator.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, while I am not surprised that the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, to use his own words, "does not believe that the bill merits favorable consideration," I am surprised at the circuitous reasoning route he took to reach this profound conclusion. The Administrator opposes the increase in income limitations on the basis that since Congress gave an increase in incomes in 1952, and since the cost of living has increased very little since 1952 to 1956, less than 2 percent, to be exact, that further liberalization of income limitations would not be justified.

Why 1952, why not go back to 1933? My reply to that assertion is this—if Congress was guilty of an injustice in 1952, which we were, must we perpetuate it to the end of time? My contention is that when these income limitations were raised in 1952, such increases were not realistic then and today they are absurd.

Mr. President, in case someone may be wondering what is this "income limitation" which I consider so all-important, I want to explain briefly what is meant by these terms and how it works to the disadvantage of veterans. Under certain existing laws pertaining to veterans who have been rated nonservice-connected, there is a provision that, although such a veteran may be otherwise eligible to receive a pension, he may have the required service, he may have an honorable discharge, together with all the other elements of entitlement, yet if his annual income exceeds a certain amount, he may not be awarded a pension. This stipulation is written in the law, and it cannot be bypassed. The same holds true for dependents of such veterans, and believe me, Mr. President, this "annual income" takes in just about everything.

Mr. President, the basis for the present income limitation on World War I veterans dates back to 1933. At that time, during the depression, Congress imposed, by Public Law 2—March 20, 1933—an income limitation of \$1,000 for veterans without dependents and \$2,500 for veterans with dependents. This was increased by Public Law 356—May 23, 1952—to \$1,400 and \$2,700, respectively. In other words, in the last 23 years we have raised this income limitations exactly \$400 for single veterans and \$200 for veterans with dependents. This is also true for veterans' dependents. And

now let us see how the cost of living has gone up since 1933:

Changes in selected consumer food prices, 1933-56

Item	Unit	1933	February 1956	Percentage increase
Butter	1 pound	27.8	70.8	154.7
Cheese, American	do.	23.9	57.0	138.5
Eggs, fresh	1 dozen	28.8	59.2	105.6
Milk, fresh	1 quart	10.4	22.2	113.5
Flour, wheat	5 pounds	19.5	53.0	171.8
Bread	1 pound	7.1	17.6	147.9
Potatoes	10 pounds	23.0	54.8	138.3
Coffee	1 pound	26.4	96.2	264.4
Chuck roast	do.	16.0	45.0	181.3

The foods I have mentioned—and they are the very cheapest grades—are necessary staples which every family must buy and consume if they are to maintain any standard of health. I am not arguing for this increase in income limitations so veterans can buy filet mignon, champagne, and caviar, but only that they may be able to buy the barest necessities.

Mr. President, what would S. 2978 do that would be so ruinous to the country and would clean out the Treasury? It would raise the income limitation in the case of single veterans from the present \$1,400 to \$3,000, and for veterans with dependents from the present \$2,700 to \$4,000. The same would apply to dependents of veterans. This bill is based on the belief that the old income limitation is outmoded and unrealistic in terms of present living costs and concepts of a minimum decent standard of living of the American people. I am very sure that Congress never intended that the veterans' standard of living should be lower than that of the nonveteran. If the argument of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs holds water, that the income limitation upon veterans' pensions should vary directly with the cost of living, then the amounts mentioned in my bill, S. 2978, are too low. They should be at least \$3,100 and \$5,000 respectively. How did the Administrator arrive at the conclusion that S. 2978 "does not merit favorable consideration"?

The figures I have just quoted concerning the cost of foodstuffs are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and prove, beyond any doubt, that the cost of living from 1933 to 1956 increased 107.8 percent. The income limitation has practically stood still. These figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics must have been available to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, just as they were available to me; and from where I sit, Mr. President, I am not able to say with certainty whether he chose to ignore them or whether not taking them into account was an oversight.

#### SECURITY CHECKING OF OFFICE OF SENATOR LEHMAN

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, on last Thursday, June 21, the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] discussed on the floor a matter

concerning the security checking of a part of his office space by representatives of the Department of Defense.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the sworn testimony of the two Department of Defense representatives and the Capitol policeman involved, which was given before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### LEHMAN MATTER

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE AIR FORCE  
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, D. C., June 21, 1956.

The subcommittee (consisting of Senators SYMINGTON, JACKSON, ERVIN, SALTONSTALL, and DUFF) met, pursuant to call, at 11:10 a. m., in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator STUART SYMINGTON (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators SYMINGTON (presiding) SALTONSTALL, and DUFF.

Also present: Mr. Fowler Hamilton, counsel; Ramsay D. Potts, associate counsel; Fred B. Rhodes, legal consultant to Senator SALTONSTALL; Edward C. Welsh, assistant to Senator SYMINGTON; and Wallace L. Engle, staff member.

Mansfield T. Sprague, general counsel, Department of Defense.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will take up a matter that has come up as the result of an article in the press this morning.

Will a member of the staff find the policeman, the one who was involved in this?

This article, at this point, I submit for the record.

(The article above referred to in its entirety is as follows:)

"[From the New York Times, of June 21, 1956]

#### "AGENTS HUNT A 'TAP' IN LEHMAN'S OFFICE

"WASHINGTON, June 20.—Two men with badges walked into Senator HERBERT H. LEHMAN's office today and scrutinized his refrigerator closet.

"Security being what it is, no one can be certain what they were looking for, but circumstantial evidence suggests they suspected a 'bug,' an electrical or electronic device used for long-range eavesdropping.

"The Senator's closet is adjacent to a Senate hearing room where hypersecret Defense Department information is being submitted to an Armed Services Subcommittee investigating the Nation's aerial preparedness for war.

"The subcommittee revealed yesterday that security police were guarding the air around the room against potential devices for eavesdropping.

"The agents' job, according to the subcommittee, is to insure that 'no remotely controlled clandestine, transmitters are put into operation during a conference.'

"Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat of Missouri, who conducts the hearings, said that though the check was merely a routine precautionary measure, a similar procedure had never been used before in Senate hearings.

"The Defense Department refused today to describe its techniques for fighting any long-range snooper. 'Radio monitoring' and 'visual inspection' are vaguely alluded to, but more precise information is secret.

#### "Secretary is startled

"The guessing Senator LEHMAN's office today was that it had been subjected to the 'visual inspection' technique. Mrs. Mildred Akins, one of the New York Democrat's secretaries, said she was startled to notice a Capitol policeman and two men in civilian

clothes prowling resolutely through private quarters of the office.

"I said, 'Nobody comes in our office unless I see a badge or something,'" she reported. The policeman, she said, muttered something about 'security' and 'a hearing next door.' The other two men flashed badges.

"Thereupon, she said, they sought out the closet where the staff keeps a small refrigerator and scanned it professionally. They left without further explanation.

"Normally congressional hearing rooms are checked for eavesdropping devices before sessions in which secret information is to be divulged. The continuous check with radio monitoring devices, however, is thought to be an innovation. It is operated by the security office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

"Mrs. Akins said that the two men who checked Senator LEHMAN's office today seemed satisfied that nothing sinister was secreted there and left after simply looking.

#### "Security 'nightmares'

"The Capitol Office Building, however, ranks among the worst security nightmares of Washington for the Defense Department. There is no restraint or check on the public. Crackpots appear in high percentage to plead all manner of causes and the corridors are usually thronged with mobs of tourists.

"The police force, which in theory guards it, is a special group recruited from men seeking minor political patronage and bears little resemblance to any other police force in the Nation. It is utterly political and has no connection with the professional Washington City force.

"In hearings last year, a private detective specializing in wiretapping told a House committee that new eavesdropping devices being developed would enable a snooper to stand outside a building and 'bug' any hearing room.

"This, he testified, could be done electronically.

"The Defense Department's reference to 'radio monitoring' as an 'antibug' device presumably means that the Department is now equipped to detect such snoopers."

Senator SYMINGTON. Is Mr. Morgan here?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you the headman of these two?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear the information you give this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. MORGAN. I do, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is this all about?

#### TESTIMONY OF CLARKE A. MORGAN, OSD SECURITY

Mr. MORGAN. It is very little, sir. Yesterday I noticed a ventilator which had insulation torn aside in it, and I wanted to see what was on the other side of it, and therefore, I asked the policeman—I thought it led to the ladies latrine, which is right next door, but it wasn't. It was behind in the next office, a little long room, and I asked the policeman if he would go along with me, and I went in and looked at it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the ventilation not connected with the ladies room?

Mr. MORGAN. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you go into the ladies room first?

Mr. MORGAN. First I checked there and then around in the next office.

Senator SYMINGTON. And then what did you do?

Mr. MORGAN. I just walked out. I saw what it was, that it had been torn aside, so I went around on the other side, I saw no listening devices, went and plugged up the hole from our side.

Senator SYMINGTON. And is that all that happened?

Mr. MORGAN. That's all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is the other man who was with you? Will you give your full name?

Mr. MORGAN. Clarke A. Morgan.

Senator SYMINGTON. And to whom do you report?

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Gould, of Security Division of OSD.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is his full name?

Mr. MORGAN. George J. Gould.

Senator SYMINGTON. Raise your right hand please. What is your name?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Bernard Bogdanowicz.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you solemnly swear all the information you give this subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were you on this joint journey yesterday, too?

#### TESTIMONY OF BERNARD S. BOGDANOWICZ, OSD SECURITY

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And will you tell what happened?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Mr. Morgan noted that the ventilator had insulation which was visibly disturbed, so he checked the adjacent ladies room, after it was noted that it was empty. The police guard knocked on the door and checked to make certain. Then we went—

Senator SYMINGTON. What did you do?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. After a police guard checked the adjacent ladies' room to make certain there was nobody in it, we went to see if the ventilator was from the ladies' room. It wasn't. It was in an adjacent office which belonged to Senator LEHMAN, so we asked the guard for assistance.

He asked the secretary if it were permissible for us to go back there, and she seemed perfectly willing. She went to check to see if there was anything that we shouldn't see. She came back and assisted us—

Senator SYMINGTON. Say that again, will you?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. It's in a room adjacent to room 457 where our hearings are. It happens to be Senator LEHMAN's suite of offices.

We sought the assistance of a police guard. He went in and asked the secretary if we could go look at the room. She said "yes," and she checked to see if there was anybody in the room.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that all she did?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Right. She went to the room, she checked to see if there was anybody there. She came back out and walked into the room with us. We looked at the ventilator and we walked back out.

Senator SYMINGTON. And that's all there is to it?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you all report to whom?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Mr. George J. Gould, Security Services Division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who told you to come to the committee?

Mr. MORGAN. That was done through, I believe, legislative liaison to Mr. Gould, who told us personally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Sprague, did you know anything about this?

Mr. SPRAGUE. No, sir.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Taylor of legislation liaison sometimes calls me, but usually it comes through Mr. Gould.

Senator SYMINGTON. Over in the Pentagon?

Mr. MORGAN. That's right.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did they tell you to do when you came over here?



Mr. MORGAN. Security coverage of the hearing.

Senator SYMINGTON. And our testimony is that as soon as you went in the office, the woman was glad to have you look the office over?

Mr. MORGAN. She did not seem to have any trouble. She walked back. She made some comment about she had a crackpot in there at one time, and she was leery about letting people in, so I showed her my badge and went in. She made no comment at all.

That was after we were in there that she said she was leery of people coming in, so I showed her my badge, and she seemed very contented.

Senator SYMINGTON. The policeman's story and your story don't jibe the way he gave it to me this morning. We are trying to find him. Do you know where he is?

Mr. ENGLE. No, sir; I don't. He has been sent for.

Senator SYMINGTON. He said the woman ran in the back and shut the door.

Mr. MORGAN. Within this office, the office that you walk into from the hall, there was a little partition, glass-paneled partition to another office back of that. Now, how long that office is, I don't remember whether it runs to the left or not. Anyway, there was another door to this little long room, the one that we were interested in.

Senator SYMINGTON. What happened when you first went in the office? What did you say? Who went in first?

Mr. MORGAN. I believe the policeman went in first.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you go in with him when he went in first?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. We went to the outer office, sir, and he inquired, or asked the stenographer, if we could go back in and check a ventilator.

Senator SYMINGTON. And what did she say?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. She said she would go to the room and check and see if anybody was there, and she came out and escorted us into the room, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was all the conversation there was?

Mr. BOGDANOWICZ. Except the fact she mentioned having had an individual in there which at one time she didn't want, something like that. That was all, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you find the officer?

Mr. POTTS. I have him out here, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you bring him in? Will you come up here, please, and sit next to this gentleman. Will you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?

Do you solemnly swear the information you give this subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Officer ENCINAS. I do, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is your full name?

#### TESTIMONY OF OFFICER GILBERT J. ENCINAS

Officer ENCINAS. My name is Gilbert J.—last name is E-n-c-i-n-a-s.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you tell us what happened yesterday?

Officer ENCINAS. I was standing in room 457. I was assigned to take care of that committee there, and the two security officers came to me and asked me if I knew where that vent led. I didn't know where it led. I thought it might lead from the ladies' lounge.

I went to Senator LEHMAN's office. I stopped at the desk. I asked the girl if she would do me a favor. The girl said, "I would do it for you if it did not mean leaving the room."

I said, "No. What it is, I have to go into the ladies lounge, and I'd like somebody to go in there and check if anybody is in there."

She said she could not leave the room, so I left. I knocked on the door and I yelled a couple of times. There was nobody in there, so we walked in there and there were no

vent in there. Then I suggested that it probably went into Senator LEHMAN's office. I wasn't sure. So I went in there, into Senator LEHMAN's office. I stood at the desk.

The two gentlemen, the two security officers were right by me. I asked the girl if it was possible for us to check that vent in the back room. She jumped up. She went to shut the door on us, and I explained to her again—

Senator SYMINGTON. I think when I saw you this morning you said "slammed the door on you."

Officer ENCINAS. Yes, sir, she slammed the door and she said, "Nobody comes in here." And I explained again to her that these were security officers. The man had identification. She asked the man for identification and he pulled out his billfold, and then she let him in. They went into the back room and she had a conversation with this gentleman right here that I think—I couldn't hear very well—I think she said about 2 weeks ago somebody tried to come into the files. She let him in and talked to him, and then we went out.

A few minutes elapsed, and she came to me while I was standing at the door, and she said that they were stuffing paper in the vent. I explained again to her why they were stuffing paper over there, and she kept on talking and I reported to some other officers there, I don't know who it was, and they were asking me different questions about the men there at the door. I said,

"Next time, man, I will ask Senator SYMINGTON if he could give us permission."

And she took that as an insult. I did not mean it as an insult. I meant it with every courtesy I could, that I would ask the Senator next time to give me permission for what I had done. That is all there was to it, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Morgan, you have already testified to whom you report in the Department of Defense, isn't that correct?

Mr. MORGAN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator SALTONSTALL, have you any comments?

Senator SALTONSTALL. No, I have no comments.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator DUFF?

Senator DUFF. None.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I have this comment, Mr. Chairman. Listening to this evidence, I should say that these men had done their best to carry out their responsibility to the Security Officer in the Pentagon to whom they report, and certainly there is no connection between the Senators who comprise the subcommittee and this duty of theirs.

We have asked them to make sure that our hearings held in executive session are debugged.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did we do that, Senator?

Senator SALTONSTALL. We didn't ask them. We found that they were here in executive session to make sure that our sessions were debugged. We did not ask them to do it, that is correct. They were here to do it, and they were carrying out their responsibilities.

Certainly, there is no responsibility on your part, and it seems to me that they were carrying out their duties, and that the officer of the law was carrying out his duty, and I should say that the incident had been much magnified, and very unfortunately magnified.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Chair would like, in case there is any real or implied relationship to the subcommittee's work in this testimony, to express his apologies to Senator LEHMAN for any inconvenience it might have caused him or his staff. Would the Senator care to join with me in that.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would be very happy to. I would say as far as I am concerned that we would be glad to, happy to apologize.

Senator DUFF. I would like to do so also, and I would like to say from what I have

heard, I don't think there was any conceivable intention of reflection on Senator LEHMAN.

Mr. MORGAN. No, sir. I might state that I didn't even know it was his office at the time.

Mr. SPRAGUE. Mr. Chairman, if you think it would be advisable, and I do, I would be glad to see to it that a letter of apology to Senator LEHMAN is issued from the Department of Defense. But I do feel on the basis of what the gentlemen have said, that they were just trying to carry out their normal duties.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate that. Senator LEHMAN called me this morning and told me that, based on the story, he intended to talk about it on the floor—if you got in touch with him as soon as convenient, it might be constructive, so he will understand the nature of what these men were trying to do, and the position of the Department of Defense.

Mr. SPRAGUE. I will do that, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, gentlemen. We will now go into executive session.

#### THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MAINSTREAM OF HISTORY

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. President, I have followed with great interest, from his schooldays, the entire career of Hon. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. Wilcox is a native Iowan, and all Iowa is proud, indeed, of him and his outstanding record.

On April 27, 1956, Mr. Wilcox delivered a speech, entitled "The United Nations in the Mainstream of History," before the American Association of International Law. In this speech he analyzed some of the main developments in the United Nations during the past decade, and the major problems we shall have to face as we look ahead.

Because of the importance of Mr. Wilcox's discussion, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the body of the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MAINSTREAM OF HISTORY

(Address by the Honorable Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State, before the American Society of International Law, Sheraton-Carlton Hotel, Washington, D. C., Friday, April 27, 1956)

As a member of the fraternity of international law, I am honored to appear before you tonight as the society celebrates its 50th anniversary. We have been colleagues for a long time. It may sometimes seem to you, as it does to me, that we in government tend to lose touch with the wellsprings of scholarship and speculations that are indispensable to intellectual vigor. The scholar, for his part, may sometimes get too far away from the harsh realities of political action. August Comte, I am told, practiced the policy of cerebral hygiene—he didn't read any books except his own. This kind of sterility of thought must be avoided at all costs and I hope the day never comes when we in the government read only our own memoranda.

Both the public service and the learned professions can profit from increased contact between our two worlds. Organizations such as the American Society of International Law can and should provide a helpful bridge in this connection.

In wondering how to use this opportunity tonight, I thought it might be beneficial to step back from the immediate and the obvious, and look upon the United Nations from an historical point of view.

How can we sum up its first decade? How should we evaluate the trends that have set in? What are the main problems that lie ahead?

#### THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE U. N.

First of all, we should abandon the notion, sometimes held, that in 1945 the United Nations sprang into being from nowhere, like Minerva from the brow of Zeus. The analogy, rather, should be the Phoenix arising from its own ashes. For while many felt it wise in 1945 to avoid dwelling on antecedents, those who labored to create the United Nations would have had an extremely difficult time without the precedents of the League of Nations to guide them.

Indeed, the ancestry of the United Nations reaches back to such historic landmarks as the rise of the nation-state, the evolution of constitutional government, the beginnings of modern economic patterns, and the development of international jurisprudence from the time of Grotius and Vitoria.

From these early roots the process which Secretary Dulles has called "the institutionalizing of peace" has slowly taken form, culminating in our age in the creation of the United Nations.

We can criticize history, but we can never rewrite it, despite the best efforts of both Stalin and his ungrateful proteges. When the United Nations came into being, men and nations had reached a certain point in their development. It was at this point, and this point only, that the United Nations could be constructed.

By no means all men realized that we had reached that historic watershed. There were those, as there still are, who out of conviction or prejudice denied the possibility of true international cooperation. Much past history was available to support their pessimism.

Others went well beyond that point. Optimistic about man's innate virtue, they sought—and still seek—utopian solutions.

In the main, the United Nations Charter represents a consensus—if not of men, at least of governments. The document itself is a remarkable compromise in the name of political reality. However, it has provided a satisfactory framework within which the organism has been able to live, to experiment, and to grow. That no nation, however dissatisfied, has withdrawn its membership bespeaks both the intrinsic value of the organization and increasingly articulate world public opinion. One can only conclude that it has been in the interest of member states to participate. This in itself is a major tribute to the architects who by and large confined themselves within the bounds of political interests and possibilities. The organization has had to function in a world of fundamental changes and its responses to those changes show that it has a strong survival factor.

#### THE FIRST DECADE—TWO OVERRIDING FACTS

What are the great changes in the first decade of the organization's life? Two facts of paramount importance stand out.

First of all, after military victory in World War II was assured, the Soviet Union resumed its doctrinal hostility to the noncommunist world, and above all to the United States—the symbol of all that stands between it and world domination.

To say this is to describe how the hopeful notion of universal collective security has had to be transformed, at least for this age, into quite a different pattern of coalitions and alliances. It describes the growth and the competition of two great powers; one determined to subvert free societies, the other equally determined to preserve from assault and subversion the values of Western civilization and the practice of freedom under law. This fact has dimmed the United Nation's bright promise of cooperation and peace-enforcement. For once the cold war

began in earnest, the United Nations had to adapt itself to an intensely competitive, often hostile, and flagrantly "undiplomatic" world of tensions among the great powers. If it had not been able to do so, it would have expired.

A second momentous development has marked the postwar decade. For the first time in modern history the scene of political and social action has significantly shifted from the European West to the great cradle of civilization lying athwart the equator, stretching from North Africa to the Islands of Melanesia. This half of the world, which seemed to slumber through the great revolutions of the West, is rising from the remains of its mighty past.

In one apocalyptic moment, as history tells time, this ancient world has erupted like some long-forgotten volcano. Today, 11 years after the war, 14 nations containing 600,000,000 people have achieved political independence and become members of the United Nations. Hundreds of millions of their neighbors are moving toward a new political status, either quickly or slowly. They, too, lay claim to the status and the opportunities of the West, demanding an equal share of both.

Those members of the United Nations who share similar backgrounds or similar problems in relation to colonialism and economic development command a parliamentary strength today which few dreamed of in 1945. This balance was strengthened by the admission of 16 more states to membership last fall. What they ask, in short, is freedom from poverty, freedom from control, and freedom from inequality. In the United Nations this takes on concrete shape in the repudiation of a passing age of Western colonialism, in expectations of economic help toward industrialization, and in demands for recognition of their claims for racial, social, and cultural equality. Together, these ambitions represent a dynamic emotional force that has swept the subcontinents of the Eastern Hemisphere.

The collision in the United Nations between these two currents, one running between the free world and international communism, the other between Europe and its old imperial holdings, has served to mould the United Nations to the shape of the world it represents. It may have set discouraging limits to the organization. But it has also opened new possibilities for utilizing the United Nations to keep within peaceful bounds these sweeping tides and currents. The foremost task facing both the policymaker and the scholar is to determine how best these forces can be turned to good and constructive use, in pursuance of our goals of peace with justice.

#### THE FIRST DECADE—OTHER PROBLEMS

But it is only too easy to forget that, if there had been no cold war, and if the colonial revolution had not broken out with such energy, there would still be a formidable array of international problems. Finding solutions for some of these problems has sorely taxed human ingenuity.

If nationalism is a vital force in Asia, it is no less so in the rest of the world. Disputes arise between nations over questions of trade, or territory, or simply prestige. Effective machinery is necessary to direct such disputes into peaceful channels. It is likewise necessary for conflicts that arise out of efforts to change the established order. One reason why it is so hard to speak of law as a governing principle of the United Nations is that, like the league, its most pressing problems arise from the desire of nations, not to see their legal rights enforced, but to change the law itself.

The clash and interplay of conflicting claims and competing systems and cultures has had a transforming effect on the concept of multilateral relations that prevailed in 1945.

For one thing, nations have tended to draw together in the United Nations in voting blocs on the basis of their special interests, and their estimate of the parliamentary power situation. Those who placed a high premium on traditions of political and civil liberties have united for defense against world communism. Those who shared a definable corner of the globe tended to find community in regional alliances. Those who administered dependent territories tended to unite on the principle of noninterference in colonial affairs. The non-Communist but anti-colonial nations have banded together to create parliamentary strength out of individual weakness. In this situation, the Communist bloc has worked, as might be expected, to take advantage of these divisions of interest in the free world.

The unreliability of the Security Council, given its unworkable premise of great-power unity, has placed a premium on the Assembly. New voting patterns, involving shifting groups of states, have come to characterize the Assembly. It was there that the Asian, African, and Latin-American nations found new ways to exert their influence. It was there that we ourselves turned in 1950 to unfreeze the organization's potential for collective defense against aggression, in the face of the deadlock in the Security Council. And it is there that the great powers have had to present and defend their policies before the rest of the world.

In this setting, the United Nations has tended to become less and less of a tribunal where abstract justice could be meted out, and where, when the chips were down, the great powers would together enforce the peace. At the same time, it has also tended to become less of a tight coalition of pro-Western nations. Instead, it has been revealed for what it really was all along—a sort of log-cabin community house where the entire neighborhood friends and strangers, rich and poor, law-abiding and law-breaking—are all present.

Their mood indoors is not appreciably different from what it is outdoors, but one great purpose is shared in common by most members: to settle differences peacefully, arguing national policy on a give-and-take basis, negotiating agreements under public pressure, and, if one member gets unruly, trying as best they can to deal with him.

The ground rules are primitive, but those that work are indispensable to world order. The dreams of a future model community under law do not die, nor should they. But just as law is a product of the community, so the community must follow from a consensus, however modest, as to the common goals and purposes of the individual members. The development of this community and the broadening of its underlying consensus is the greatest long-term task facing us today.

#### HOW THE U. N. HAS DEVELOPED—ADAPTATION TO REALITY

We have so far depicted the United Nations in broad terms. What has happened to it in the face of changing conditions? The combination of pressures on the organization have led it to adapt in a number of significant ways. None of these has been formally ratified by amendment of the charter. In some cases there was no suitable charter provision to change. But in the main, these were adaptations designed to permit the machinery to function without having to rewrite the charter.

Chief Justice Marshall once said of our Constitution that "it was intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Throughout our history the process of constitutional growth has gone on unceasingly. Specifically, the Constitution has grown in four ways: through formal amendments, through interpretation by the Courts, through custom and usage, and through



basic legislation passed by Congress. With remarkably little textual change the Constitution has been kept a living document.

In somewhat the same fashion the Charter has proven flexible enough to meet new situations not foreseen 10 years ago. Despite the fears of some, these are not changes in the powers of the organization as a whole in relation to its member states. The United Nations legal powers are no less and no greater than what was agreed to at San Francisco, although they have been in some respects clarified. The purposes and goals have not changed either. Indeed the changes I refer to have brought these goals closer to fruition by avoiding futility, and refusing to accept impotence.

These informal evolutions fall into four categories.

In the first place, some provisions of the charter early became obsolete and unworkable. Much of charter VII dealing with Security Council enforcement had to be put aside so long as the great-power unanimity it presupposed was impossible to achieve. Similarly, article 106 on interim enforcement measures called for great-power unanimity, and similarly it became unworkable in a setting where one of the powers itself constituted the chief threat to the peace.

In the second place, new interpretations were found for existing charter provisions. The practice of abstention prevented total paralysis of the Security Council, on occasions where an outright veto could be side-stepped. The Secretary-General's role has come to be interpreted quite liberally, opening the way to new possibilities in the peaceful settlement of disputes. A new set of activities in the colonial field has grown out of interpretations of article 73 regarding responsibilities with respect to non-self-governing territories, a development which we must help to keep constructive and balanced. And, as I have indicated, the General Assembly has largely replaced the Security Council as the principal forum for consideration of political issues, including many arising from the colonial revolt against the West.

In the third place, international agreements have been developed to fill out gaps in the charter. I have in mind such important treaties as the Atlantic Pact, the SEATO agreement, and other regional and collective defense pacts based on articles 51-54.

These pacts, I am aware, have sometimes been criticized on the ground that they run counter to the spirit—if not the letter—of the charter. Actually, they are based on the obvious fact that the enforcement procedures outlined in the charter were denied vitality by the Soviet Union.

Finally, the major organs of the United Nations have used their authority to create subsidiary organs, such as the Interim Committee and the various ECOSOC regional commissions, to assist the parent organs in performing their proper functions.

It is clear that if the United Nations is to develop without charter amendments, we must strike a balance between the extreme positions of loose and strict construction. The idea that the charter is so flexible that it can be changed at will merely by interpretation, may be dangerous not only for the member states but also for the United Nations. For obviously, a member that supports a broad interpretation on one occasion might find the precedent very much against its interests on another occasion. And a General Assembly that might seek to enlarge unduly the area of its power by narrow voting margins would probably find its influence weakened in a relatively short time.

#### THE FUTURE OF THE U. N.: SOME CENTRAL ISSUES

When the member nations come to re-examine the powers, functions and structure of the United Nations in connection with the proposed charter review conference,

these developments all constitute vital background. Nothing could be more futile than to scrutinize the charter in a political vacuum, in the vain hope that improvements in language alone will somehow transform the behavior, the interests, or the motivation of nations. But it would be equally irresponsible, in my judgment, to assume that no real improvements are possible.

This is a uniquely propitious time to be taking a hard look at international organizations, and at the role the United States should play in them. For we appear to be living through one of those electric periods when the whole apparatus of history seems to hesitate, shift gears, and move ahead on a new and different track.

Certainly the program of the Soviet Union has shown startling signs of alteration, if not of policy, then of strategy and tactics. We must not be deluded into a false set of assumptions about its continuing purpose. But the tactical shift of the Soviets should not be minimized. It is a major political development, and it has already had an important impact in the United Nations. Indeed, its effects confront us everywhere with new and challenging problems. Their solution will call for the most imaginative balance between the continuing need for military defenses, and the growing possibility that economic, social, and cultural weapons may be decisive factors in an era of competitive coexistence.

We still have some distance to go to prepare ourselves to act effectively in the long pull ahead. Indeed, the comments made at the first meeting of this society, in 1907, by its President, Elihu Root, are still discouragingly timely:

"The education of public opinion, which should lead the sovereign people in each country to understand the definite limitations upon national rights and the full scope and responsibility of national duties, has only just begun."

What do we seek when we look ahead to the next 10 years? Our world has changed drastically over the last 10; have we reason to believe the process will stop?

My own crystal ball is no better than yours. But it is possible to project ahead some of the fundamental issues, with confidence that whatever else happens to these problems, they will not disappear.

#### THE PROBLEM OF DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

The most profound issue involving the United Nations has to do with the scope of its authority in relation to member states. Around this central question revolves the whole galaxy of controversial problems involving supranational powers, domestic jurisdiction, the veto, human rights, the development of world law, and many others. We can see the two extreme poles of this argument—world government at one end, relatively complete national freedom of action at the other. But, like all extremes, these are misleading and impractical.

We can equip ourselves to deal intelligently with this problem only if we clarify our own thinking as to the nature and authority of the United Nations.

There is no more persistently recurrent—and unjustified criticism of the U. N. than that it threatens the sovereignty of the United States. This is a good illustration of how mischievous a little misinformation can be. The misinformation in this case is that the U. N. allegedly has the power to make treaties automatically binding on the member nations. This, of course, is just not so. The United Nations or its specialized agencies can, if its members wish, freely draft and recommend conventions or treaties. However, none of these can ever be binding on any nation until that nation has given consent through its normal constitutional processes. In our case, this means approval by two-thirds of the United States Senate.

The member states of the U. N. are sovereign. They have agreed to collaborate in certain fields in their common interest. If they wish to use the U. N. as a forum for reaching international agreement on a variety of matters, there is, of course, nothing in the charter to prevent them from doing so. But there is nothing to prevent those same countries from reaching agreement on the same matters outside the U. N. The point is that it is the states which make this decision, not the organization, and it is, as it always has been, up to the individual state to enter into a treaty or not.

In considering the matter of jurisdiction and the United Nations, we would do well to keep emotions from obscuring the facts.

#### COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE CHARTER

Another central issue is the matter of collective defense against aggression. There has been abundant evidence that the original premises of universal collective security were unattainable in today's world, in the sense that nations would not commit themselves in advance to fight any aggression, any time, anywhere. If the great powers were the antagonists, this seemed to be particularly true.

When great power unanimity proved unrealistic, the United States took the lead in devising alternative methods of developing collective defense under the charter. This took two forms. When it was seen that the Security Council was able to act in the Korean aggression only because of the absence of the Soviets, we sponsored the uniting-for-peace resolution, strengthening the Assembly's capacity to respond to similar emergencies. Also, we have played a leading part in organizing regional defense pacts and mutual security arrangements, the possible need for which had already been anticipated by the charter.

Some people have complained that our Government has been suffering from a case of "pactitis." We should all recall, however, that soon after the end of World War II the Soviet Union, which alone of the great powers had not disarmed, began to employ military threats and pressure to expand its influence and territories. The urgency of the formation of collective defense pacts was obvious. Behind these bastions nations have been able to put their political and economic houses in order, and develop their own defenses. These pacts, along with the uniting-for-peace program, have been the answer to the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto. They have provided free world security inside the charter but outside the veto.

Today, as the world political situation changes, the United States and other nations are exploring the possibilities of giving greater effect to the potentialities of NATO, for example, in the nonmilitary field, without losing sight of its primary role as a bulwark against aggression. We must now go on to encourage and support other aspects of co-operation inside and outside the U. N. This leads to a third great issue relating to the U. N.: the technical and economic fields.

#### U. N. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

It is important to remember that the charter did not specifically create any of the specialized agencies or the now flourishing technical-assistance program. It merely authorized and approved their establishment. In my mind, their growth and vitality constitutes one of the most remarkable developments in the last 10 years. They reflect a high degree of successful international co-operation.

The United States has from the beginning given the strongest support to this aspect of the U. N. system. It is clearly in our national interest, and it constitutes a powerful force for peace and international understanding. The Soviet Union, after years of indifference or downright hostility, now seems prepared to play a more active role in this work. If this participation is genuine,

it is welcome. This is a field in which we do not hesitate to compete with the Soviet Union.

In carrying on its social and economic programs the U. N. and its specialized agencies must be guided by two cardinal principles. In the first place, in their natural enthusiasm to get results, they should be very careful not to alienate public opinion by invading the domestic jurisdiction of their member states. This engenders adverse criticism and loss of valuable support, out of which only harm can come to the organizations and their objectives. There is plenty to do within the limits of their present authority, and it can be done most effectively if the agreed metes and bounds are respected.

In the second place, the U. N. should not attempt to do more than it reasonably can. Progress in the social and economic fields is painfully slow, and there is much to do. Yet I believe that modest programs well conceived and effectively administered, will take the U. N. further toward its goal than more grandiose programs that exceed the organization's present capabilities. We must recognize that the U. N. will lose ground, and may indeed suffer incalculable damage, if it tries to move too far too fast.

#### OTHER BASIC ISSUES

I have dealt with only three of the issues that must be thought through in the years to come. Other problems will persist and other vistas of opportunity will open up. There is, for example, the issue of colonialism, and the possibilities inherent in the U. N. for resolving colonial disputes and establishing nonviolent patterns of change. There is also the important field of pacific settlement and international adjudication.

In this connection I might say just a word about Secretary General Hammarskjöld's mission to the Middle East. It is, of course, too early to predict the final outcome of his efforts. Up to this point he has made a valuable contribution in easing tensions in the area and avoiding the possible outbreak of war. He may well lay the groundwork for a more lasting peace. His role illustrates once more the fact that there are many resources for peace within the charter—including the techniques of direct and quiet diplomacy—which have not yet been fully tapped.

In evaluating the political work of the United Nations let us remember one hard fact. Many important and difficult international problems are solved outside the organization. But the really tough ones, the well-nigh insoluble ones, come to the United Nations. It is, in a way, the court of last appeal.

#### UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is, as I have emphasized, a voluntary partnership of nations which have subscribed to a set of common purposes and principles. In trying to look into the future of this organization we cannot speak for other nations. We can, however, speak for ourselves.

Last fall 16 new members were admitted to the United Nations. Other qualified states are waiting and the membership list may soon exceed the 80 mark. It is our view that this trend toward approximate universality will add new vitality and strength to the organization.

There are, of course, a few prophets of gloom who have been predicting that the United States will lose its role of leadership in the United Nations. I have no fear of such a development. In the General Assembly the democratic process has worked remarkably well. The small countries, on nearly all important issues, have rallied to the cause of the free world.

Thus far whatever leadership we have exercised has stemmed largely from the logic of our position and our ability to persuade other nations of the rightness of our cause.

We intend to continue to rely on these principles. And if the time should ever come when we are consistently outvoted in the General Assembly then we had better begin to reexamine our basic policies.

As we move into the second decade let us keep firmly in mind the fundamental principles which underlie our participation in the United Nations.

First. We intend to live up to the purposes and principles of the charter. We shall refrain from the use of force and we shall do our utmost to settle our disputes by peaceful means. If other nations will do the same there can be established that mutual confidence which is the indispensable ingredient of permanent peace.

Second. We shall continue to foster and encourage the concept of collective security so that those nations which wish to remain free may stand together in protective unity under the charter against the threat of aggression.

Third. We shall earnestly pursue our quest, within the framework of the United Nations, to bring about adequately safeguarded disarmament. This is the most complex and the most urgent of all world problems.

Fourth. We shall continue to cooperate with other countries in our mutual efforts to attain the social and economic goals of the charter. To this end our Government can be counted on to continue our strong financial support to the United Nations technical-assistance program and the work of the specialized agencies.

May I tarry on this point for just a moment. There are suggestions from a few critics to the effect that the United States should limit its participation in, or even withdraw from, certain of the specialized agencies. One argument is that increasing Soviet and Communist satellite activity in these agencies is a threat to free-world interests. This seems to me to be an additional reason, if any were needed, why we should continue in, and even increase our support for, the specialized agencies.

Actually, if we were to withdraw from enterprises of this kind every time we encountered a serious obstacle or an unpleasant situation, we would perforce be compelled to desert almost every international activity of any consequence in which we participate. And it is extremely difficult for me to understand how we can wage peace successfully by running away from all the battlefields.

Fifth. We shall do what we can to encourage through the United Nations the development of international law. Unfortunately this is a period of history in which certain nations ignore moral principles and break rules of law when it suits their convenience. That is precisely the reason we should put renewed effort into the great search for that consensus of world opinion which will make permanent peace the unwritten law of relations among the nations.

While I said earlier that the United Nations did not materialize out of nowhere like Minerva, I recall now that Minerva was, among other things, the patron of peace. It now seems possible that we have an opportunity to wage the sort of diplomacy we ought to excel at—the diplomacy of peace.

Such a peace, if it should persist, will not be a static one. It will have to be maintained in a world of conflicts, of passions, and of change. In the background will still lurk the terrible possibility of nuclear war. The hostility of world communism will be long sustained. The working out of far-reaching transformations in the formerly colonial areas, and in economically underdeveloped regions, will be slow and precarious.

But in the sort of world we are working in and toward—a world of peaceful change—the United Nations can continue to grow and flourish as a patron of peace, striving always to create community out of discord, and law out of community.

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1957

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 10986) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, and for other purposes.

Mr. ROBERTSON obtained the floor.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Virginia to yield to me for the purpose of suggesting the absence of a quorum, with the understanding that he will not lose the floor.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, the concern which I shall express today as to the adequacy of funds which have been provided and which are to be provided for our Air Force and the action which I shall advocate have roots going back to the fall of 1955, when I attended a meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in Helsinki.

Talking at that meeting with representatives of the forty-odd nations which belong to that organization, devoted to the preservation of world peace and increasing understanding among nations, I was disturbed by two things: First, the lack of friendliness exhibited by members of parliaments of some of the countries which had received generous shares of the more than \$50 billion of foreign aid we have provided since the end of World War II; and second, indications that allies on whom we were counting to stand beside us in any future world conflict were taking seriously Soviet assurances of peaceful intentions, and evidently were planning to reduce their own defense efforts.

At Helsinki, I learned nothing that led me to believe that there had been any major change in the Communistic cold war offensive. While speaking long and loud on the subject of peaceful coexistence, delegates from behind the Iron Curtain were doing all in their power to drive a wedge between the free nations and the so-called neutral nations of the Orient over admitting Red China both to the Interparliamentary Union and United Nations; and in sowing seeds of discord for the French and the British, by denouncing all programs of colonialism, while themselves exercising the most vicious type of colonialism the world has ever seen, in East Germany and what are commonly referred to as the satellite countries. I knew that Communists in France, acting on orders from Moscow, had wrecked French participation in EDC, which in turn had delayed German membership in NATO;



and that the Communists in North Africa were forcing the French to materially reduce their support of NATO, in order to combat a troublesome type of guerilla warfare in North Africa. In other words, when the NATO program for manpower, mechanized equipment, fighter planes, and airfields capable of handling jet planes was from 2 to 3 years behind the anticipated schedule, it became very apparent to me from the many contacts I made at Helsinki that our prestige in the world had deteriorated, and that it was vital for us to reappraise our own defense establishment in the light of those developments.

It was with a sense of shock, therefore, that immediately after my return to Washington, I was confronted by newspaper headlines stating that the administration's estimates for defense spending in the 1956 fiscal year, which already had been pared once after January 1955, were expected to be cut another billion dollars.

Although no individual official was quoted in these new stories, the similarity of the accounts in various papers made it evident that this was not merely some reporter's pipe dream, but that facts had been "leaked" from high sources.

The New York Times, for example, in a front-page story in the September 7, 1955, issue, written by William R. Conklin, under a Washington dateline, quoted "a Defense Department spokesman" as saying:

No top limit on defense expense has been set either by George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury, or by Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense. However, by reworking our estimates and revising certain programs that will not impair national defense, we are working toward the \$33 billion goal.

Explaining the significance of this figure, the reporter said the \$33 billion figure mentioned on September 6 was an even billion dollars less than an estimate given by the Defense Department 2 weeks earlier. He said the January 1955 estimate for 1956 fiscal year spending included a Department of Defense estimate of \$35,750 million, but that budget experts in the Department had reviewed the items, and said later that the services probably would not spend more than \$34 billion in the fiscal year 1956.

Two weeks before this article was written, the reporter quoted the armed services as saying they had identified potential savings of \$1,750 million, which would permit them to reach the reduced goal of \$34 billion, but a further review in the last few weeks had resulted in \$33 billion being set as a likely goal.

The Times story also said:

Secretary Wilson conferred last Thursday with Mr. Quarles and Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, at Mr. Wilson's vacation retreat in northern Michigan.

It was reported at the Pentagon today that Mr. Wilson had directed a thorough overhauling of budget estimates by all the armed services. His budget exercise calls for backtracking along previous 1956 estimates to see where cuts can be made. Concurrently, the services are working on estimates for the fiscal year 1957 with the present goal of \$33 billion in mind.

Pentagon officials expect the Air Force to meet the brunt of any cuts, with the Army

and Navy making up the \$1 billion total. In 1955 the Air Force spent about \$16,600 million. This included almost \$7 billion for aircraft and related items.

For 1956 the Air Force plans to spend about \$5 billion on such procurement. This amount is expected to suffer the heaviest cut.

When Secretary Wilson testified before our Appropriations Committee, last week, I asked him about the stories of a billion-dollar cut in the Air Force which had been published in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and, I assume, all other metropolitan newspapers of the Nation; and he replied that he had never heard of the story.

From the official record of the hearings, I quote the following questions and answers on that subject:

Senator ROBERTSON. Who makes the decision as to whether we will slow down on foreign military aid for some nations that give evidence of perhaps running out on us at a critical time?

Who makes that decision? Do we just go ahead and keep pouring it in, and saying, "We will hope everything is going to work out all right?"

Secretary WILSON. We are getting organized all of the time to use better judgment, and we use the best we have. If it is a highly important matter, we finally get up to the President. Or, the State Department, and ourselves would talk it over and say, "Here is one that looks like it is getting sour and we had better slow down on this one."

Senator ROBERTSON. That is considered?

Secretary WILSON. Surely.

Senator ROBERTSON. There is just one other question that I had. I have been listening to your concern about keeping our allies armed, but last August I read a piece attributed to a high source in the administration that we were going to cut our own Air Force a billion dollars. I had just gotten back from Helsinki, and I had heard many evidences of unfriendly attitudes from those that we thought ought to be our friends. I heard many expressions that the summit Conference in Geneva had eliminated the possibility of war.

Then I read that somebody in the administration was going to cut our own Air Force \$1 billion.

Do you know who sent up that trial balloon?

Secretary WILSON. No, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. You remember that, do you?

Secretary WILSON. I do not remember, because there are so many that go up and I am so troubled by it that I finally paid no attention to any of it and I try to go about the business.

Senator ROBERTSON. It was widely published, and they do not generally pick that up from some low subordinate, I do not think, that is so vital a matter as cutting our Air Force \$1 billion.

And here is where he sidestepped the issue:

Secretary WILSON. The current rumor is that it is going to be increased \$1 billion; is it not that?

Senator ROBERTSON. I hope it is; I took it up promptly with the President and they said, "Please do not give that letter out, the President has not authorized that statement," and, in about 4 days, Mr. Hagerty flew out to Denver and the President issued a statement that they were not going to cut the Air Force \$1 billion.

But, I am convinced that it was being considered by somebody or it would not have been published. Then, after you set up the budget estimate, you took another look, and

sent up an additional \$500 million, and I thought that was fine, but still too little.

Secretary WILSON. I can tell you this: As far as I was concerned, and I would know it, there was never any intention to cut the Air Force \$1 billion. Who started the business and the rumors and the statements, I do not know.

That is the exact quotation from his testimony before our committee.

Mr. President, is it not astounding to hear a Secretary of Defense say that he knew absolutely nothing about a discussion which was on the front page of all metropolitan newspapers about cutting the Air Force a billion dollars, with a view, of course, to balancing the budget, and perhaps proposing a tax cut in an election year—a statement which finally was set at rest by a statement issued by Secretary Wilson's second in command, in behalf of the Pentagon,

But we should be getting more or less accustomed to astounding statements made by our distinguished Secretary of Defense, as witness the one he made at Quantico the day following his testimony before our committee just quoted above. That statement is headlined in the Washington Post of the 22d, "Wilson Brands Plans To Up AF Fund Phony." Then the United Press story says that—

Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson declared tonight that Senate efforts to increase the Air Force's budget by \$1.16 billion are "phony."

And the news item added:

He said he felt the "same way" about Republican attempts to compromise on an extra \$500 million.

In other words, they are "phony" too. But he did not stop at calling everybody in the Senate who thought there should be more Air Force money appropriated "phonies"; he even saw fit to hang that tag on millions of patriotic Americans when he gratuitously insulted them in this manner:

The people of our country want to make sure we have a strong defense but when it comes to paying off they take a different slant.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me at that point?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I read the statement about the people and their reaction to taxes. So far as national defense and national security are concerned, there has not been any complaint from the American taxpayers or the American people. No Senator has received a single communication objecting to sufficient funds for national security.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I fully endorse the statement of the chairman of our subcommittee which handled this bill. We have received no protest whatsoever from the taxpayers about an adequate defense program.

Of course, every sensible taxpayer wants to see the country get its money's worth for funds spent on our own defense, as on our program of foreign aid, and is fully justified in criticizing all evidence of waste and inefficiency. But Wilson's broadside against them that they ask for a strong defense but are not willing to pay for it will not soon be forgotten.

What did Secretary Wilson mean when he called those who advocate a strong national defense phonies? "Phony" is a slang word described by the dictionary as meaning "not straight or genuine, counterfeit, fake." When Secretary Wilson solemnly denied before our committee that he had ever heard of any proposal last September to cut the Air Force by a billion dollars I did not call him "not straight or genuine, counterfeit, or fake." I did not even intimate that I did not think he was telling the truth. I was merely forced to the conclusion that our distinguished Secretary of Defense had been operating in a vacuum, suspended, as Thomas Carlyle would say, between two worlds—the one dead, the other not yet born. When he went down to Quantico the next day, if he had just called the Democrats in the Senate who did not agree with his defense budget phonies, I could have shrugged that off as being a political attack of a rather low order. But what possible political advantage could the Secretary hope to gain by thus questioning the sincerity of the members of his own party who have introduced an amendment to add \$500 million to the Air Force appropriation and all other Republican Members of the Senate who plan to support it. This comment on the ability of the Secretary of Defense to decide for the American people vital questions of military policy and national defense becomes necessary. Before I conclude my remarks I shall cite specific testimony of Secretary Wilson on what our military needs are and compare it with specific testimony given by our top military experts. Then, of course, I shall pose the question of whose leadership in so vital a matter we should follow.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It is true, is it not, that in the spring of 1953 the Secretary of Defense took more than \$7 billion from the national security budget without requesting an opinion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. ROBERTSON. He impounded the money after Congress had appropriated and indicated a policy of building up our Defense Establishment.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator know that the decision to put all the officers in Washington in mufti was made without discussion with the Secretary of the Army?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I did not know, but when I heard of it I could not believe that the Secretary of Defense had discussed it with any sensible man.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In his testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning the Secretary of the Army stated that he did not know the order was about to be issued until he saw it in the press. It was not discussed with him.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I first learned of it when I was on the Shenandoah River in the valley of Virginia, where I was doing a little quiet fishing and trying to get away from these troublesome things. A lieutenant commander in the Reserves had read the morning newspapers. He asked, "Do you know what Secretary

Wilson has done?" I replied, "No, I do not know what Secretary Wilson has done."

He said, "He has said to the thousands of soldiers, sailors, and marines in Washington, 'You cannot wear your uniforms in Washington.'"

He said, "I have never written a letter to a newspaper in my life, but I cannot take that." We want to persuade the boys to enter the service. We want them to be proud of the uniform. We want them to fight bravely. But the Secretary says, "Do not go around Washington looking like soldiers, sailors, or marines. When you come to Washington, you must invest in civilian attire."

I said, "As soon as that gets back to the President, I think the order will be reversed."

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Secretary of Defense took \$7 billion plus from the Defense budget in 1953, without consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is merely running true to form, is he not, when he states, in 1956, without consulting the Secretaries, that officers on duty in Washington must not wear their uniforms. Is not that a logical conclusion?

Mr. ROBERTSON. The junior Senator from Virginia could not question the soundness of that logical conclusion.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Is it not true that while possibly the Senator from Missouri, the Senator from Virginia, and the Senator from Massachusetts might not agree with the original order, immediately thereafter, on the suggestion of the President, when he saw that possibly the Secretary had been a little hasty, the judgment of the Secretary was corrected?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I fully agree with my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts that the Nation is fortunate to have as Commander in Chief over the Secretary of Defense so grand a man as President Eisenhower.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. LONG. This is a matter about which some of us are beginning to have concern. Apparently the President is being advised by a man who will not listen to his military advisers. The man who advises the President declines to listen to military advice. Apparently the President is being led around by the advice of such a man.

The Secretary did make one wise decision. When he was named Secretary of Defense he did offer to give up his General Motors stock, because it would have been against the law to hold it. But when he moved out as president of General Motors Corp., the stock doubled in value during the following 2 years.

Mr. ROBERTSON. As I stated, this is not an issue between Secretary Wilson and myself. The fact that he called us "phonies" has no bearing on the merits of this question. I tried to indicate my position as early as last September. I

started a drive to keep our Air Force from being cut. I started a drive to have an Air Force second to none, because the testimony is that a second rate Air Force is national suicide. That is what we are headed for under the present program. Whether we are "phonies" or not does not matter. We are acting on our best convictions as to the interests of the Nation.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That was the entire philosophy behind the efforts of the committee—not whether Mr. Wilson thought we were "phonies," or whether he thought we were good men or not. Under our oath of office, we felt that the important thing was national security. Secretaries of Defense come and go. I hope the present one will remain in office at least until November, because I am pretty sure that on future occasions he will discuss bird dogs and "phonies."

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, since I dictated the paragraph I have just read Secretary Wilson has issued a kind of combination alibi and apology, saying he was misunderstood by the reporters and that he intended to apply the word "phony" to the reporter's question and not to maneuvers in the Senate.

That statement, published in Saturday afternoon papers, came, however, not only after Mr. Wilson's comment had been denounced here in the Senate by Members on both sides of the aisle, but also after it had been discussed by the President and his aides.

And it is significant that the Saturday morning papers still were quoting the Secretary of Defense as saying, when given an opportunity to retract his remark, that if he had thought more about it he probably wouldn't have used the word, but he added: "it's all right."

Therefore, I shall not retract my comment, which I have given to the press, because it seems evident that Mr. Wilson's real feelings were indicated not only by his use of the word "phony" in an unguarded moment, but also by his sneering statement that he would like to see the people who vote for expenditures vote for taxes to produce the money and stand up and be counted.

Returning for the moment to the newspaper story of last September about a billion-dollar Air Force cut the reporter said that although the Air Force was continuing its buildup, the \$5 billion estimate for 1956 procurement, already \$2 billion less than had been spent in fiscal 1955 "is a tempting target for reduction-minded officials."

These statements, Mr. President, at a time when I had been made acutely conscious of the Soviet threat and felt that a strategic air force which the Russians must respect was the chief deterrent to another war, alarmed me to such an extent that I immediately wrote a personal letter to the President.

In that letter I told him I had just returned from the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Helsinki, where our delegation had succeeded in preventing admission of Red China, which would have made a farce of an organization



intended to advance democratic institutions, but that China might still gain admission at a later meeting.

I said the largest delegation at the meeting was the Soviet Union group, and that apparently most of the other delegates had accepted at face value their assurances of peaceful intentions, although one Austrian delegate was bold enough to ask how, if the Russians were as peaceful as they claimed to be, they could explain their continuing occupation of a part of Finland, where they had installed long-range guns capable of destroying the city of Helsinki.

In the letter which I wrote to the President of the United States in September 1955, I said:

The primary purpose of this letter is to convey to you my impression that the representatives of some 40 nations at Helsinki are so weary of the cold war and its incident expense that they intend to cut their military appropriations as rapidly as possible, saying that it is unthinkable that anybody in this atomic age would start another world war. I agree that it would be unthinkable if we continue to have air superiority, at least in quality if not in numbers, and therefore, I am a bit disturbed over news items to the effect that you are now planning to reduce actual expenditures for the buildup for our Air Force by more than a billion dollars below what even just a few months ago you thought was absolutely necessary.

With respect to NATO you, of course, know that the original proposal was for France to furnish 20 divisions. Later that was cut to 10. Of the 10 promised only 6 were finally furnished and they were not fully equipped. And then 3 of the 6 that were fully equipped and were fully trained were withdrawn by France from NATO for use in Morocco. If that action should be followed, and it is not too unlikely that it will be, by other members of NATO by the end of next year, NATO will be nothing much more than a paper organization because the German divisions will still not be in being and Germany might follow the example of other nations and decline to furnish them.

While, of course, I am not unmindful of the more favorable atmosphere for peace generated at the Geneva Conference, I applaud the statement you made at the meeting of the American Bar Association in Philadelphia, which I was privileged to read in full in Oslo, to the effect that tangible evidences of the Russian will for peace had not been received. At Helsinki the Russian delegation and also those of their satellite countries were very friendly with our delegation and those of the other democracies but that, of course, was only in line with the new approach.

In my opinion, it is entirely too early to assume that the Russians will withdraw from East Germany, that they will in any way release their stranglehold on the satellite countries, or that they will agree to any bona fide inspection of armaments. Therefore, the real deterrent to another war is our Air Force; and for that reason I feel that we would be taking an unnecessary risk, regardless of how desirable a cut in expenditures and a reduction in taxes may be, to seriously delay at this time the proposed expansion of our Air Force.

My letter was acknowledged by a member of the White House staff in the absence of the President, who was in Colorado, and the reply contained a copy of a Department of Defense press release, dated a day later than my letter. This release said there was "no factual basis" for news stories that "drastic cuts will be made in currently approved defense pro-

grams in order to reduce fiscal year 1956 expenditures."

The statement, quoting Acting Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., said that although the President's January budget message had indicated that if the defense program were carried out in full it would result in expenditures of \$35,750 million, it was indicated at the time and in later testimony by witnesses before congressional committees that "all the detailed projections could not possibly develop exactly on schedule and that for some of them expenditures would fall somewhat below the preliminary estimates. Actual expenditures were then estimated at around \$34 billion."

Mr. President, that is from Mr. Wilson's Department, sent out by Mr. Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., Acting Secretary. Mr. Wilson said he did not know anything about it and had never heard of it.

The press release statement went on to say that revised estimates, taking into account specific actions taken by the Congress on the President's request, some of which would increase expenditures and some of which would decrease them, now added up to \$35 billion but that overall expenditures for the year "are still expected to be approximately \$34 billion, as originally estimated."

Mr. President, I also received an excerpt from a letter sent to other Members of Congress who apparently had inquired about the reported billion dollar cut and in this the White House said there had been no change in objectives for defense and there would be no reduction in forces programed. It said the fact that the current estimate was still approximately \$34 billion, rather than the \$33 billion mentioned in the news stories, was "a good indication that we are not contemplating cutting back our forces or reducing military readiness."

The letter also promised continued emphasis would be placed "on acceleration of production of high priority items such as the B-52 bombers."

Mr. President, I have no way of knowing whether that September 1955 talk of another billion-dollar cut in defense spending, to be applied mostly to the Air Force, was a trial balloon sent up by someone in the Defense Department who wanted it done and shot down by higher authority when the reaction became evident, or whether there was some misunderstanding between a number of competent news reporters and an authorized briefing officer.

At any rate, I was reassured at the time by the promise that the reported cut to the \$33 billion level in 1956 would not be made.

I had some renewed concern last January when the President's budget estimate for fiscal 1957 proposed only \$33.7 billion for defense, including \$15.7 billion for the Air Force as compared with the \$16.6 billion it spent in 1955, and I was glad when the President submitted a supplemental estimate of \$419 million of which \$376 million was for the Air Force.

In recent months, however, I have had growing concern as to the adequacy of our Air Force as an effective deterrent to another war in the light of increas-

ingly ominous information about advances in Soviet air power.

For the reasons I have indicated I had a conviction when our Senate Appropriations Committee began its hearings on the defense-appropriations bill for 1957 that greater emphasis needed to be placed on our Air Force, and that conviction was reinforced by the testimony we received.

I also entered those hearings with a feeling that the amount approved by the House for Air Force activities was not adequate and that even the slightly larger amount proposed in the administration's budget was too little and what we heard from Defense Department witnesses confirmed that impression.

Some of the facts and figures given to the committee in executive session are classified material and cannot be quoted here, but I want to call attention to some passages in the published hearings which are not secret and which illustrate my point.

One question which concerned me greatly was how our military strength on land, sea, and air compares with that of the Soviets, both now and in potential for the immediate future.

In his opening statement Secretary of Defense Wilson said that although the Soviets have many more divisions of ground forces than we have, our defense needs are different, and our present program provides adequate forces for our needs (p. 7).

This difference of strength was not dismissed so lightly, however, by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff, when he took the stand, and after he had made, in his opening statement, the presentation expected of him as administration representative, and began to answer questions we put to him, this fine officer's optimism appeared even more limited.

General Taylor said:

Ground forces constitute the predominant element of the Communist military strength. As is well known, the Soviet land forces are the most powerful in the world today. Since 1950 they have equipped their army with a complete family of modern weapons and equipment and continue to maintain it in an excellent state of combat readiness (p. 77).

He said weapons of World War II vintage have virtually been replaced by a new arsenal, and that training, including atomic-warfare training, is first class, and added:

Known dispositions indicate that the Soviet Army is ready to undertake a major war with little warning. \* \* \* The combined Communist armies present a formidable threat and outnumber Allied forces of the free world by a considerable margin (p. 78).

Then, by way of reassurance, General Taylor told us that the United States and its allies have the capability, if they have the will, of producing ground forces able to counter those of the enemy—page 78.

Under questioning by our subcommittee chairman, the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, General Taylor said he was referring to the willingness of our allies to expend the effort and make the sacrifices necessary to attain the level of readiness of which he spoke, and when I questioned him further on that point, he agreed that since he had submitted his

estimate of essential needs of our Army. NATO has become weaker, because of withdrawal of French units from Europe, and there have been discouraging developments involving relations of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece.

He said there are many things we do not know in detail about Russian equipment; that our Allied Forces are uneven as to capability and that he could not generalize in evaluating our strength as compared to that of the Soviets, even though man for man and weapon for weapon he believed the American Army division is the best in the world—pages 95-96.

Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker, at this same stage of our hearings, said there was no doubt as to the numerical superiority of the Red armies—page 85. He said we have the ability to meet on better than even terms as to weapons and men anything on the other side but significantly added:

There is one additional concern I should voice, one that General Taylor and I share. We must develop the Reserve. The Reserve is not just a second line. It is part of the line. Under the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 we have to develop it from voluntary enlistments, and we have to get 1,350,000 by 1960 to balance our forces. We cannot afford to depend upon the Regular Establishment and the Active Army to do the whole job (p. 97).

Asked if failure to get the Reserve now planned by 1960 would leave us deficient in our ground strength, Secretary Brucker replied:

It certainly would by 1960 unless we get it. We might as well be frank. We are depending on it (p. 97).

I asked General Taylor whether anything specific had happened since last October when he submitted an estimate of \$10.2 billion as required for the essential needs of the Army to lead him to believe we need less Army now than we needed then and he replied frankly: "No, sir."

He confirmed that when the administration budget was made up his request was cut \$800 million and that the House had cut another \$264 million, so that the bill came to the Senate with \$1,063,843,000 less for the Army than General Taylor thought last October was essential. Then I asked him:

If you had the sole say-so, what would you do under the statistics I cited? Your original request has been cut \$1,063,843,000, and you are unable to point out to us that the situation from a military standpoint is better, including the negotiations for a dependable worldwide disarmament which is dimmer now than then—and it is possible that some of our allied support that existed in the fall of last year has to some extent deteriorated. What would you do if you were sitting here passing on what the economy can stand, and then on what is needed to preserve our lives, which are worth more than money to everybody, I assume. What would you do?

General Taylor, who knows from bitter personal experience what it means to face Communist forces in the field, replied frankly:

As Chief of Staff, I would adhere to my previous recommendation.

To be sure there was no misunderstanding, I asked again if, as Chief of

Staff, when his recommendation had been cut more than a billion dollars he would put it back. He said:

Yes, sir (p. 99).

So, Mr. President, I believe there is a solid basis for my feeling that we cannot rely primarily on our ground forces to deter the Soviets from launching an attack on us any time the Kremlin leaders feel it is to their advantage to do so.

Now, what about seapower?

There is no question that the United States now has the most powerful Navy in the world, but in World War I and particularly in World War II we found that the greatest surface fleets were highly vulnerable to mass submarine attacks; and while we have continued to work on defensive measures, it seems apparent that the development of underwater craft has advanced at a comparable pace, as is illustrated by our atomic-powered *Nautilus* with its almost unlimited cruising range.

In the prepared statement which he submitted to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, had this to say about the Soviet threat:

The United States is not alone in recognizing the importance of seapower. The Soviet Union is aware of the attack potential afforded by use of the seas and the transportation problem the free world faces in the event of war. She has been engaged in a huge naval building program since World War II.

The New Soviet Navy is powerful. It is designed to isolate the United States from our overseas bases and allies. It is designed to prevent our naval forces and supply ships from reaching European and Asiatic waters. It is designed to prevent vital raw materials from reaching our industry from overseas sources.

In any war—regardless of length—regardless of weapons used—the Soviets will endeavor to isolate and destroy our forces deployed overseas. They will pinpoint and try to destroy our overseas bases and our overseas stockpiles. If the Soviets can prevent our Navy and our supply ships from reaching their overseas terminals—they can overrun Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, as they see fit.

German submarines almost severed our sea communications with Europe in World War II. The Soviets' undersea force right now—consists of over 400 submarines. That is about seven times the strength with which the Germans entered World War II.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The statement by the Chief of Naval Operations, a statement already made by the Secretary of the Navy, that "The Soviets' undersea force right now consists of over 400 submarines" was made many months ago. If the number was more than 400 at that time, the chances are that it is considerably greater now.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Undoubtedly; and very likely the number now is more than 7 times as great as the submarine force with which Germany, in World War II, almost wrecked us. Furthermore, the Soviet submarine is probably a much better type of craft.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Is it not true also that the production of Russian submarines is many times greater than the

production of submarines in the free world?

Mr. ROBERTSON. There is no question about that.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Therefore the already great difference between the number of submarines which the Soviets have as compared with the number we have is rapidly becoming even greater, is it not?

Mr. ROBERTSON. This is what Admiral Burke testified:

Their submarine building program is still accelerating.

They are his exact words. He testified further:

New snorkel-equipped units have the latest technological advances, including long endurance, higher submerged speed and improved weapons, detection, and communications gear. They can operate thousands of miles from their home bases and are capable of sustained operations off the coasts of the United States (p. 129).

Mr. President, in the light of that testimony I believe it also is evident that, whether or not we are ahead of Russia in development of nuclear-powered craft, the Soviets have in being an offensive undersea force which makes it unlikely that they would regard our Navy as an adequate deterrent to keep them from attacking us if they chose to do so.

But if our ground and sea forces, regardless of their defensive value to us, are discounted as effective instruments to prevent the start of another war, that leaves only air power. And what did we find out about that in our hearings?

Gen. Curtis LeMay, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, told us that if war were to start tomorrow, we would unquestionably be the victor, but he followed that statement quickly with sobering qualifications. He said there were two reasons for our current superiority: First, failure of the Soviet leaders to recognize the true value of strategic air power immediately after World War II; second, realization by our own national and military leaders of the potential of an atomically armed Air Force and their timely action to insure its full development—page 1222.

General LeMay said we concluded in 1954 an extensive study of Strategic Air Command requirements through 1965, but the results of that study had to be discarded in 1955 after the Soviets gave us a glimpse of their actual progress in developing a strategic air force. He continued:

We have since received a series of new estimates, each more pessimistic than its predecessor, all of which emphasized one point. The Soviets now have a distinct appreciation for the decisive nature of the long-range air weapon and they developed this appreciation early enough to be able to display today substantial and unexpected progress in the building of a strategic air arm. . . .

If one takes the new estimates of projected Soviet capability at face value and measures them against our current programs, only one conclusion can be drawn.

Who is better equipped to draw that one conclusion than General LeMay? I quote verbatim the conclusion he draws:

The supremacy which we enjoy today is on the wane. By 1959 the Soviets will have the superior strategic air force. (P. 1223.)



In our executive committee session there was discussion of the latest estimates of our needs for B-52 and B-47 bombers, involving figures which cannot be publicized, and General LeMay told us the figures he had mentioned as requirements actually could not be obtained. He said:

It is too late now. We have delayed too long.

Even if the planes could be produced, he said, we would be unable to man and support the force properly. His recommendation, therefore, even though it involved increasing funds for the Strategic Air Force next year from \$5 billion to \$8 billion, and continuing at that rate for 4 years, still did not represent the kind of program we ought to have to fully meet the Soviet threat, but merely the best we could hope to do in the situation in which we find ourselves.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It is true, is it not, that in 1953 General Vandenberg predicted, if there were further cuts in personnel, it would make no difference whether or not planes were obtained because the skilled personnel would not be available to operate those planes?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is exactly what General LeMay said. He said it is too late now. We are late getting the planes, but we do not have the trained men to handle them, and we do not have the dispersal fields. General Vandenberg was absolutely correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. But this administration, instead of trying to raise the level of skilled personnel, states that because we do not have the personnel, we do not need the planes or the bases. Is not that, in effect, a correct statement?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is correct. The committee discussed the subject quite fully with General LeMay. I asked, "If you broke down the \$3,800,000,000 into so much for personnel, so much for bases, and so much for miscellaneous items, could you get delivery, could you get the men, and could you fulfill the program?"

He said, "Absolutely, we could."

Mr. SYMINGTON. Instead of raising the number of the lowest of the 3 basic components of airpower to the magnitude of the other 2, is not, this administration consistently lowering the 2 higher components to the level of the lowest?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I think that is true, and I believe it has been a very dangerous miscalculation.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Could there be any other reason for this policy except the belief that money is the most important characteristic of our defense program?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I would have to admit, without saying what was the most important characteristic, that the recommendations of a very able and fine Secretary of the Treasury undoubtedly have had some bearing on the program.

Proceeding with the testimony of General LeMay, in response to a question I asked him, he said:

In response to questions I asked, General LeMay said:

The force that we require now, based on the latest intelligence estimate of the Russians' force is larger than we can possibly produce between now and when it will be necessary. We just cannot do it unless we go into all-out emergency measures.

So, I have submitted a force that I think we can produce in that time and the cost for that force alone, Strategic Air Command, is about \$8 billion a year. I think it is well within the resources of the country to do that. I think it is well within the ability of the country to do it, without going to emergency measures. Whether it will be enough or not I do not know.

Listen to this, Mr. President:

Our calculations are that it will not be enough—

That is, the \$8 billion.

I am here today in support of the proposal of the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ] to add \$1,160,000,000. That is less than one-third of what General LeMay recommended, and he said, according to his present calculations, that if the amount he recommended were continued for 4 years, it would not be enough.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The approved committee recommendation now in the bill is \$1,160,000,000. Is not that practically only one-third of the recommendation made by General LeMay?

Mr. ROBERTSON. He recommended \$3,800,000,000. That is correct. He also said, as I have just quoted, that if that amount were provided for 4 years, which, in his calculation would be about as much as could be provided at this time, it would not be sufficient.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I will say to the Senator from Virginia, for whose opinion I have a great deal of respect, that General LeMay was testifying as head of the Strategic Air Command. He was speaking of his command alone. He was asking for \$3 billion a year for the next 4 years for his command alone. As I recall his testimony, he did not profess to talk about ballistic missiles or guided missiles or new aircraft which may be developed. That is security information, and we cannot discuss it.

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is correct, but I shall point out later in my statement that the forces under the Chief of Staff, who was thinking of missiles and fighter planes and new planes, have already been subjected to a cut of \$3 billion. I am going to point that out.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. All I want to suggest is that these figures of General LeMay did not include other funds which may be required for other purposes, but includes merely what he wanted for his Strategic Air Command, for which he is entitled to ask funds.

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is correct; and it looks like a lot of money. What we are proposing is a third of what he asked, and which he said was not enough.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Is not it the official view of the Air Force as expressed by Mr. Quarles, and in one area with which General LeMay is involved, that for a long time we shall have to depend on "man bombs"? Ballistic missiles, intercontinental and intermediate which are in initial stages of development, will help to supplement our air atomic devices, and in years ahead may substantially supplant "man bombs," but that is a long way ahead.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The junior Senator from Virginia has heard so much testimony, classified and unclassified, and what has been said about guided missiles is classified, so that he is afraid to say anything more than this, and I am sure this may legitimately be said publicly: "We do not have it now; we do not know when we will get it."

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. I wanted to say to the distinguished junior Senator from Virginia that what I have just said has been uttered publicly by Mr. Quarles and by General LeMay.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The distinguished Senator from Washington is one of our best experts on classified material, because he has served on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, where nearly everything is classified. The Senator must be fearful of waking up in the night and saying something he ought not to say. The Senator from Washington has served on the subcommittee of which the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] is chairman, and I am sure he has heard the facts, because the subcommittee's duty was to learn the facts. Therefore, I am sure that when the Senator from Washington states that what he has said can be publicly said, he is correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The distinguished Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ] mentioned the fact that the amount of money requested by General LeMay is three times the amount contained in the amendment of the Senator from New Mexico. As I read the testimony that in the included provision for \$1,160,000,000, is a great deal of money which does not go to the Strategic Air Command. There is provided \$100 million for research and development; \$200 million for bases; \$40 million for operation and maintenance.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The total amount included money for research, also.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think I said \$100 million for research and development. The actual difference is much greater than only one-third.

Mr. CHAVEZ. What I meant was the total difference between the approximately \$3 billion and the \$1,160,000,000.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There was an additional \$450 million for aircraft procurement.

Mr. CHAVEZ. And \$20 million for personnel.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I wish to quote again from what General LeMay said, because nobody can question his qualifications on the subject of strategic air power.

General LeMay reminded us that we have the only strategic capability in the NATO organization, and must carry the full load of that type of defense.

I told General LeMay I realized that if we got into war we would need all the defensive services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, but that I wanted his opinion on what would be the greatest deterrent to the Russians to keep them from starting a war.

He replied: "Nuclear offensive airpower."

General LeMay said that, looking at the national defense picture for the next 15 years, we can see a number of enemy strengths of various types we may have to face, but the only threat which can destroy the United States and our allies is the Soviet capability to deliver a surprise, massive nuclear air attack. Then he said:

I know of only one thing which will make us capable of meeting the threat of an all-out nuclear attack as well as lesser threats and that is the clear possession by the United States of an effective strategic nuclear air offensive force in being. Its size and effectiveness must meet the enemy threat or we invite miscalculations on his part which could lead to our own defeat. There are no adjectives which can adequately describe the destruction and desolation which would result from a war in 1960. We must have a force strong enough in size, so deployed and in such a condition of readiness to guarantee to him that the inevitable consequence of any attack they might launch will be devastation of his own homeland. Should they be so foolhardy as to miscalculate our capability, this force must be capable of insuring the emergence of the United States as the superior power (p. 1225).

In addition to the need for the Strategic Air Force as a deterrent to war, General LeMay said all military men will agree that no military task can be undertaken in these modern days until a nation has air superiority and has won the airpower battle. It is necessary, therefore, to put into the hands of the military the weapons to win the airpower battle before any other military task is undertaken—page 1250.

Mr. President, in contrast with that strong plea for added airpower, what did our committee learn about the budget figures on which the bill passed by the House was based?

When the Chief of Staff for the Air Force, Gen. Nathan F. Twining, was before us I asked him how the Air Force budget submitted to the Congress last January compared with the figure he had submitted for the Air Force last October, and he replied there was a difference of more than \$3 billion. The Air Force in October said it needed \$20,480 million, and the President 3 months later recommended that they be given \$16,518 million. Later the Defense Department found out some things it did not know before about our needs, and recommended \$376 million as a supplemental appropriation, but that still left a difference of more than \$3 billion between the request and the budget figures—page 162.

Later, testimony brought out that the Air Force Advisory Committee on budget matters had done some paring which resulted in a final figure of \$19,392 million, which still was \$2,874 million more than the budget recommendation; and explanations were offered as to how some of the difference was to be made up by adjustment of reorder leadtime, and some by revision of procurement estimates to which the Air Force had agreed, and some by changes in actual procurement plans.

After those adjustments had been made, however, there remained a difference of \$500 million, which General Twining and Maj. Gen. Frank A. Bogart, the Air Force budget director, defined simply as an "arbitrary reduction." General Bogart said:

We just absorb that. We don't know quite how (p. 1276).

So, Mr. President, at the end of our hearings the Appropriations Committee was faced with uncontroverted evidence that our airpower is deteriorating, relative to that of the Soviets, at a rate which will leave us in second place by 1960; that a program increased by \$3 billion a year, as recommended by General LeMay, to use our full productive capability, would still not fully meet our estimated requirements to retain superiority; and that the even smaller program officially recommended by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force had been placed under the handicap of an arbitrary cut of \$500 million, which those who must carry on the program have not figured out how to absorb.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. POTTER in the chair). Does the Senator from Virginia yield to the Senator from New Mexico?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Is it not true that notwithstanding that General Twining—who is now in Russia, to find out how advanced Russian airpower is, in comparison to our airpower—stated that he was willing to go along with the budget recommendations of the Defense Department, yet he thought the program was austere?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is correct.

Mr. CHAVEZ. What does the Senator from Virginia think General Twining meant by his use of the word "austere"?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I think he meant that not only did he not have as much as he had requested or as much as he thought he would need, but that he was like a man who had been underfed: he was still alive, but was not feeling good about it; in other words, he had been trained down until he was too thin. That indicates General Twining's attitude, after he had requested appropriations amounting to \$3 billion more than the Air Force received in the end.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield to me?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Not only did General Twining request that amount of money; but the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Quarles, a distinguished scientist in his own right, asked for \$2,363,000,000 more than Secretary Wilson allowed.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Yes. Every time anyone looked at the appropriation, it was reduced.

Mr. President, that was the basis on which a majority of our committee voted to increase the Air Force funds \$1,300,000,000 over the amount allowed by the House, and \$1,112 million over the Budget estimate.

But, Mr. President, since the Secretary of Defense has said our proposed increase in funds for the Air Force is a "phony," and that our concern about the comparative quality as well as quantity of the Russian Air Force is not soundly based, I want to point to additional testimony which emphasizes and reinforces the information given to our Appropriations Committee.

During the same period when we were conducting our hearings, the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Senate Armed Services Committee was holding hearings focused on the question: "Are the present and planned strengths of the United States Air Force adequate to preserve the peace through the deterrence of aggression?" That was the topic and the theme on which the testimony was taken.

The witnesses at the hearing were not men who had made their reputations by supervising the production and sale of automobiles. They were the past and present commanders of our Armed Forces, who learned by personal experience in Africa, in Europe, over the Pacific, and in Korea the practical difficulties of modern scientific warfare; and they were men whose business it has been to study Soviet actions and to plan the details of the course we must follow if the Communists make a future move against us.

One of those witnesses was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff during World War II; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1949; and, after that, Director for 3 years of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has the mission of keeping us informed as to developments in potentially hostile nations.

General Smith, who appeared under subpoena, naturally was discreet as to what he told the committee; but he made clear his belief that we seriously underestimated the ability of the Soviet Union for scientific development and industrial production. He said we knew they had a few top-level scientists, but thought there was a shortage of technically trained people and of those with practical ability. We found that we were wrong as to their ability to take training rapidly. We also failed to make proper allowance for the advantage of a monolithic system of government which can meet defense and heavy industrial needs by ignoring public opinion and allowing light industry to go short.

They can ignore the wishes of the man in the street—

General Smith said.

If he wants to buy another suit of clothes or a cooking pot, he can go short, if it is necessary, for them to concentrate on heavy industry (p. 10-11).

General Smith agreed, in answer to a question, that since the end of World



War II, the Soviets have been able to break our monopoly of atomic weapons, atomic and hydrogen, fission and fusion, and said we would be justified in assuming that they have been concentrating on a delivery system for those weapons—page 13. In that concentration, as he pointed out, they have had the advantage of ignoring civilian desires or demands, and concentrating on this one task of overtaking our strength in the air.

Another witness heard by the Armed Forces Subcommittee was Gen. Carl Spaatz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who retired in 1948, after a distinguished career which included service as Chief Air Adviser to General Eisenhower in North Africa, and Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Forces in Europe in 1944, and against Japan in 1945.

General Spaatz said:

The Air Force in being at this very moment I would say, in my opinion, is adequate to meet any threat that the Russians might put against us from the air. As of today. But remembering also that the money we spend today will determine what we have 4 or 5 or 6 years from now (p. 52).

Asked, then, whether at the rate of present spending, and based on our present budget, we will continue to have an Air Force that can carry out the assigned mission, General Spaatz replied:

I do not believe so. In the first place, the Russians have improved their air position both with atomic weapons and by increasing the range and performance of the aircraft, closing a gap that existed before. And in the second place, I am not sure that we are anticipating what the situation will be 4 or 5 years from now by spending enough money in certain fields (p. 52-54).

General Spaatz then mentioned airbases for dispersion, funds for more research, and greater production of ultra-long-range aircraft as areas in which more spending would be profitable; and these are the same objectives our Appropriations Committee had in mind in voting for an increase of \$1.1 billion.

The next witness questioned by the Armed Services Subcommittee was General LeMay, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command. Asked for his views about the best defense against atomic air attack, he said—and he was testifying under oath—that all responsible airmen agree it is impossible to provide an airtight defense against a well-coordinated and properly executed atomic bombing attack, and that some of the planes are bound to get through and hit their targets. Therefore, General LeMay said:

The primary defensive force is the ability to strike back with sufficient effectiveness to provide a deterrent force.

And he quoted the statement of Winston Churchill that—

The primary deterrents to aggression remain the nuclear weapon and the ability of the highly organized and trained United States Strategic Air Command to use it (p. 101-102).

That statement was echoed this month, by the way, but with a different and rather alarming emphasis, by the present Prime Minister of England, Anthony Eden, who asked why the countries of western Europe should continue

to spend \$12 billion a year on defense, in accord with a 100-division plan laid out in 1952, when the real barrier to Soviet aggression now is the hydrogen-bomb power of the United States.

When others see no adequate deterrent force except what our Air Force can provide, and are unwilling even to try to supply such a force, can we afford to neglect our own defense?

General LeMay told the Armed Forces Subcommittee, as he told our Appropriations Subcommittee, that Russian offensive airpower has increased more rapidly than had been expected when our Strategic Air Force program was established in 1953; but that we have made no consequential changes in our plan, and, therefore, our strength in relation to the Soviet strength is decreasing; and unless there are changes, it will continue to decrease through the 1958-60 period.

Mr. President, Secretary Wilson has said we are unduly alarmed about Soviet progress, and that their Bison bombers are not in a class with our B-52's. That is his opinion. On just what evidence it is based, I do not know. But I want to call particular attention to the testimony of General LeMay as to the quality of Russian airplanes.

General LeMay was the man who introduced the formation pattern bombing used during World War II, and personally led many missions. He also headed the Research and Development staff of the Air Force, before taking command of the Strategic Air Force. We do know, therefore, something about the basis on which he would evaluate a Russian airplane and compare it with one of ours.

When he was asked what kind of long-range bombers the Russians now have, General LeMay said:

The Soviets now have the Bear, which is a turboprop aircraft; the Bison, which is a jetpowered aircraft comparable to our B-52. These are new aircraft, and neither is obsolete (p. 104).

Then he was asked whether the quality of these bombers was comparable with our own aircraft, including the B-52. He replied:

If our estimates as to the performance characteristics of the Bison are accurate, then it is comparable to our B-52. The Bear, while a long-range bomber, is a turboprop-powered aircraft, and, therefore, its performance is greater in range, but less in speed and altitude, than that of the B-52 (p. 104).

Asked about production rates, General LeMay said:

If our estimate of Soviet production is accurate, then they are producing Bears and Bisons at a combined rate substantially higher than we are producing B-52's.

Mr. President, I pause here to say that everyone knows that the Russians have more of them, to begin with, than we have B-52's.

General LeMay said also that the Soviets now have more Bear and Bison bombers in inventory than we have B-52's; that they are producing their long-range bombers at a substantially higher rate than we now are, we do not now plan to increase the rate of production of B-52's to a point where it will equal the Russian production and

assuming no change in our present plans and programs, they will have a substantially larger force of this type of airplane than we will in the 1958-60 period—page 104.

As to striking power, General LeMay said it would be foolhardy to assume the Russians would not provide weapons, bases, refueling capacity, maintenance capacity, training and professional personnel to support their numerical superiority of aircraft and therefore, he said:

I can only conclude then that they will have a greater striking power than we will have in the time period under our present plans and programs.

When he was asked if he thought there should be an increase in the number of B-52's planned for the Strategic Air Command, General LeMay said:

Yes; I believe that we should maintain the deterrent position that we have had over the past 10 years. I think this means an increase in the planned number of B-52's.

He added that more bases also would be needed because our building of bases has lagged behind production of airplanes and has resulted in shortage of bases and crowding of units—page 105.

When the commander in chief of our Strategic Air Command was asked if it was within the competence of the United States to step up B-52 production between now and 1960 enough to prevent Russia from having an undue preponderance he said that it was possible; that we have factories which could do the job—page 227.

But in discussing our needs General LeMay also said that we do not have the proper ratio of jet tankers to jet bombers to develop our full intercontinental strike capability, that if we get more B-52's we will have a still greater need for jet tankers and that a satisfactory tanker ratio for the 1958-60 period can be obtained only "if prompt action were taken now"—page 107.

That statement ought to be weighted alongside the statement of the Secretary of Defense that the Russian long-range bombers are not so formidable because they lack tankers for refueling.

Then the Armed Services Subcommittee heard from Gen. Earle E. Partridge, commander in chief of the forces on which we rely for our continental defense, and who said his comments on the threat we face were based on general estimates on which all intelligence agencies agree, and which are prepared for the National Security Council.

General Partridge said it was estimated that today the Russians have the capability of sending hundreds of bombers against us of which a number, deleted for security reasons in the printed hearings, would arrive within our defenses, and that this capability would be measurably increased by 1959.

This witness too called the Bison bomber comparable to our B-52 and pointed out that it apparently does with four jet engines what our craft does with eight. He said we have no counterpart to the Bear, which does not have as high altitude or speed as the B-52, but has extremely long range to permit a

two-way attack on this country without requiring refueling—page 238.

Summarizing, General Partridge said he believed it must be assumed from the data he and others had given—

That the Soviets have the capability for air attack on the United States using large numbers of modern bombers, and that they have a sufficient number of weapons to destroy the key targets of this country unless those targets are well defended (p. 240).

He said also that if the Russians put just 50 bombs of the proper kind on target they could destroy or at least bring under fire 40 percent of our population, 50 percent of our key facilities, and 60 percent of the industry of the United States—page 239.

When asked if we have planes with capabilities to provide the defense which he felt was needed against such attacks, General Partridge said:

I am not satisfied with what we have at this time (p. 283).

I invite attention also, Mr. President, to the testimony before this committee of Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, the Air Force's Chief of Staff for Development, who said the technological lead of our Air Force over the Soviets' has become "progressively more expensive and decreasingly strong." He continued:

If we are to maintain the required qualitative deterrent Air Force in-being, we must always stay ahead through the development of tomorrow's weapons yesterday.

General Putt said:

We could lose the next showdown if proper emphasis is not being placed on tomorrow's weapons today; further, dollars spent for less than the best Air Force, as measured against requirements, is a total waste. In fact, it is a national suicide (p. 537).

Yet all the experts who appeared before the committee testified to the effect that under our present program we shall wind up in 1960 with the second-best Air Force. This, according to the witness whose testimony I have just quoted, would be national suicide.

General Putt said Russian research progress is at a more rapid rate than ours is today and they are threatening to overtake us. He said this progress added to our research requirements but that we did not provide as much in additional funds as he felt was required to do the necessary job—page 555. Then—and I direct particular attention to this—General Putt said in reply to questions that of the funds appropriated by the Congress for research and development in 1956, a sum of \$30 million was withheld from the Air Force by the Bureau of the Budget on recommendation of the Department of Defense—page 556.

He said also that in comparison with \$129 million asked for research and development to meet Killian report requirements, only \$52.5 million was provided in fiscal 1956 by the Department of Defense, and of this \$30 million had to be used for non-Killian items which were to have been paid for by the money which was impounded.

Later General Putt confirmed published reports that the Russians have a passenger plane with engines apparently producing 19,000 pounds of thrust com-

pared with the 10,500 produced by our B-52 engines and said:

I think had we had enough money to carry it on, we would have developed bigger engines sooner than we have (p. 569).

He added that what concerned him more than the fact that the Russians have bigger engines than we have is the demonstration by these engines of their ability to overcome complex and difficult problems—pages 569 to 570.

Finally, Mr. President, I refer briefly to the testimony of former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, Trevor Gardner, who said that our tendency during the last 3 years has been to avoid making the kinds of decisions that would assure our staying ahead of the Russians in weapons research and development—page 334 of transcript.

Mr. Gardner said the Air Force repeatedly stated in detail to the civilian managers of the Department of Defense the Air Force programs and amounts of money needed to develop new engines, fuels, and other matters suggested by the Russian competition but they had been unable to break through the flat ceiling of guidelines, which he described as blank instructions from the Secretary of Defense, dictating the total amount of money which could be spent, regardless of projects involved—page 335.

He said that after learning of the Bison and other aircraft developed by the Russians and the implications of their advanced technology in powerplants and radar "we attempted to make a response by asking for a larger budget and we were told that we must make do with the amount of funds that were available under an austere budget"—page 341.

This witness said that "unless we recognize the power of the Russian threat by increasing our bomber forces and our defensive system and our research and development on missiles, we are being extremely foolhardy"—page 360.

Mr. President, I have presented only a few scattered excerpts from the large volume of testimony before two committees indicating the vital importance of our maintaining a first-class rather than a second-class Air Force as a deterrent against an atomic attack.

Our situation today reminds me, in some respects, of that many years ago, when Gen. Billy Mitchell tried to convince Army and Navy leaders of the importance of airpower. Instead of being recognized as a prophet, he was court-martialed. I hope none of those who have been bold enough to give us their honest opinion in these hearings will meet a similar fate. We know today that Billy Mitchell was right, but we lost valuable time during which we might have become better prepared for World War II.

Today there are many who, while recognizing the airplane as a new weapon of modern warfare, still believe that wars will continue to be won or lost by conventional older weapons, and that therefore any program of defense expansion must involve proportional expansion of all convention weapons and branches of the service.

I do not challenge the theory that all weapons will be needed and used. But the point which must be stressed is that there can be no winner in the next war; and it is far more important to try to prevent it than to plan to win it after it starts.

I cannot see how any civilian, much less a military expert, can claim that a large land army, a large navy, or a large combination of both can be as effective as a deterrent of future aggression as a large strategic air force capable of inflicting such great damage that no nation will want to incur that risk.

It is for this reason I am supporting the increased appropriation for our Air Force, and I accept the challenge of Secretary of Defense Wilson to tell the taxpayers what I am doing and why I am doing it.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have listened with a great deal of interest to the presentation of the able junior Senator from Virginia. I must admit that there is much he said with which I am wholly in agreement.

I am not in agreement with those who suggest that we have a second-rate Air Force today, or that we might have a second-rate Air Force in the future.

I wish to ask the Senator from Virginia if, during the hearings and during the executive sessions of the committee, emphasis was placed, in the testimony given before the committee, upon the need for attention to the question of the personnel of the Air Force, the retention of fringe benefits, and the increase of specialist pay, so as to avoid the result which is indicated by the table on page 901 of the printed hearings, which shows that during the past fiscal year we lost 1,713 E-7 airmen, and gained only 192.

Mr. ROBERTSON. All those matters were considered and discussed. General LeMay said:

It would injure the morale of my whole outfit if, in order to compete with skilled industry, I should put one sergeant's pay twice as high as another sergeant's pay. I cannot do that. It is unnecessary. But if you will give us fringe benefits, better housing, and better assurance of a sane program, we can hold the necessary men we need over a period of years.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Were those suggestions made specifically?

Mr. ROBERTSON. The suggestions were made specifically, and we had assurance of the Armed Services Committee that they would take care of legislation on the subject of fringe benefits. We cannot write fringe benefits into an appropriation bill. That would be legislation. We do have an item for new housing, for more personnel, and for education, and things for which we can properly appropriate, but we would have to change the law before we could provide so-called fringe benefits. Proposed legislation on that subject is now under consideration by the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. GOLDWATER. And that committee has made a definite recommendation; has it not?



Mr. ROBERTSON. I do not think the committee has reported the bill, but I know the Defense Department has made specific recommendations concerning the legislation it wants for the armed services. The committee has the matter under consideration, and hopes to report a bill to the Senate before adjournment.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I ask these questions, Mr. President, because, while I am in agreement with the Senator from Virginia that in certain categories of airplanes we certainly should have a faster production of planes, I think we are completely overlooking the nub of the whole problem when we seem to neglect the very source of the trouble, which is the low rate of enlistments not only in the Air Force, but in all our forces.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I can assure the Senator that that is only a part of the problem. The big part of the problem is that we do not have enough B-52's. When we get them, we have got to have more personnel and certain types of programs and plans to hold the technical men in the service. That will be by means of better living conditions and fringe benefits. The Air Force will need enough men to do the job.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I do not wish to prolong the discussion.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I should like to clear up the personnel angle. The first report which General LeMay made was on personnel, for the reason that when a B-52 is acquired a different kind of technical personnel is needed than that which is necessary for some other kind of aircraft. It is like a mechanic working on an old jalopy and one working on a high-powered car.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I agree with the Senator. I wish to comment further on the need of additional personnel. I am not in complete disagreement with the Senator from Virginia. The Senator from Virginia remembers that we have a fleet of more than a thousand B-47's. The B-47 is not an obsolete airplane. Our trouble is that we do not have a sufficient number of crews.

We spend approximately \$684,000 for training a lead pilot, and then we lose him to industry. If it takes a little more pay, if it takes a little more fringe benefits, let us give them. I believe that is the best investment we can make. I imagine a colonel who will command a B-52 will probably have three-quarters of a million dollars spent on his training. If we listen to a discussion based on numbers of planes only, the people of the country may become unduly alarmed. We must remember several things about the Russian Air Force. Their experience in World War II was based almost entirely on tactical support of ground forces. The Russians flew very few strategic missions and only one over 200 miles. We performed hundreds of thousands of missions before we perfected our bombing patterns. The Russians, from every indication we can get, have not been able to duplicate our strategic bombing efforts. We have the finest trained crews in the world in SAC.

Mr. ROBERTSON. We are told that the Russians have superiority in every category except the B-47. If we pay attention to what the top experts say, we can still lick them; but 4 years from now, if we do not speed up, we will have a second-class air force. During the course of my speech I have quoted technical witnesses who are well informed on the subject, not the kind of people who say an American can whip his weight in wildcats. That is a lot of tommyrot.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I could not more agree with the Senator. The point I am trying to make is that the morale of the Air Force is affected when responsible Senators say that our crews are inferior to the Russian crews.

Mr. ROBERTSON. They are the best in the world.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am saying that we should pay attention to the enlisted men and officers of all grades, from second lieutenants up to lieutenant colonels, and let us worry about a housing program here and there, about hospitalization, and other fringe benefits. I should like to see the Senator devote an hour and a half to talking about the personnel of the Air Force rather than to the subject of equipment.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I can give my distinguished colleague a little encouragement, because I am told that next year we are going to step up these expenditures.

Mr. GOLDWATER. This situation has not developed in the past year or 2 years or 3 years; it has been developing ever since World War II.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, with the indulgence of the Senator from Arizona, let me say I am glad he has made his statement. I am very sure there is one vote the committee will have on the \$20 million increase for personnel. It makes me most happy.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Will the Senator tell me whether \$20 million is sufficient?

Mr. CHAVEZ. According to the best information we have, \$20 million is probably not sufficient, but—

Mr. ROBERTSON. It is sufficient for a one-third step-up.

Mr. GOLDWATER. All I am trying to point out is that so far I have not heard enough stress placed on personnel.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I think if the Senator had read my first statement he would know that I devoted several pages to nothing but personnel. When we talk about personnel, there is no question that the Senator from Arizona is correct, but an increase in personnel cannot be taken care of merely by fringe benefits in order to induce men to remain in the service. Corporals, sergeants, second lieutenants, and first lieutenants are extremely essential, and we should take care of them, but I have not heard anyone complain about another shortage, which is in the higher echelon. A national magazine, less than 3 or 4 weeks ago, contained a statement regarding the many admirals and generals who are now working in private enterprise.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not think that enters into this discussion at all.

Mr. SALTONSTALL and Mr. JACKSON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Virginia yield, and, if so, to whom?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I should like to yield to my colleague from Massachusetts, and then I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I wish to emphasize what the Senator from Arizona [Mr. GOLDWATER], has said, as well as what has been said by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], and the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ]. Every man in uniform and every civilian in the Air Force believes that the personnel situation can be helped by fringe benefits and in various other ways, but perhaps more by creating a new group of technicians.

I should like to take exception to one statement which the Senator from Virginia has made. General LeMay and many other generals, and also many civilian officials, have testified that today we have the best Air Force in the world. No one has said that it would be the second best Air Force in the world 2, 3, or 4 years from now. What they have said is that they are worried about whether it will be such a deterrent as to prevent an attack upon us. That is the principal issue; and the problem will be solved, as others have said, by personnel rather than by planes.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Let us realize the difference between putting specific words in General LeMay's mouth and what he actually said. He said that on the present basis Russia was gaining superiority; and that if we continue on the present basis, then 4 years from now Russia would have superior airpower. If that does not forecast that we will be second best, it might mean that we will be third best. Certainly we will not be first.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. We can never engage in a numbers race with Russia. What we must do is to keep up the quality of our planes and of our research.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I agree with the Senator's statement, because Russia has twice as many planes as we have. She outnumbers us in every respect except as to B-47's.

I wish to finish my remarks with this thought. We have the best potential in the world in our American youth. They must be trained. They must be adequately equipped. We need not match Russia in numbers, but there are certain fundamentals with which we must be concerned. I think it was with that in mind that General LeMay and the other persons I have quoted considered all the factors which must be kept in mind. They admit that we cannot even try to catch up with Russia on the ground; that is out of reason. Similarly, we may not be able to keep up with Russia in the building of submarines; that is not in the plans, and certainly it is not in the present budget.

But we do not have to think, when it comes to the realm of flying a bomber 3,000, 4,000, or 5,000 miles, and dropping bombs, that we are second to anybody.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I agree with the Senator from Virginia as to that.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Much has been said about the United States not having a better personnel program. I could not agree more with anything than with what has been said on that subject by my distinguished colleagues this afternoon. I think the record should be made clear, however, so that every Senator will realize the exact situation. The truth is that the committee which is investigating airpower has asked for recommendations for improvements in the personnel program. We have not received those recommendations from the Department of Defense. Therefore, it is rather difficult for Senators to be called upon to improve the personnel program when we do not have the recommendations from the Department.

We should not have to ask the Department of Defense for recommendations; they should have been submitted by the Department on the Department's own volition.

What all this boils down to is dollars. There is no substitute for money when it comes to getting a stronger Air Force. If we are to have more planes, we must have the supporting resources of personnel, bases, research, and development. That all costs money. It is not possible to concentrate on the training of personnel in order to fly the planes, but not ask for money.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Everyone must agree with that statement.

In the case of the Army, if we are to have more military bases overseas, it will be necessary to have more ground troops to guard the bases. That all adds up to more money.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If I may, I should like to have the attention of the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts. I had to leave the floor temporarily. I should like to ask a question of the Senator from Virginia based upon some of the observations which he made in response to questions I understand were asked by the Senator from Massachusetts.

It is true, is it not, that in 1948 it was said we could not match the Communists man for man on the ground.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Absolutely; and all the witnesses testified to that effect.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In 1952 it was agreed, was it not, that we could not afford to match Russia submarine for submarine?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That has not been so completely agreed to, but it has been tacitly understood. Of course, we have made no effort to do so.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as Russia now has hundreds more submarines—many more times the number than we have—regardless of the reasons for this situation, the decision has been made; has it not?

Mr. ROBERTSON. Indubitably.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Recently, the Department of Defense, and I believe even higher authority, stated that the United States could not afford to match the Communists plane for plane.

Mr. ROBERTSON. That is correct; but the statement was that it was not necessary.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Neither are we matching Russia scientist for scientist or engineer for engineer in our training programs. Is not that correct?

Mr. ROBERTSON. All the testimony is that Russia is moving ahead of us in the matter of trained scientists. They are training twice as many as we train. Russia provides attractive rewards for scientists. All Russia's schools are channeling scientists into the production effort.

I have placed in the RECORD the speech made by former Senator Benton, in which he sets forth how Russia is moving ahead of us in those fields. He said that if we are worried about being bombed, we had better give some thought as to how to win a war without firing a shot.

Mr. SYMINGTON. With the exception of our carrier force and our medium bomber force, the latter becoming rapidly less and less effective because of the deterioration of our base structure around the world, which my colleague from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] will develop in more detail, it now appears that there is little in which we can afford to match Russia. Is not that correct?

Mr. ROBERTSON. General LeMay wanted to match Russia's Bison with our B-52. But he said it is now too late. We cannot do it except by going onto a full, all-out basis. He said that even if we provided \$3,800,000,000 for 8 years, we would not actually match the Soviet Union, but that with our superior technique and skill we could deter them from seeking a fight.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Since I have had the honor of being in the Senate, many Senators have taken the floor in opposition to military appropriations on the ground there already was a large amount of unexpended funds. I hope we can give the Senate, before this debate is over, the truth about our aircraft production. But if any Senator is interested in resisting appropriations for more money, the best way to do that would be to think up ways to further reduce aircraft production. Is not that true? Would they not in that way have a good argument for less money, because of greater unexpended funds?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That would be the easiest way to impound money.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The record of unexpended funds and the record of aircraft production are tied together. I ask the distinguished Senator from Virginia if he will tell us anything he can, of an unclassified nature, as to whether this administration is even approximating its own schedule of B-52 production.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I hope I am not disclosing any classified information, but I must say that we are not approaching even the administration's schedule on actual deliveries.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would most respectfully say that that is not a strictly accurate statement. There has been a defect in the plane which is now being

cured. It cannot be stated on the floor—at least I will not state on the floor—the numbers of planes or the production schedule of the planes. All I can say is that I believe—and I have every reason to believe—that the production of B-52's is going forward on schedule, and that by next January, when Congress returns and we can ask more questions, the program will be on schedule.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I do not deny that it will be on schedule by next January; I simply say that my impression is that the production of B-52's is behind schedule today. I could state the number which have been delivered between January and June, but I do not want to speak out of turn.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator from Virginia know the name of the aircraft company which makes the B-52?

Mr. ROBERTSON. No.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It is the Boeing Aircraft Co. Does the Senator know that before a B-52 can leave the Boeing plant, and fly away, it must be taken by truck or trailer across a main highway, U. S. Highway 99?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I have heard something to that effect, yes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Therefore, thousands of persons have the opportunity to see every B-52 which is built. Does the Senator know that?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I assume the Russians know all the details about matters which I have heard in the greatest confidence, but which I myself cannot disclose.

Mr. SYMINGTON. But the fact is, is it not, that every B-52 which leaves the Boeing plant, before it reaches the field from which it will fly, must be escorted slowly, by a trailer or tractor, across one of the main highways of the United States, on which highway there are no security restrictions of any kind whatsoever?

Mr. ROBERTSON. As the planes leave the factory, anyone can see them move across the ground.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator from Virginia.

I disagree with the Senator from Massachusetts. There is a published figure in excess of 500 as the number which we hope to obtain. There is no secret about that number. However, we do not have even a small percentage of that total, even if we include every plane being held up because of defects.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. JACKSON obtained the floor.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The Senator from Missouri was out of the Chamber when I had a colloquy with the Senator from Virginia. The junior Senator from Virginia and I are not in complete accord on most of these matters. But what constantly frightens me in these annual discussions about airpower and the United States position in airpower is that our Air Force is referred to as a second-class or a second-rate air force. I maintain, as a member of that Air Force, that that is not so.



I think this type of discussion is very healthy, indeed, if it aids to keep up the rate of production and to assure adequate personnel. But I do not like to have the position taken on the floor, particularly by my distinguished friend from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], that the United States today has a second-rate air force.

I think we can maintain or even increase our rate of production.

The Air Force is not engaged in a numbers racket. However, in the Air Force we have a kind of numbers game with personnel. We simply are not attracting young men to the Air Force; or, having obtained them, we are not keeping them. That, to me, is the problem. It is not a new problem; it was in existence when the distinguished Senator from Missouri became head of the Air Force, and at the end of World War II. Through Democratic and Republican administrations alike, it seems to me, we have failed to recognize that service in the Armed Forces today is a profession on an equal basis with the profession of a lawyer or doctor or merchant, and that the compensation provided should be sufficient to make a career in the Armed Forces attractive. That question started the whole argument.

Before I take my seat, I again say, Let us not leave in the minds of the American people the inference that we do not have a good Air Force today. I think such an impression would hurt the morale of the personnel of the Air Force.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I enjoyed the question asked by the distinguished Senator from Arizona. But when he says I stated we had a second-rate Air Force, he is putting words in my mouth.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I shall take them back out of the mouth of the Senator, but such words are coming out of the mouths of other Senators on this floor, and they should not be.

Mr. SYMINGTON. We have had sworn testimony from many commanders in the military service that if the present policies of this administration continue, we can only end up with a second-rate Air Force at some date in the not too distant future. Some day current policies will have to be changed, or else we will have a second-rate Air Force. I refer my friend from Arizona to the sworn testimony of General LeMay, General Partridge, and many others, that unless we change the policies of this administration—which policies are the reason for the debate this afternoon—we shall have a second-rate Air Force. Then we shall add our second-rate Air Force to our quantitatively second-rate Army, and to our second-rate undersea Navy. The policies of this administration are policies which are going to make us, very shortly, second rate in the air. The sworn testimony before the subcommittee proves that statement.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I hope we can keep this debate on a high level, that we can keep politics out of it, and that we can stress to the American people the need for the expenditure of these funds. This is not a new problem. Our military leaders still do not recognize that the Air Force is the pivotal point around which

we should build our whole military strategy. I blame that attitude partly on Congress, partly on the administration, and partly on the old school tie, when we have a new school.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The junior Senator from Missouri was authorized by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services to start an investigation of air power last February. Since that time, I believe it is correct to say I have not in any way referred to this question of money. Each year the question of air power becomes more secondary to the question of money. For once, I hope we can get before the American people the fact that an additional \$1 billion or an additional half billion dollars is not the most important consideration, because if the American people learn the truth with respect to United States air power as against that of the Soviet Union, the question of money will automatically be taken care of.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I could not agree with the Senator from Missouri more completely. In conclusion, I merely wish to say I should not like to have the young men who are standing on alerts at airstrips at the distant early warning lines, and I should not like to have bombing crews on 24-hour alerts, hear coming from us the assertion that we have a second-rate air force today.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to add one statement to that which I made to the Senator from Missouri. I had made certain notes, and I have had them gone over for security reasons. I wanted to make certain I would not break security regulations. In relation to the B-52, we have one wing in service. Additional wings will be added in 1957. If the 1957 budget is carried out as drafted, we shall have 500 B-52's. Presumably there will be new orders for B-52's in the 1958 budget, but the decision as to how many has not yet been made. That is the statement I have had gone over for security reasons.

Mr. SYMINGTON. When will we have 500 B-52's?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. By October 1958.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I hope the Senator from Washington will yield to the chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. JACKSON. I am very happy to yield to the distinguished senior Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I wish to call a statement made by General LeMay to the attention of the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. To what page of the hearings is the Senator referring?

Mr. CHAVEZ. Page 1222 of the hearings, last paragraph. General LeMay said:

If one takes the new estimates of projected Soviet capability at face value and measures them against our current programs only one conclusion can be drawn. The supremacy which we enjoy today is on the wane. By 1959 the Soviets will have the superior strategic air force. I have yet to see our intelligent people overestimate his capability. The new estimates demanded new studies of our force requirements. Our new studies conclude that no less than — B-52's and

B-47's supported by — jet tankers are required to meet the new Soviet threat in 1960.

That is the justification for the recommendation of the committee that the Air Force be given the extra money.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I am very happy to yield to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not want to prolong this discussion, because I know the distinguished Senator from Washington is anxious to proceed with his remarks, but I am in complete accord with what the Senator from New Mexico has said, and I am in complete accord with the statement of General LeMay, as read by the Senator. Certainly, in the field of their economy, the Russians are showing rapid strides. It is an amazing thing to see the Communist nation slowly taking on capitalist methods, such as incentive pay, leasing of farms, and private ownership, while we in this country embrace more and more of the Socialist economic ideas. If that continues, then we might have a second-rate Air Force in the future. If this policy goes on in this country for too long, we might become the great slave nation and Russia might become the great free republic of the world.

I agree with the Senator and with General LeMay that we must review our methods.

My whole remarks have been directed to the point that we should not criticize our Air Force as being second rate, because today it is the best. I will go along with everything the Senator has said about the future. I will go along with the suggestion that there should be a nonpartisan effort to appraise the situation.

Mr. CHAVEZ. It should be an American effort, and not a partisan effort.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has risen on the floor of the Senate to announce, presumably with pleasure, that the production of B-52's will be some 500 by October 1958.

The American people have the right to know that that quantity is nothing as compared to which the commanding general of the Strategic Air Force believes is necessary for the security of the United States. It is only a small fraction of what he believes is the necessary quantity. In addition, the number of B-52's being delivered to the Air Force, regardless of the reasons, is nothing like the planned schedule for yesterday or today; and tomorrow is always another story.

The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has now stated that the number of planes for the Air Force, by October 1958, will be nothing as compared to what General LeMay believes is essential.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am not responsible for the last statement made

by the Senator from Missouri. I merely stated what the number of bombers would be by that date. I did not say whether the commanding general said that number was adequate or inadequate.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I should like to ask my good friend from Massachusetts why he states the figure as one he thinks will solve the problem, if the figure he has given out is small compared to what General LeMay says is needed? In addition, the number of B-52's we shall have by October 1958, will be nothing like the 500 the Senator has referred to, if we can take as precedent the number we have today as compared with what it was stated the Air Force would have last January.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I simply gave the number as a factual number. I did not give it as a bad or good or indifferent figure. I simply stated it out as the fact.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If I may respectfully say so, it is not a fact; it is the opinion of the Department of Defense, not a fact.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would be happy if the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts would give the number of B-52's which have been delivered. It would solve a lot of our problems in this discussion.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. From the information I have, that figure is a security figure which we cannot reveal, and I shall not reveal it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The distinguished Senator knows that every B-52 which is produced has to be taken by tractor across Highway No. 99. There are no security regulations in effect on that highway. Thousands of people each day see each B-52 built. Is the reason the Senator from Massachusetts does not give the figure because he is proud of it, or ashamed of it?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. For neither reason. It is because on my notes there is a red pencil mark through that line, inasmuch as I have been asked, for security reasons, not to give out the information.

Mr. SYMINGTON. On what note?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. On my personal notes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Not to give out what figure for security reasons?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The figure of the number of planes being produced by the factory.

I know where the Boeing factory is, just as do the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Washington. I have been there.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Why does the Senator from Massachusetts think it is proper for the people of the State of Washington to know what is the production of B-52's, but not proper for the rest of the country to know what is that production?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. They may or may not know what the production is. If other Senators wish to give out that

figure, they may do so; but I do not wish to reveal the figure when the Department of Defense has asked me, for security reasons, not to do so.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator from Massachusetts know there is no security whatever as regards the number of B-52's produced at the Boeing plant? If that is correct, does the Senator from Massachusetts believe it is proper for the American people not to be informed?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Presumably the factories must continue to be located where they are at this time.

I may say semifacetiously that a few days ago the Senator from Washington and I voted against the dispersal bill; but perhaps in this case there should be dispersal, so the people could not know the number of planes coming from the plants.

Speaking seriously, I merely say that to the best of my ability I shall see to it that I do not state on this floor information which I have been advised should not, for security reasons, be stated publicly; and I am sure that the Senator from Missouri does not want such information to be stated publicly either.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NEUBERGER in the chair). Does the Senator from Washington yield to the Senator from Missouri?

Mr. JACKSON. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the figure of 13 a month—which means nothing as against actual production—and the figure of 17 a month—and the figure of 20 a month—did not originate with me. Those figures are "planted" figures periodically coming from the Department of Defense, in effort to place in the minds of the American people the idea that 13, 17, or 20 B-52's would shortly be produced per month. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for 8 weeks the Special Air Force Subcommittee has received testimony on the requirements of a modern air force. That testimony has centered on four major elements, which taken together, determine air force effectiveness, namely, planes, personnel, bases, and research and development.

I am happy to see that the Appropriations Committee has proposed additional funds for each of these four elements. The performance of our Air Force is proportional to the availability of modern aircraft, manned by trained personnel, with properly dispersed and guarded bases, backed up by adequate research and development.

I do not believe this is the occasion for lengthy remarks on my part. My views are well known to the Senate. I wish to comment briefly on the recommended increase in Air Force spending.

Mr. President, the funds we vote this week will not augment the air power we now have. Our strength of the moment results from decisions made several years ago. What we are now deciding is the kind of Air Force we shall have 3 years hence.

Today, we have the best Air Force in the world. But, Mr. President, unless

we expand current programs, our strategic striking power will soon be inferior to Russia's. On June 11, General LeMay told the Appropriations Committee:

The supremacy which we enjoy today is on the wane. By 1959 the Soviets will have the superior strategic air force.

This testimony stands uncontradicted and uncontested. Mr. President, it is now in our hands to maintain our supremacy in air power or to lose it to the Soviet Union.

I am pleased to see that a major portion of the recommended increase would go for additional B-52 bombers.

The argument has been made that the extra funds proposed in this bill cannot be spent this year. This argument is based on the premise that our productive plant cannot promptly absorb the increase. In my opinion, this contention is utterly unsound. The record is clear that our B-52 production can readily be doubled. The Boeing plant at Seattle is not operating any one of its three shifts at full capacity; and the same situation prevails at its Wichita plant. With the step-up in goals that these additional funds will permit, production schedules can be adjusted rapidly with a minimum effort.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield to me?

Mr. JACKSON. I am very happy to yield to the junior Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. KENNEDY. Within the limits of security, I wonder whether the Senator from Washington can answer this question: If, under the present program, we are to have 500 B-52's in 1958, according to the figures submitted to the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] what additional number shall we have if we accept the \$1,200,000,000 figure; and does the Senator from Washington know the basis of the statement about 500 B-52's, as made by the senior Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, if the Senator from Washington will yield, I believe I can answer that question.

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In the figure of \$1,160,000,000, referred to by the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] there is \$800 million for airplanes. That would be roughly equivalent to 100 B-52's.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes; I will say that one B-52 costs approximately \$8 million.

Mr. SYMINGTON. With spares.

Mr. JACKSON. Does that figure include spares?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. So in one case, 100 B-52's would be added, and in the other case, 50 B-52's would be added; is that correct?

Mr. SYMINGTON. In one case there would be \$800 million, which would be equivalent to 100 B-52 planes. In the revision, that figure has been reduced from \$800 million to \$350 million.

Mr. KENNEDY. That represent 35 B-52's, does it?

Mr. SYMINGTON. That is correct.

Mr. KENNEDY. The senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL]



said that in 1958 we would have 500 B-52's.

Mr. SYMINGTON. That will depend upon the rate of production. Actually, in this bill, a certain amount of money is included for more B-52's, on the basis of appropriating \$1,600,000,000, if \$800 million of that amount is for the procurement of aircraft.

When the planes would be obtained would depend upon the schedule.

The number of B-52's which would be obtained with \$800 million would total 100. When we would obtain them would depend upon the rate of production.

Mr. KENNEDY. I should like to ask one more question of the Senator from Washington. It has been suggested that next year the administration will request more funds for the production or procurement of airplanes. Will there be any advantage in postponing the request for additional funds? Would there be such an advantage because of the possibility of the production of newer types or the possibility of advances which might be made between the present time and a year from now?

Mr. JACKSON. I am glad the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts has asked that question. I shall discuss that matter in a moment, in connection with my prepared remarks. At this time let me say that we do not have a replacement for the B-52; that is the uncontested testimony of General Putt, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. KENNEDY. In other words, the question, then, is simply whether an additional number of B-52's of the same type will be available a year sooner than they would be if the money were made available next year? Is that correct?

Mr. JACKSON. I cannot state the exact time; but the question is how rapidly are we going to obtain them.

Mr. KENNEDY. But all other things being equal, the question is whether this year or next year we shall provide funds for additional planes of the same type; is that correct?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will my colleague repeat his question? I had difficulty hearing him.

Mr. KENNEDY. My question was this: If it is assumed that we would simply spend more money next year for aircraft—and Secretary Quarles has suggested that that would be the case—will such money, if spent next year, be spent for a later version of the B-52 or for the version now available?

The Senator from Washington has said that the money spent next year would be spent for the same type of plane. Then I asked him whether it is a fact that we would receive the B-52's sooner if we spent the money this year, rather than next year; and he was about to answer that question.

Mr. JACKSON. I shall go into that question in a moment.

The usual argument made about not turning out too many planes of a certain type is that a new type is coming along, and we do not want to have a great number of obsolete aircraft on hand. However, in connection with the B-52, the point is that we do not have such a plane coming along. Until we get the

IBM or the ICBM, this is the one means of delivering a retaliatory atomic attack by air from the United States or from the North American Continent. It is the only intercontinental means we have in the jet-propulsion field. We now have the B-36, but the B-36 cannot carry out its mission much longer, in view of the growing air defenses of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one further question, which he may or may not be able to answer?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. KENNEDY. In view of the problems in Iceland and other places, would it be possible for the United States to deliver an atomic bomb from any of our bases overseas without prior consultation with the governments involved?

Mr. JACKSON. I prefer not to go into that subject. I may say, in general, that there might be problems. It is not the most reliable means of defense, so far as we are concerned.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield before he leaves the discussion of the B-52?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I show the Senator a picture of the B-52 plant, with which I am sure he is familiar. It shows a B-52 coming out of the Boeing plant, with thousands of people around it. It is a correct statement, is it not, that the only way this B-52 can leave the plant is to cross United States Highway No. 99?

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. It must cross United States Highway No. 99, which runs through the city of Seattle.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Calling the Senator's attention to this picture, is the Senator familiar with the site?

Mr. JACKSON. The junior Senator from Washington has passed the plant many times. Everyone in the area knows the situation. Anyone traveling up and down United States Highway No. 99 is familiar with the situation.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Therefore thousands of people on the highway and thousands of people in the plant, if they are interested in the number of B-52's being produced in this country—in which a possible enemy would be exceedingly interested—could find it out without any difficulty whatsoever, could they not?

Mr. JACKSON. I think we might clarify the subject. I believe that members of the Press Gallery are aware of the fact that General LeMay gave production figures, at least from the first of January, for each month up through April. Those figures were approved for release by the Department of Defense censor, so I think there is no question about security at this point so far as the Department of Defense is concerned, inasmuch as the Department approved the release of the production figures with respect to B-52's from January on. I would rather not disclose those figures now, because I do not have the published testimony before me.

Mr. SYMINGTON. To the best of the Senator's knowledge these pictures are correct, are they not?

Mr. JACKSON. There is no question about it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Therefore there is no problem of any kind from the standpoint of Soviet interest in knowing how many B-52's are produced in this country.

Mr. JACKSON. Apparently the Department of Defense came to that conclusion when it released the production figures given by General LeMay in open session.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I am very happy to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I had not intended to ask the Senator a question. I was listening with very great interest to the colloquy between the Senator from Washington and the Senator from Missouri. But since the opportunity is made available to me, let me ask the Senator a question which is also addressed to the Senator from Missouri. Has the Senator received any explanation whatever, in any committee of which he is a member, or any suggestion as to what the United States should do with respect to expanding its Air Force, now that the former editor of Pravda, who was promoted to take the place of Mr. Molotov as Foreign Minister, has just completed a tour of Egypt, which resulted not only in an agreement with Soviet Russia to furnish Egypt with arms, but in a totalitarian election in Egypt by which Colonel Nasser, now Premier, has been elected President, with no opposition party being permitted to exist?

In the face of this and other evidences of the activity of Soviet Russia, through the new regime; in the fact of 18 months conversations which a representative of our State Department has held in Geneva, without results, looking to the release of American citizens who are falsely and illegally held prisoner by Communist China, has the Senator heard any suggestion emanating from the administration—or, should I say, the Department of Defense—as to what should be done in connection with the question of the preservation and expansion of American airpower?

How can we be so utterly complacent about what we can do in the future, in the face of the news coming over the radio and television day after day about the growing acuteness of the situation in the Middle East, where Soviet Russia is promoting a policy directly antagonistic to that which our State Department and the regents at the White House pretend they want the United States to follow?

Mr. JACKSON. The Defense Department has a program. The Defense Department proposes to postpone the buildup of airpower. I should like to read into the RECORD at this point the testimony of the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald Quarles, before the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 11, 1956:

If we are to continue to support an Air Force program of this magnitude there is no escape from a substantially larger budget in fiscal year 1958 than the one we are submitting this year.

General Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the same day, said:

The budget is really going up considerably next year—a greatly increased budget.

General Twining, on February 21, 1956, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, said:

The program I have outlined and the budget for fiscal year 1957 is austere. It meets only our most essential needs on a minimum basis. To keep this minimum program going and to reach and support 137 wings will require an increased budget in 1958. On this basis, I urge support of this year's program.

Charles E. Wilson, at a press conference on December 20, 1955, said:

Quite a few of the economies that we have been able to achieve are what are often referred to as "one-shot savings." In other words, you can't do the same every year. We are about through that stage of it, just like we are about through being able to carry out the program from money previously appropriated. We are getting closer to where the appropriations are going to have to be substantially in line with estimated expenditures so that we can keep the thing going. Maybe that will have to go up a little bit.

Since he made that statement he had to concede, a week before we started the airpower investigation, that he needed a quarter of a billion dollars more money.

There is a program, but the program is to postpone the procurement of the long-range intercontinental jet bombers, which remain the foundation of our atomic retaliatory air striking force. I do not believe we can afford to postpone a program so vital to the security of our country.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. If the Senator will permit me to say a few words, with the understanding that he will not lose the floor, let me say that in 1951 and 1952 the United States Senate, by yea and nay votes of more than 70 to 0, passed military appropriation bills which were designed to insure that the United States would possess the greatest airpower in the world. The purpose of the committee which recommended those appropriations, and the purpose of the Senate, which unanimously approved them, was to be certain that no power on earth should exceed the United States in air strength. Many of the Senators whose voices I have heard on the floor today defending the cuts of the administration voted with the unanimous Senate at that time. The conclusion was clear. We wanted to be certain that no other nation on earth should exceed the United States in airpower. But in 1953 appropriations were cut back.

I wish to be fair. During Democratic administration, because of the same false reasoning, appropriations made by the Congress for building up airpower were cut back when they should not have been cut back. The same error was made then that is being made now. But in those days there was no question that American airpower was the greatest in the world. Now we know that that is not the case. The Chief of the Air Force, General Twining, has been permitted to go to Moscow to witness the air show put on by the Soviet Union.

No one in his right mind thinks that General Twining will secure from Mr. Khrushchev, and the other men who now hold power in Soviet Russia, any suggestion of disarmament. The object of the

air show is to intimidate the United States.

Mr. JACKSON. And its allies.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. The object of the air show is to show Egypt, the Middle East, and Asia that Soviet Russia has the airpower which will dominate the world. I wonder how much effect this demonstration has had upon the recent decisions of the commanders of the NATO forces in Europe to resign, and I wonder, of course, why General Gruenther has resigned as the chief of all the military forces of NATO. When we see these things with our very eyes and hear these reports with our own ears, how is it possible that Members of the Senate, in this presidential election year of 1956, should give more attention to pleas of postponement and plans for balancing the budget than to the protection of the United States?

Mr. JACKSON. Would the Senator agree that the invitation which we and our allies received is part of a Soviet attempt to demonstrate to our allies and to our friends around the world, and to neutral nations, that the industrial supremacy of the United States may be shifting toward the Soviet Union?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. That is correct, of course. They are seeking to intimidate the free peoples of the world and to show them that they need depend no longer upon the United States. I hope the Senate itself and the entire Congress will refuse to follow the pusillanimous doctrine suggested by the Department of Defense. My concern about it is that within a year we shall be defending our shores in a hot war, not a cold war.

Mr. JACKSON. Is it not a fact that in the long history of airpower we have never found ourselves in a position where we had too many planes at any one time?

Mr. O'MAHONEY. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. Unless it was at the conclusion of hostilities, at the end of World War II. We then made the mistake of disarming, when we should have continued to maintain our Air Force.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. I remember very well when, as an excuse for our failure to ratify the treaty of the League of Nations, the Republican leaders upon this floor, with the aid of some Democrats, fought against it, and then the Harding administration, in order to demonstrate that it was for peace, agreed to sink the American Navy. And it was sunk. Instead of having the second largest Navy in the world, we ended up with a Navy smaller than even that of Japan. We paid the price for that at Pearl Harbor. It is beyond my understanding how any Member of Congress, no matter what his party, should continue to fight against a guaranty that the United States of America shall remain before the whole world as the greatest power in the air. To be the greatest power in the air, we must have not only planes, but guided missiles and long-range bombers. We know that representatives of Soviet Russia in this country are even now seeking to return to Russia certain Russian citizens who sought to escape communism by coming to the United States. Spokesmen in the Russian Embassy in Washington have tried to intimidate and have succeeded in intimidating some and

sending them back to Russia, and Members of the Senate, in the face of such facts, say, "Oh, we can let it go until next year or the year after that."

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to compliment the distinguished Senator from Wyoming for having made a very excellent statement. He served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Armed Services of the Senate Appropriations Committee for many years.

He speaks from great personal knowledge, and he knows the dangers inherent in any kind of penny-pinching program when we deal with this all-important area of national security. I compliment the Senator for a very excellent contribution.

Mr. President, it is argued further that, being preoccupied with the production rates of B-52's, we have ignored the effectiveness of the medium range B-47 bomber operating from overseas bases. The capabilities of the B-47 are not in question. But the B-47, without overseas bases, cannot substitute for the B-52. And the truth is that our overseas bases are becoming less and less reliable to support our air-atomic power. From Iceland to Okinawa, key strategic bases are now under political attack.

For example, in Iceland, we are dangerously close to being evicted. North Africa is in tumult: Five United States airbases in Morocco have been in doubtful status since Morocco won her sovereignty. The airbase in Libya is under strong anti-Western pressures. Key bases are now up for renewal in the agitated Middle East.

Of course, we hope that we will not be denied the use of these important overseas bases. However, we and our B-47's could be excluded from these bases overnight, and we could not, overnight, get the intercontinental planes to operate without them.

Another unsound argument is being made. We are told that it is foolish to spend more money for B-52's, because the B-52 will soon be replaced by a new and better plane. But, Mr. President, the fact is that no replacement is in sight.

At a hearing of the Special Air Force Subcommittee on May 17, General Putt was asked:

What are you doing for a replacement for the B-52?

In released testimony General Putt replied:

We have only some research and development projects at this time.

When asked:

The B-58 is not to be a replacement for the B-52, is it?

General Putt answered:

No.

According to the sworn testimony of General LeMay, even when we get the ICBM and related missiles in quantity, the long-range manned bomber will be in the picture for a long time. The IRBM and ICBM, when available in operational numbers, will first supplement, and later partially replace, our manned bomber force. But until we have these ballistic missiles in quantity, we have to rely almost wholly on the B-52.



There is no planned successor to the B-52.

No weapon is obsolete so long as it serves as a deterrent. Nothing we have in sight will make the B-52 obsolete.

The Soviets may make the B-52 obsolete, in the sense that it becomes out-of-date relative to their weapons. That would be the situation if Moscow either develops the IRBM or the ICBM in quantity or if it produces before we do a more advanced long-range bomber than the B-52.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I am very happy to yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I noticed the Senator's remarks about the B-52. Many times the failure to obtain B-52's is explained away by emphasis on B-47 production. The latter is the one class of airplane, namely, the medium bomber, in which the Russians are not up to free world production.

I observe a headline in this afternoon's newspaper, which reads: "Oust United States Parties, Win Iceland Vote."

Will not this base development, if it continues throughout the world, much reduce the importance of the B-47 to our national security?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is absolutely correct. The foundation of our air atomic retaliatory striking power today, until we have enough B-52's, is our reliance upon the B-47; and the capability of the B-47 to perform that mission is dependent upon bases overseas.

Mr. SYMINGTON. And on refueling.

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct. If we lose our bases overseas the B-47 will not be able to carry out its mission, because we do not have the tankers necessary to permit refueling of B-47's.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am very glad the Senator has raised the tanker situation, normally overshadowed by B-52 discussion. Is it not true that we are at least as short in the number of tankers necessary for B-47 operation as we are in B-52's?

Mr. JACKSON. According to the public testimony, we are further behind on the tankers than we are on bombers at this time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If we lose overseas bases—and it would seem, according to the newspaper this afternoon, we may lose the important base in Iceland, then the B-47, in order to be an intercontinental bomber must have tankers; and we do not have sufficient numbers. Is that correct?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator has stated the situation correctly, as I understand it.

(At this point Mr. JACKSON yielded to Mr. JOHNSON of Texas, who submitted a proposed unanimous-consent agreement, which, with the ensuing colloquy, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of Mr. JACKSON's speech.)

Mr. JACKSON. But Mr. President, if the Kremlin does achieve this sort of success, then we are going to need all the more B-52's. Under these conditions the larger our fleet of B-52's, the better off we will be—the more B-52's we had on hand, the greater would be our chance

still to deter Moscow, or if deterrence fails, to retaliate with some effectiveness.

It should be clear that there is no reason for holding back on production of more B-52's on grounds that there is a better plane on the horizon.

There is nothing new about the arguments against a step-up in spending for the B-52. The Pentagon politicians have made the same arguments ever since some of us advocated a B-52 speed-up over a year ago.

However, the Pentagon politicians have reversed themselves twice. Back in May 1955, even after the Moscow fly-by, Secretary Wilson told a press conference he thought no more B-52 funds were needed. But in June, less than a month later, he asked for about one quarter billion more for B-52's.

In March of this year Secretary Wilson told another press conference he thought no new funds for B-52's were needed. But in April he changed his tune again and asked for about one quarter billion more.

This is why I cannot be surprised at the attitude of Secretary Wilson toward the increase recommended by the Appropriations Committee. It fits the pattern of error which has marked his approach to our military requirements.

I am glad that both the committee amendment and the substitute of the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] provide added money for Air Force research and development.

This country has already surrendered the lead to Moscow in quantity of airpower. It is the unanimous verdict of professional military men that the Russians are now closing the gap in quality. In the words of General Twining: "The Soviets are narrowing our margin of superiority. They have long since passed us in quantity and they are making remarkable strides in quality."

The Kremlin achieves this result in part because it concentrates talent and money on research and development. Russian leaders know the best route to the most powerful air force in the world.

And what has been our policy? We have imposed a fixed dollar ceiling on Air Force research and development. Projects have been deferred for lack of funds. Urgent work has been stretched out. Breakthroughs have been dropped that should have been followed up.

Before our special Air Force Subcommittee on May 17, General Putt listed 11 research and development items which have suffered from inadequate funds. His testimony has been released, and here, in brief, are the 11 items:

First. Work on a nuclear propulsion system for aircraft has been slowed.

Second. Initiation of a new tactical bomber, and work on strategic bombers, has been delayed.

Third. Vitally important work in the field of reliable electronics has been deferred, with serious implications for B-52 performance and for jamming and counterelectronic measures.

Fourth. Work, almost across the board, in the field of missiles could have progressed faster with more funds.

Fifth. Projects in research aircraft which would make aerodynamic exploration have been held up.

Sixth. The earth satellite program has been retarded because of too little money.

Seventh. Funds are deficient for radar development to improve our air-defense system, particularly against long-range ballistic missiles.

Eighth. Good prospects in the field of propulsion will go unexplored, unless more funds are forthcoming.

Ninth. Important technical studies that would influence future programs have been brought almost to a standstill.

Tenth. Funds for producing prototypes of aircraft are so limited that only one prototype is produced for each type of aircraft required. General Putt pointed out that the intelligent thing to do is to produce more than one prototype, so that in case one prototype fails, less time is lost.

Eleventh. Research in high-energy fuels shows great promise of substantially increasing the range of existing aircraft, but this research is hampered by insufficient resources.

This recital by General Putt is most disturbing. Unless we give greater emphasis and more money to our research and development effort, we are bound to lose the critical races for the discovery of advanced weapons. And in the nuclear age, Mr. President, even minor inventions in nuclear weapons can spell the difference between defeat and survival.

Mr. President, our defense program could make good use of more money than it will get this year. It is the testimony of the administration itself that the defense budget will be substantially increased in 1958. Even Secretary Wilson said so. On May 11, General Twining informed the Senate Appropriations Committee, "the budget is really going up considerably next year—a greatly increased budget."

It is hard to see how anyone can fail to vote for the additional funds recommended by the Appropriations Committee, as a step in the right direction.

General LeMay told the Appropriations Committee this month that with programs now in effect "by 1958-59, somewhere in there, the Russians will have as many bombers as we have," and they will have "twice as many of the heavy bombers as we have."

General LeMay has asked for an additional \$3.8 billion to expand current programs. As it stands, the increase recommended by the Appropriations Committee is only about one-third of what General LeMay believes we need.

If any Senator is reconciled to the United States having the second best Air Force in the world, then I suggest that he vote against the committee's proposal. But if the Senate wants the United States to continue to have the best Air Force, then I urge that we support the committee's recommendation.

Mr. President, I recently attempted to summarize my thinking on American defense policy in an article published in the New York Times magazine section of May 20, 1956, entitled "Toward a Superior Force in Being."

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**TOWARD A SUPERIOR "FORCE IN BEING"**

(By HENRY M. JACKSON)

WASHINGTON.—For the second year in a row, the 84th Congress is challenging a defense budget approved and submitted by the first five-star general ever to reach the White House. While the budget has been questioned primarily by Democrats, the ironic nature of the debate is compounded by the unusual reluctance of their Republican colleagues to come to the President's defense.

In the public view, the defense controversy appears to rest largely on questions of dollars and cents. It is certainly true that budgetary issues play a central role. In a wider sense, however, the debate concerns the basic form that our Defense Establishment shall take in a period which does not find us at war, and certainly does not find us at peace as we once knew it.

In essence, the question is whether we can be content to rely on our defense potential, or whether we must resolve to acquire the "force in being" adequate to protect our security. "Force in being," as I understand the phrase, describes the actual military strength available to us for immediate use—as opposed to the latent resources on which we can draw tomorrow, the next day, or sometime in the future.

Of the several factors which combine to produce this debate, two are of special importance. The first is a growing awareness, in Congress and elsewhere, of the threatening achievements of the Soviets in the development and production of new weapons. In light of recent history, Khrushchev's latest forecast of Russian progress in the missile field cannot be discounted. The record is clear that similar Soviet predictions on the A-bomb and H-bomb were promptly confirmed in fact. Disturbing knowledge of Russian accomplishments led some of us in Congress to demand, many months ago, that our air-atomic program (including missiles) be drastically revised.

It is apparent now that this same knowledge has created some uneasiness in the executive branch. Just 3 months after submitting his original budget, the President last month asked Congress for an extra half-billion dollars in defense funds—almost half of which is slated for additional production of B-52 bombers. It is likely that further increases in defense spending will result from the current study of the Air Force by a special Senate Armed Services subcommittee.

The second factor affecting the budget controversy is the realization—as yet dim in some quarters—that a workday, routine approach to matters of defense simply does not fit the strategic patterns of the hydrogen era.

The fact is that we will never again in total war be permitted to mobilize armed strength as we did after December 7, 1941. The precious gifts of time and space, which once permitted the construction of a vast military machine after hostilities had begun, are gone forever.

In 1941, space was our shield—protecting us from the direct onslaught of the Axis Powers. Until the war's end, despite the conquest of Europe and Southeast Asia by our enemies, the continental United States lay untouched. Time was on our side too. The dogged stand of our allies, notably in Europe, gave us precious months to harness our industrial machine to the manufacture of tanks, guns, and planes.

In terms of security, what do space and time hold for us today? Can we once again afford to lose every battle but the last? It is not inconceivable, in my opinion, that today if we lose the first battle, we may lose the war. Our buffers of the past have disappeared.

Time is gone because the United States is now one of the two great military powers of the world. If total war should break out, our involvement would be instantaneous. As a practical matter, the speed with which we entered such a war would be a critical factor in determining our success. For we now confront a power which possesses, like ourselves, potent nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. A frontal assault on the United States could inflict a measure of destruction in hours which the weapons of World War II could achieve only in years.

Space as an advantage in security planning has been eliminated by air-atomic weapons, present and planned, which virtually equate the distance between Moscow and New York with the distance between Moscow and London.

No longer have we the leeway to develop new weapons in the environment of war. If, for example, the United States and Russia both achieve and produce the intercontinental ballistic missile, but Russia alone develops a counterweapon of defense, our security would be in mortal jeopardy. As Dr. John von Neuman, distinguished recipient of the Enrico Fermi scientific award, has said, "Today there is every reason to fear that even minor inventions and feints in the field of nuclear weapons can be decisive in less time than would be required to devise specific countermeasures."

In my opinion, the increasing awareness of this wholly new set of strategic considerations lies wholly at the heart of the present defense controversy. The United States now requires what is for her a revolutionary defense philosophy, and is going through the growing pains of getting it. In essence, such a philosophy is based on the principle that the United States must have on hand, ready for use, the weapons and delivery systems essential to ultimate survival in an all-out war. It follows that we must discover, develop, and produce in peacetime the crucial weapons which, if first obtained by a hostile power, could turn the military balance of power against us. And we must keep on producing them. As one becomes obsolescent, its replacement must be ready.

"Force in being" is a cold, military phrase, but no three words could more aptly summarize the demands of the new defense philosophy. Ideas in men's minds, plans on drawing boards, weapons in process on assembly lines, will not contribute to our military might if we are once again cursed with total war. Money spent next year for planes to fly 3 years hence will not help us much if such a war should come tomorrow.

Nor is it safe or realistic to assume that such a war cannot come. I do not know of any expert on Soviet Russia who is willing to state that recent changes in Russian policy mean an abandonment of the basic aim of communism—ultimate world domination. Soviet leaders stand ready to use every weapon at their command, military, political, or economic, to achieve this goal. Our hope that Russia will shun nuclear war now rests on the "balance of terror." Fear of crushing reprisal continues to deter the Soviets from sudden attack.

But if at any time the margin between their force in being and ours is sufficient to justify the plunge; if the gains ever seemed worth the costs, we cannot count on them to resist the temptation. Moreover, smaller nations, steered by reckless leaders, could quite possibly involve both Russia and the United States against the better judgment of both.

The force in being concept has radical implications for our entire defense setup. They concern manpower problems, facilities, and weapons production in each of the three services. With particular reference to missiles and air-atomic strength, a number of these factors are receiving special emphasis in the current defense debate.

Our most advanced weapons must at all times be ahead of or equal to those in Rus-

sian hands. Because the long-range B-52 bomber is today our most advanced means of deterring or damaging the enemy, the size of our B-52 fleet is now a central issue. (The Russians at present far outproduce us with their comparable "Bison" bomber.) Also involved in the debate is the effectiveness of present efforts to develop and produce a radically advanced type of long-range bomber to supplant the B-52. Because ballistic missiles are likely soon to supplement—and later partially replace—our manned bomber force, the momentum with which the ballistic missile program is progressing is also a controversial question.

To maintain superiority in advanced weapons, stress must be placed on research and development work throughout our Military Establishment. Only through broad research effort, both basic and applied, can we win the critical race for the discovery and development of advanced weapons systems. The adequacy of our "R and D" work is thus also a major point at issue.

The problem in the research and development field is one of emphasis as well as money. It is certainly true that appropriations for this work must be geared to the expanding requirements of technological progress. The more complex the scientific problem, the more costly its solution. At the same time, however, the success of our research and development work also depends on the energy with which this effort is pushed in certain critical areas.

There comes a time when some unexpected discovery of the highest importance results in a scientific "breakthrough"—opening new vistas and inviting broad exploration into untouched fields of knowledge. To recognize and exploit vital "breakthroughs," with heavy applications of men and money, requires the finest organizational teamwork and the highest administrative skill.

The concept of superior "force in being" calls, in addition, for production techniques which match the effectiveness of our scientific effort. Once our scientists have devised an important, perhaps crucial, weapon, we cannot hesitate to produce it in such numbers as to create a genuine deterrent. The United States has always prided itself on its ability to move new concepts from the drawing boards to mass production in record time. In 20th-century jargon, this period from blueprint to completed product is known as "lead time." By halving our lead time on the production of heavy jet bombers, the Russians tossed another issue into the defense debate.

We will never be able to maintain a superior "force in being" as long as dynamic weapons are stalled on production lines by overcautious and archaic administrative methods. Discussing our production failures, Admiral Rickover points out that the "money we try to save by checking and counterchecking, by being too careful not to make mistakes, is frequently offset by the lengthening of our lead time." In the long run, such economy can be both false and fatal, for the margin by which we lead the Russians in placing advanced weapons in mass production may also be our margin of survival.

This thesis is slowly gaining recognition. The Air Force, for example, recently announced a new method of selecting contractors which, while safeguarding the competitive principle, succeeded in reducing by many months the period from development directive to signed contract. The importance of dedicated administrators who thrive on cutting redtape cannot be overemphasized.

The demands of the new philosophy of defense presents a formidable challenge for a free society. The vigorous national effort required to achieve a superior force in being has never been asked of our people in peacetime.



The Soviet military buildup has proceeded unhampered by the obligations of a democratic government. While we devote our productive capacity to supporting a high standard of living for all our people, the Russian masses have to take what they can get—after the priorities of military production have been met.

Nor does the Kremlin face the necessity of competing with private industry for technical and scientific skills. It does not go to any Congress for funds to support a weapons program. For a totalitarian state, building a war machine in time of peace is accepted practice. On a scale that was minute compared to the Soviets today, Hitler, too, created a great aggressive force in peacetime.

But militarism of any sort runs counter to basic democratic beliefs. Short of war—when the issue of self-preservation is dramatized—the American people are not readily persuaded to marshal their talents and resources for a full-scale military effort.

Yet the wide implications of our changed strategic position cannot safely be ignored. I am convinced that our people will gladly make whatever sacrifices are required once they become aware of the problem which confronts us. But the general support and understanding which is vital to the success of a new defense program can be created only through frank reporting to the people by their elected and appointed officials.

Even Congress itself cannot discharge its duties unless it hears the best available professional opinion. Senators and Representatives need to know not only the opinions on defense that are accepted and embodied in a Presidential budget; they must also have those views which are rejected, know why they were rejected or why a compromise was reached. Congress cannot judge the wisdom on proposed programs unless it hears the conflicting viewpoints they claim to resolve. Our professional military leadership, in other words, should be permitted to speak its mind to properly constituted committees of Congress—free from restraints and fear of re-creation.

Likewise, the people themselves must learn the main alternatives of defense planning. They cannot be deeply persuaded of the necessity for a great effort if they do not debate the possibilities and decide for themselves.

In the past few months much progress has been made toward a freer discussion of our defense posture relative to that of the Soviet Union. Some officials have shown commendable courage in speaking their minds on current shortcomings. Many people, once reluctant to speak frankly, are now speaking out—and with authority. The current Air Force study is sharpening important issues. The public press, radio, and television are dramatizing many of our problems.

Once our citizens are given an honest appraisal of the requirements, I believe we will develop a defense program that we can live with—and by.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] said there were some figures on B-52 production which he would like to give, but did not feel he could do so. Last April, before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, General Lemay, in testimony now released by the Department of Defense, in reply to questioning by our very able counsel, Mr. Fowler Hamilton, made the following statements with respect to B-52 production:

Mr. HAMILTON. How many B-52's were produced up to January 1, 1956?

General LEMAY. We consider B-52's have completed production when they have completed shop assembly. Up to January 1, 1956, 57 B-52's had completed shop assembly.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were accepted by the Air Force?

General LEMAY. Forty-one.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were produced in February 1956?

General LEMAY. Six had completed shop assembly.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were accepted by the Air Force?

General LEMAY. Two.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were produced in March 1956?

General LEMAY. Six.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were accepted by the Air Force?

General LEMAY. None.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were produced in April?

General LEMAY. Five.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many were accepted by the Air Force?

General LEMAY. None. Most of the B-52's produced and not accepted in February, March, and April have not been accepted because of a component failure for which we now have a solution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it not true that every time a B-52 replaces either a B-36 or a B-47 it makes for a more effective strategic air force?

General LEMAY. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, if the Senator from Missouri will permit a comment, the junior Senator from Washington would like to say that he understands that if planes are not accepted, the Air Force does not have to pay for them. Is that correct?

Mr. SYMINGTON. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

During the delivery of Mr. JACKSON's speech,

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Washington may yield to me, so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum, and then propose a unanimous-consent request on behalf of the distinguished minority leader and myself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I submit a proposed unanimous-consent request, and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The proposed unanimous-consent agreement will be read for the information of the Senate.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

#### UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Ordered, That, effective on Tuesday, June 26, 1956, at the hour of 1:30 p. m., during the further consideration of the bill H. R. 10986, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1957, debate on any amendment, motion, or appeal, except a motion to lay on the table, shall be limited to 1½ hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of any such amendment or motion

and the majority leader: *Provided*, That in the event the majority leader is in favor of any such amendment or motion, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority leader or some Senator designated by him: *Provided further*, That no amendment that is not germane to the provisions of the said bill shall be received.

Ordered further, That on the question of the final passage of the said bill debate shall be limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the majority and minority leaders: *Provided*, That the said leaders, or either of them, may, from the time under their control of the passage of the said bill, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, motion, or appeal. (June 25, 1956.)

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I yield.

Mr. BRIDGES. May I ask the distinguished majority leader if the latter provision means that the extra time to be allotted would come from the time on the bill?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CHAVEZ. But there is no particular amount of time allotted on the bill itself, is there?

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Yes; each side is allotted 1½ hours on the bill.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I do not intend to object, but am I to understand that the Senate will remain in session as late as necessary this evening? I have a matter which I wish to discuss.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. As I told the distinguished Senator from New York earlier today, that will be done. The Senator certainly will be protected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the proposed unanimous-consent agreement? The Chair hears none, and the agreement is entered.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL NOON TOMORROW

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, its reading clerk, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the following bills of the Senate:

S. 3295. An act to amend the act of April 28, 1953, relating to daylight-saving time in the District of Columbia; and

S. 3663. An act to exempt from taxation certain property of the Columbia Historical Society in the District of Columbia.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 3693) to amend title IX of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, as amended.

The message further announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to each of the following bills of the House:

H. R. 7227. An act to amend further the Federal Property and Administrative Serv-

ices Act of 1949, as amended, to authorize the disposal of surplus property for civil-defense purposes, to provide that certain Federal surplus property be disposed of to State and local civil defense organizations which are established by or pursuant to State law, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 8634. An act to authorize the conveyance of a certain tract of land in North Carolina to the city of Charlotte, N. C.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 6243) authorizing the construction of a nuclear-powered merchant ship to promote the peacetime application of atomic energy, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BONNER, Mr. ROBESON of Virginia, Mr. TUMULTY, Mr. TOLLEFSON, and Mr. ALLEN of California were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 7380) to amend the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1953 to correct certain inequities; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. DAVIS of Georgia, Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi, and Mr. BROYHILL were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 9052) to amend the Export Control Act of 1949 to continue for an additional period of 2 years the authority provided thereunder for the regulation of exports; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SPENCE, Mr. BROWN of Georgia, Mr. PATMAN, Mr. RAINS, Mr. WOLCOTT, Mr. GAMBLE, and Mr. TALLE were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 9852) to extend the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SPENCE, Mr. BROWN of Georgia, Mr. PATMAN, Mr. RAINS, Mr. WOLCOTT, Mr. GAMBLE, and Mr. TALLE were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 11320) to effect the control of narcotics, barbiturates, and dangerous drugs in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, and Mr. MILLER of Nebraska were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 11619) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act to provide for a

more effective control of narcotic drugs and marihuana, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. COOPER, Mr. MILLS, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. SADLAK were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 256) correcting the enrollment of H. R. 6782, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

#### ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the President *pro tempore*:

S. 1614. An act to amend the act entitled "An act to fix a reasonable definition and standard of identity of certain dry milk solids," title 21, United States Code, section 321c;

S. 2771. An act to authorize the Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and provide certain services to the Boy Scouts of America for use at the Fourth National Jamboree of the Boy Scouts of America, and for other purposes;

H. R. 101. An act relating to the administration by the Secretary of the Interior of section 9, subsections (d) and (e), of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939;

H. R. 5590. An act to amend the act entitled "An act to recognize the high public service rendered by Maj. Walter Reed and those associated with him in the discovery of the cause of means of transmission of yellow fever," approved February 28, 1929, by including therein the name of Gustaf E. Lambert;

H. R. 5790. An act relating to the application in the Territory of Hawaii of the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act and the Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act;

H. R. 8493. An act to exempt from taxation certain property of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, Inc., in the District of Columbia;

H. R. 9582. An act to provide for the delayed reporting of births within the District of Columbia;

H. R. 9671. An act to provide for the conveyance of certain property of the United States in the village of Carey, Ohio;

H. R. 10374. An act to amend the act to incorporate the Oak Hill Cemetery, in the District of Columbia;

H. R. 10768. An act to amend section 5 of the act of August 7, 1946, entitled "An Act for the Retirement of Public School Teachers in the District of Columbia," as amended; and

H. R. 11473. An act making appropriations for the legislative branch for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, and for other purposes.

#### ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, June 25, 1956, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills:

S. 1614. An act to amend the act entitled "An act to fix a reasonable definition and standard of identity of certain dry milk solids," title 21, United States Code, section 321c; and

S. 2771. An act to authorize the Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and provide certain services to the Boy Scouts of America for use at the fourth national jamboree of the Boy Scouts of America, and for other purposes.

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1957

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 10986) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, and for other purposes.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I am not posing this afternoon as an armchair strategist. I serve on the subcommittee which recommended the appropriation of this money, and I regret that because I was busily engaged first on the farm bill, and later on the public works appropriation bill, I was unable to attend as many of the hearings before the Subcommittee on Armed Services of the Appropriations Committee as I desired.

Mr. President, I personally do not know what it may be best to do in the way of appropriating specific sums for defense purposes for the simple reason that I do not have the facts at hand which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President have. Because they have these facts—as far as I know—they are the only individuals so equipped, I believe that we must, by all means, rely on what they tell us is necessary.

I realize that if we should be forced to engage in another war, it will be necessary for us to have the best of everything—the best Army, the best Navy, and the best Air Force. I believe I can illustrate my point by a story. I recall reading that during the Civil War it was necessary for the Confederate Army to obtain more recruits; quite a number of the Confederate soldiers had been killed, and the ranks were growing very thin. Someone thought of a method by which more recruits could be obtained: In various States, officers serving in the Confederate Army were told to do some recruiting—to make talks to the younger men, and to get them to enlist in the Confederate Army. In South Carolina, a young major volunteered to make speeches, in the attempt to get as many recruits as possible. Every time he began to speak, he would tell his audience, "Why should we fear those Yankees? We can beat them with cornstalks." And in each case he ended his speech with the same statement: "Why should we fear them? We can beat them with cornstalks." Recruits flocked to the Confederate cause—sparked, no doubt, by the man's eloquence.

Of course, all of us know what the result was.

After the Civil War was over, the same major decided to run for Congress. He proceeded to make speeches on behalf of his candidacy. He would make riproaring speeches among the citizens of his district. One day, an old fellow in the back row called out, "Look here, Major: You ain't fit to be a Congressman. I thought you told us during the war that we could beat those Yankees with cornstalks."

The major scratched his head a while, and then said: Yes, I did say that. But the devil of it was that those Yankees wouldn't fight with cornstalks. [Laughter]

Mr. President, I am not expert in the matter of what weapons the Russians might use against us should hostilities



break out. I frankly do not know what weapons we should have available. But Mr. President, I am a firm believer in our Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are men of experience. They should know what we need, and the budget they helped formulate represents their judgment. The budget we are now discussing was not made overnight. It has been worked upon since last July by all the services—the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. I am quite satisfied that none of the services is allowed in the budget the full amount it originally requested. Instead, each of the services is allowed, in the budget, somewhat less than the amount it requested.

In making up the budget, those in charge of it had to weigh all the proposals made by representatives of the various branches of the armed services.

I am satisfied that General LeMay made a good case when he presented his budget to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. President, at this point I should like to read into the RECORD what General LeMay said, at the hearings, regarding how these budgets are made:

General LEMAY. We make up our portion of the budget out at the command, stating our requirements to carry out the mission assigned and then send that in.

The "mission assigned" is designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the evidence they have, they assume that an enemy potentiality will be "X," and in order to counter that strength each branch of the services make an appraisal of their need. Those figures representing the needs of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army as their shares of the military budget are presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I read further from the testimony, at the hearings, of General LeMay:

From time to time we make recommendations as to size of the force we should have based on what we think the enemy capability will be and our own position at that time. Those are two different things. We prepare a budget for the new program that we are told to do; but we go beyond that and recommend the proper size force that we think is necessary to carry out our assigned task.

Senator ELLENDER. Now, does the present budget for 1957 as originally submitted provide for all of the money that you asked for?

General LEMAY. You understand that I submit my budget and I never see it again until it gets through the Congress.

Senator ELLENDER. You are familiar with what is being asked, are you not? You are now, I presume, acquainted with the amount of money that we are asked to appropriate and that part which should be given to your command?

General LEMAY. No, I am not.

Now I read the testimony which was taken a moment later:

Senator ELLENDER. I am sorry I was not here to listen to all your testimony. I had to be with another committee. But judging from your testimony it would seem to me that much more money than has been budgeted is being requested by you.

General LEMAY. That is correct. I turn in my recommendations to the Department of the Air Force as to what I think should be done.

It is the responsibility of the Air Force and the Department of Defense to weigh those decisions and come up with a program. Then, as a good soldier, I must support the program and try to get the job done the way

my superiors want it done. I do that. I have been talking about my personal recommendations in the past; what I personally think is necessary.

Mr. President, I should like to point out that General LeMay's recommendations fall in the same category as the recommendations made by General Ridgway several years ago. Senators will recall that General Ridgway came before the committee, and stated that by all means we should increase the appropriation for the Army to provide a force of 1,200,000 men. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an Army force considerably below that figure. In fact, I have the figure before me; and it shows the Army wound up with 1,082,000 men, instead of 1,200,000, as requested by General Ridgway. In other words, the individual recommendations of one military leader must yield to the overall recommendations of our Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. President, as I have said, these budgets are made by the departments a year in advance. Once they are presented to the committee and defended before the committee by representatives of the Government agencies, the members of the committee take over and must use their own judgment.

In the case of the information which has been developed recently, I believe that no doubt it will be reflected in the preparation of the budget for the next fiscal year—that is, for fiscal year 1958.

I shall show in a few minutes, the amount of money budgeted for the Air Force was determined at least in part on what our production capability is; in other words, the recommended budget for the Air Force represents the number of aircraft our facilities can produce, and the Air Force can sustain during the 1957 fiscal year. I refer not only to B-52's and the Strategic Air Command, but to the entire Air Force, including the Tactical Air Command.

As I have said, Mr. President, I was unable to attend all the hearings on the defense appropriation bill. I have read most of the printed hearings. Except for the personal testimony given by General LeMay, I have not been able to find in the course of the lengthy hearings conducted by the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee any testimony which would lead me to believe that either the \$1,160,000,000 additional, as proposed by the Appropriations Committee, or the more modest additional amount of \$500 million, as proposed by the amendment submitted by the Senator from New Hampshire, for himself and other Senators, is necessary, justified, or justifiable. The Department of Defense will end the current fiscal year with an unobligated balance of almost \$12.6 billion. The Air Force will have almost \$5.5 billion in unobligated funds.

Mr. President, for some time now, particularly since I have been a member of the Subcommittee on Armed Services, of the Appropriations Committee—I have been expressing concern about the huge carryovers of unobligated balances.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPARKMAN in the chair). Does the Sen-

ator from Louisiana yield to the Senator from Florida?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. First, I wish to say that I agree completely with the Senator from Louisiana. I think we have a right to complain about the huge unused and uncommitted balances.

I note that the Senator from Louisiana has already stated for the record the uncommitted and unused balance for the Air Force as a whole. I am sure the Senator from Louisiana recalls that a separate item—the principal item in which we are now interested is assigned for aircraft procurement. I have noted that \$2.9 billion is the amount of the uncommitted, unobligated funds to be carried over for that purpose, and that in excess of \$9 billion, although committed for that purpose, is unexpended—meaning that there is a \$12 billion carryover into the next fiscal year, from former appropriations. The Senator from Louisiana recalls those figures, does he not?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes, I do.

Mr. HOLLAND. Considering that immense amount of carryover, and considering, further, that the current budget includes in excess of \$6 billion for aircraft procurement, making a total of more than \$18 billion for that one objective, does not the Senator from Louisiana think that the Air Force would have more funds than could possibly be spent in the approaching fiscal year 1957 if only the budgeted amount were appropriated as new funds?

Mr. ELLENDER. I think there is no doubt that the Air Force will have sufficient funds. As I pointed out a while ago, when General LeMay testified before the subcommittee, he said that in presenting his figures he tried his best to outline a plan to meet the mission which was given him by the Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs have all the facts before them. They also have from General LeMay what he thinks ought to be done. It seems to me that the decision should be left to them as to how many B-52's or B-47's we should have. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should make that decision.

I shall read from the testimony of General Twining in a few moments. He places the requests for planes in category 4. He calls attention to the fact that we are short of technical personnel. He even places housing and fringe benefits for officers ahead of airplane production. He places the need for more bases ahead of airplane procurement. As the Senator knows, he put research and development ahead of airplane production. In the amendment which is being proposed, the arm-chair strategists say, "We want you to spend \$800 million for B-52's, whether you need them or not, and whether you have the trained personnel to man them or not."

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Am I to understand that the distinguished Senator from Louisiana is taking the position—which apparently is becoming rather foolish in the eyes of some—that General Twining,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other military experts know more than we do about this subject?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes. It is my honest opinion that a great many persons are prone to accept the Kremlin's boasts—statements which come out of Moscow and which are pure propaganda—as “The real McCoy.” They forget that Moscow is trying to bleed us white. Moscow is trying to make us spend ourselves into bankruptcy. As I pointed out at the hearings, if we continue to spend \$35 billion to \$40 billion a year to prepare ourselves for the next 10 years, we shall lose our way of life. We cannot long support such expenditures and still preserve our way of life.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Of course, the Senator has noted that General LeMay, who is one of our great flying heroes and one of our great strategists in the Air Force, has asked, not the paltry billion dollars which is recommended here as an increase, but an increase of \$3.8 billion, not for airplane procurement in general, but for airplane procurement for the needs of our Strategic Air Command alone.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is true. As I pointed out a while ago, I am satisfied that the Navy has asked for a great deal more than it will get, and I am sure the Army has also done so. I am sure the Tactical Air Command asked for more.

The top military experts—our Joint Chiefs of Staff—know the facts. They receive intelligence from the CIA, from the Navy, the Army, and various other sources which we do not have. I have faith that those men know what they are talking about.

As my good friend from Missouri stated a moment ago, 5 or 6 B-52 airplanes were produced in April, 4 or 5 in February, and so forth. They were turned down. Why? Because they had “bugs” in them. Would Senators want us to continue to build such planes unless they were perfected? That was one of the reasons for the delay. A B-52 cannot be built overnight. The Senator knows that we spent hundreds of millions of dollars in perfecting the B-36.

Where is it now? It is obsolete. The B-52 succeeded it.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. The distinguished Senator feels, as I likewise feel, that when the responsible head of the Air Force and the Chiefs of Staff tell us that there are personnel needs which they must place first, or the planes will not do them any good because they will be without trained men to operate them and service them; that housing facilities come close to top priority, because satisfied men are required for long periods of time in the service; and that research and experimentation are required, because “bugs” have been found in even our most up-to-date planes, such a request, coming from such a source, should be heeded by Members of the Senate.

Mr. ELLENDER. There is no question about it.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thoroughly agree with the distinguished Senator. I commend him for his speech. I agree that Members of the Senate, with the multifarious duties they have to perform, cannot possibly have the grasp and understanding of this subject which is possessed by those good men who have now come to the top of the pile so far as their profession is concerned. Of course they want to make good. They come to the Congress with the burden on their consciences as to what to recommend to place our Nation in the most secure position. I agree with the distinguished Senator that we would be foolish indeed if we were to pay no attention to their recommendations.

Mr. ELLENDER. I thank the Senator.

Because of the huge sum asked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have taken the position that they now have control of the purse strings of our country. We in the Congress have lost control over defense appropriations.

Of the billions of dollars we appropriate each year to operate our whole Government, 90 percent is for future protection and to pay for past wars, including the interest on our huge debt.

As the record will show, I have posed many times this question to Mr. Wilson: What weight do the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the President, and others give to the impact which such expenditures may have on our own economy? Of course, they must give weight to that factor. Otherwise, what is the use of our having a large Army, a large Navy, and a large Air Force, if the net result is to bring to our shores a new and destructive “ism”—a form of dictatorship?

As I shall show in a moment, the representatives of our Department of Defense are satisfied with the budget as presented to Congress. I shall show, by a letter from the Department of Defense, that the SAC budget suggested by General LeMay was not substantially changed prior to submitting the total military budget to Congress, except possibly as it may have been affected by an arbitrary cut of \$500 million, imposed at the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our top military leadership.

I come back to the proposition that each year there have been unobligated balances in the armed services, and each year they have grown steadily. On July 1, 1954, the carryover from the year before was \$15,706,808,000. Those were funds that were not even obligated.

The Defense Department started the fiscal year 1956 with an unobligated balance of \$12,815,170,000. At the beginning of the fiscal year 1957 it will have unobligated balances available of \$12,593,914,000. All these appropriations are global; they can be channeled in almost any way the Department of Defense sees fit. Some of this money could be used to procure additional B-52's. No new appropriation is required for that purpose.

If the increase which has been suggested is voted, and additional appropriations are made, the result will be merely to increase the unobligated balances by just that much more.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a schedule from the Department of Defense indicating the unobligated balances for each year during the period beginning January 1, 1949.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## EXHIBIT 1

Department of Defense: Obligations and obligational availability of current general appropriations, summary by service (excluding working, revolving, and special funds and expired general appropriations and authorizations), fiscal year 1950-57

(Thousands of dollars)

	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	OSD and interservice activities
FISCAL YEAR 1950—ACTUAL <sup>1</sup>					
Unobligated balance July 1, 1949.....	872,313	71,390	567,648	233,275	.....
Plus:					
New obligational availability fiscal year 1950.....	13,169,339	4,233,508	4,073,017	4,671,364	191,450
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(13,041,902)	(4,405,144)	(4,328,383)	2 (4,116,925)	(191,450)
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-1,809,529)	(-220,000)	(-789,529)	3 (-800,000)	.....
New unfinanced contract authority.....	(1,936,966)	(48,364)	4 (534,163)	5 (1,354,439)	.....
Administrative adjustment of contract authority.....	-99,081	-99,081	-99,081	-99,081	.....
Reimbursements.....	186,436	33,675	74,228	78,535	.....
Transfers (net).....	-22,982	7 -30,350	-26,247	16,615	17,000
Equals total available for obligation fiscal year 1950.....	14,106,029	4,308,224	4,589,565	4,999,789	208,450
Deduct obligations incurred fiscal year 1950.....	13,163,453	4,066,577	4,159,910	4,729,083	207,883
Equals unobligated balance June 30, 1950.....	942,576	241,647	429,650	270,706	567
Expired as of June 30, 1950.....	(137,962)	(124,165)	(3,825)	(9,405)	(567)
Available in fiscal year 1951.....	(804,614)	(117,482)	(425,831)	(261,301)	.....

See footnotes at end of table.



Department of Defense: Obligations and obligational availability of current general appropriations, summary by service (excluding working, revolving and special funds and expired general appropriations and authorizations), fiscal year 1950-57—Continued

[Thousands of dollars]

	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	OSD and interservice activities
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1951—ACTUAL</b>					
Unobligated balance July 1, 1950.....	804,614	117,482	425,831	261,301	—
Plus:					
New obligational availability fiscal year 1951.....	48,038,560	19,360,143	12,337,975	15,895,975	444,467
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(48,086,926)	(19,270,030)	(12,319,074)	(15,813,522)	(684,500)
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-2,317,600)		(-767,600)	(-1,550,000)	
New unfinanced contract authority.....	(2,269,233)		(700,293)	(1,568,940)	
Distribution of OSD emergency fund.....		(90,113)	(86,207)	(63,513)	(-239,833)
Adjustment of unfinanced contract authority.....	-20,560		-20,560		
Reimbursements.....	654,212	138,211	290,822	224,714	465
Transfers (net).....	-1,886	2,958	-2,862	-1,982	
Equals total available for obligation fiscal year 1951.....	49,474,939	19,618,795	13,031,204	16,380,008	444,932
Deduct obligations incurred fiscal year 1951.....	45,772,330	17,658,609	12,443,623	15,264,406	405,692
Equals:					
Unobligated balance June 30, 1951.....	3,702,609	1,960,186	587,581	1,115,602	39,240
Expired as of June 30, 1951.....	(251,732)	(65,407)	(88,980)	(58,105)	(39,240)
Available in fiscal year 1952.....	(3,450,879)	(1,894,779)	(498,602)	(1,057,497)	—
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1952—ACTUAL</b>					
Unobligated balance, July 1, 1951.....	3,450,879	1,894,779	498,602	1,057,497	—
Plus:					
New obligational availability, fiscal year 1952.....	59,986,264	21,639,719	15,648,422	22,265,123	433,000
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(61,411,104)	(21,648,032)	(16,291,087)	(22,948,985)	(523,000)
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-1,424,840)	(-48,364)	(-666,476)	(-710,000)	
Transfer to offset pay deficiency.....		(13,342)			(-13,342)
Distribution of OSD emergency fund.....		(26,709)	(23,811)	(26,138)	(-76,658)
Reimbursements.....	837,391	36,912	508,157	292,237	85
Transfers (net).....	37,765	-513	38,719	-441	(10)
Equals total available for obligation, fiscal year 1952.....	64,312,298	23,570,897	16,693,900	23,614,416	433,085
Deduct obligations incurred, fiscal year 1952.....	56,867,342	20,902,622	15,482,198	20,111,958	370,564
Equals:					
Unobligated balance, June 30, 1952.....	7,444,956	2,668,275	1,211,702	3,562,458	62,521
Expired as of June 30, 1952.....	(359,946)	(69,683)	(121,525)	(106,218)	(62,521)
Available in fiscal year 1953.....	(7,085,010)	(2,598,592)	(1,090,177)	(3,396,240)	—
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1953—ACTUAL</b>					
Unobligated balance, July 1, 1952.....	7,085,010	2,598,592	1,090,177	3,396,240	—
Plus:					
New obligational availability, fiscal year 1953.....	46,971,036	13,537,510	12,532,758	20,345,983	554,785
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(49,198,317)	(13,124,410)	(13,205,745)	(22,318,362)	(549,800)
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-2,307,681)		(-577,302)	(-1,730,379)	
Transfer to offset pay deficiency.....	(80,400)	(400,400)	(-96,000)	(-250,000)	(26,000)
Distribution of OSD emergency fund.....		(12,700)	(315)	(8,000)	(-21,015)
Reimbursements.....	1,941,886	1,200,777	429,720	311,389	—
Transfers (net).....	-49,643	-48,933	-568	-142	—
Equals total available for obligation, fiscal year 1953.....	55,948,287	17,287,946	14,052,086	24,053,470	554,785
Deduct obligations incurred, fiscal year 1953.....	45,734,793	14,194,587	12,256,645	18,747,624	535,936
Equals:					
Unobligated balance, June 30, 1953.....	10,213,494	3,093,359	1,795,441	5,305,846	18,849
Expired as of June 30, 1953.....	(821,755)	(268,091)	(489,049)	(46,009)	(18,607)
Available in fiscal year 1954.....	(9,391,739)	(2,825,268)	(1,306,392)	(5,259,837)	(242)
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1954—ACTUAL</b>					
Unobligated balance July 1, 1953.....	11 9,360,999	11 2,802,629	1,306,392	5,259,837	242
Plus:					
New obligational availability fiscal year 1954.....	34,473,599	12,938,992	9,333,356	11,410,496	790,755
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(34,554,042)	(12,937,406)	(9,438,310)	(11,408,776)	(769,590)
Treasury restore warrant.....	(11)	(11)			
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-80,454)		(-80,454)		
Transfers in lieu of supplemental appropriations.....			(-24,500)		(24,500)
Distribution of OSD emergency fund.....		(1,575)		(1,720)	(-3,295)
Reimbursements.....	2,507,433	1,652,302	402,808	452,323	—
Transfers (net).....	-18,969	-172,010	161,162	-8,121	—
Equals total available for obligation fiscal year 1954.....	46,331,163	17,221,913	11,203,718	17,114,535	790,997
Deduct obligations incurred fiscal year 1954.....	27,956,827	9,517,784	8,258,236	9,752,374	428,432
Equals:					
Unobligated balance June 30, 1954.....	18,374,336	7,704,129	2,945,482	7,362,162	362,564
Expired as of June 30, 1954.....	(2,667,528)	(1,464,377)	(620,435)	(320,152)	(262,564)
Available in fiscal year 1955.....	(15,706,808)	(6,239,752)	(2,325,046)	(7,042,010)	(100,000)
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1955—ACTUAL (SF-133 BASIS)</b>					
Unobligated balance July 1, 1954.....	15,706,808	6,239,752	2,325,046	7,042,010	100,000
Plus:					
New obligational authority fiscal year 1955.....	29,104,475	7,092,081	9,730,936	11,715,763	565,696
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(29,617,073)	(7,619,570)	(9,810,824)	(11,557,930)	(628,750)
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-34,000)		(-34,000)		
Congressional transfers.....	(21,402)	(-27,489)	(-45,888)	(157,833)	(-63,055)
Congressional rescissions.....	(-500,000)	(-500,000)			
Reimbursements.....	2,583,214	1,739,735	417,792	425,618	69
Equals total available for obligation fiscal year 1955.....	47,394,498	15,071,568	12,473,774	19,183,391	665,765
Deduct:					
Obligations incurred in fiscal year 1955.....	34,172,618	10,627,788	7,616,755	15,323,861	604,213
Balances expiring on June 30, 1955.....	406,710	130,559	228,949	20,633	26,569
Equals unobligated balance available in fiscal year 1956.....	12,815,170	4,313,220	4,628,070	3,838,897	34,983

See footnotes at end of table.

Department of Defense: Obligations and obligational availability of current general appropriations, summary by service (excluding working, revolving and special funds and expired general appropriations and authorizations), fiscal year 1950-57—Continued

[Thousands of dollars]

	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	OSD and interservice activities
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1956—ESTIMATED</b>					
Plus:					
New obligational authority fiscal year 1956.....	33,026,146	7,084,153	9,620,517	15,653,431	668,046
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(33,081,603)	(7,329,953)	(9,578,960)	(15,479,054)	(702,208)
Cash to liquidate prior contract authority.....	(-28,000)		(-28,000)		
Congressional transfers.....	(-18,885)	(-245,800)	(78,129)	(174,376)	(-34,162)
Congressional rescissions.....	(-8,572)		(-8,572)		
Anticipated reimbursements.....	5,109,369	1,391,933	684,285	3,033,151	
Fiscal year 1955 MDAP common item orders.....	(3,728,545)	(758,871)	(257,485)	(2,712,189)	
Fiscal year 1956 MDAP common item orders.....	(417,200)	(335,000)	(31,700)	(50,500)	
All other.....	(963,624)	(298,062)	(395,100)	(270,462)	
Equals total available for obligation fiscal year 1956.....	50,950,685	12,789,306	14,932,871	22,525,479	703,029
Deduct:					
Obligations incurred in fiscal year 1956.....	38,114,472	9,579,485	10,936,505	17,034,206	564,276
Balances expiring on June 30, 1956.....	242,300	65,691	127,409	18,000	31,200
Equals:					
Unobligated balances available in fiscal year 1957:					
Appropriations and reimbursements earned.....	9,634,172	2,521,743	3,670,932	3,333,944	107,553
Anticipated reimbursements from MDAP fund reservations outstanding as of June 30, 1956, to be earned:					
In fiscal year 1957.....	1,078,165	375,000	60,665	642,500	
After fiscal year 1957.....	1,881,577	247,387	137,360	1,496,830	
Total unobligated balance available in 1957.....	12,593,914	3,144,130	3,868,957	5,473,274	107,553
<b>FISCAL YEAR 1957—ESTIMATED</b>					
Plus:					
New obligational authority, fiscal year 1957.....	<sup>1</sup> 36,133,164	7,954,425	10,406,464	16,894,500	677,775
Direct congressional appropriations.....	(35,189,300)	(7,761,425)	(10,212,600)	(16,537,500)	(677,775)
Proposed for later transmission.....	(200,000)				
Congressional transfers.....	(785,000)	(103,000)	(235,000)	(357,000)	
Congressional rescissions.....	(-41,136)		(-41,136)		
Anticipated reimbursements.....	973,949	440,200	258,037	266,712	
Fiscal year 1957 MDAP common item orders <sup>12</sup> .....					
All other.....	(973,949)	(440,200)	(258,037)	(266,712)	
Equals total available for obligation, fiscal year 1957.....	<sup>13</sup> 49,701,027	11,547,755	14,533,458	22,634,486	785,328
Deduct:					
Obligations incurred in fiscal year 1957.....	<sup>13</sup> 39,870,804	10,321,625	10,883,139	17,680,712	785,328
Balances expiring on June 30, 1957.....	14,238		14,238		
Equals:					
Unobligated balances available in fiscal year 1958:					
Appropriations and reimbursements earned.....	7,934,408	978,743	3,498,721	3,456,944	
Anticipated reimbursements from MDAP fund reservations outstanding as of June 30, 1957, to be earned after fiscal year 1957.....	1,881,577	247,387	137,360	1,496,830	
Total unobligated balance available in fiscal year 1958.....	9,815,985	1,226,130	3,636,081	4,953,774	

<sup>1</sup> For purpose of continuity, fiscal year 1950 amounts include the appropriation "Alaska Communication System, operation and maintenance," which was reclassified from civil function to military function during fiscal year 1951 (Public Law 843).

<sup>2</sup> Fiscal year 1950 excludes and fiscal year 1951 includes \$22,461,000 cash carried over to fiscal year 1951 from fiscal year 1950 reserve ("Research and development, Air Force").

<sup>3</sup> Excludes \$75 million appropriation for payment of obligations incurred prior to June 30, 1946, against the appropriation "Air Corps, Army 1942-46." This amount does not represent cash to liquidate prior contract authority ("Construction of aircraft and related procurement, Air Force").

<sup>4</sup> Fiscal year 1950 excludes and fiscal year 1951 includes \$124,797,000 contract authority carried over to fiscal year 1951 from fiscal year 1950 reserve ("Construction of aircraft and related procurement, Navy").

<sup>5</sup> Fiscal year 1950 excludes and fiscal year 1951 includes \$726,151,000 contract authority carried over to fiscal year 1951 from fiscal year 1950 reserve ("Construction of aircraft and related procurement, Air Force").

<sup>6</sup> Administrative adjustments in contract authority, as follows:

Construction of ships.....	-\$18,873,000
Ordinance for new construction.....	+\$5,000,000
IRNV:	
Armor, armament, and ammunition.....	-\$6,500,000
Construction of machinery.....	-\$78,708,000
Total.....	-\$99,081,000

<sup>7</sup> Excludes \$42 million transfer representing extended availability of "Transportation Service, Army, 1949" which is included in "New obligational authority, fiscal year 1950."

<sup>8</sup> Represents rescission of \$31,460,000 contract authority made by Public Law 759 ("Ordinance for new construction, Navy") and administrative increase of \$10,900,000 contract authority ("IRNV—Construction and machinery, Navy").

<sup>9</sup> Transfer to "Military personnel, Army, 1952," which was not actually made until fiscal year 1953.

<sup>10</sup> Excludes \$6.1 million transfer from "Contingencies, DOD" to "Navy petroleum reserve No. 4, Alaska," which is included in new obligational authority fiscal year 1952.

<sup>11</sup> Differs from ending balance fiscal year 1953 due to reclassification of "Civilian relief in Korea" from a military function to a civilian function.

<sup>12</sup> Excludes reimbursements that may be anticipated later from fiscal year 1957 MDAP common item orders.

<sup>13</sup> Includes \$200 million not distributed by service.

Source: Standard Form 133.

NOTE.—Amounts do not necessarily add to totals due to rounding.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I bow to no other Member of the Senate in our efforts to be certain that our country is well protected. But in making these appropriations we must remember that we also owe an obligation to the taxpayers of the country. If we continue to increase appropriations—without what I consider to be justification—and make taxes so burdensome as to destroy initiative, we shall not need the armed services. Our way of life will be destroyed as efficiently as if the Russian air force sowed atomic destruction on our land. The testimony given before both the House and Senate committees clearly indicates that the 1957 request was based on the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was per-

sonally approved by the President, who certainly possesses an unequalled competence to evaluate the requirements of our security.

I should like to call the attention of the Members of the Senate, Mr. President, to the information contained on pages 1275 to 1277 of the hearings, excerpts from which I shall read in a few moments. It is clearly established there that the budget requests submitted by the President to the Congress, after review by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget, provide all but \$500 million of the funds originally requested by the Department of the Air Force.

We have all had sufficient experience in these matters to know that any origi-

nal staff estimates are certainly not the minimum amount actually required. The \$500 million reduction represents differences of opinion between the various field air staffs and reviewing authorities, consisting of \$400 million for operation and maintenance—which involves no new airplanes—and \$100 million for military construction, which has nothing to do with B-52 procurement.

We had before us in the hearings men in charge of the budget, who helped to prepare the budget, and who had the facts upon which the budget was based. In the hearings, at page 1276, there is a letter from General Bogart, Director of Budget, Department of the Air Force, dated June 11, 1956, indicating the manner and method in which the original



amount asked by the Air Force was reduced.

It will be noted, as I said a while ago, that the amount of the cut does not in any manner affect the number of airplanes which are to be constructed.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. I noticed that the Senator from Florida and the Senator from Louisiana were complaining about the money not being spent, and about certain airplanes which seem to have "bugs" in them, and therefore, they do not wish to spend the money. Does not that bring to our attention the fact that we should try to find out what we should have and use some of the money to protect the people of the United States?

Mr. ELLENDER. I anticipated the Senator's question, and I have before me a document which has to do with research and development, tests, and evaluation programs of the Department of Defense, which states that a total of \$5.2 billion will be available in fiscal year 1957 for these purposes.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. That is money which they have. When are they going to spend it?

Mr. ELLENDER. They are spending it now. For specific research and development items for the Army, the request is \$410 million. For activities in support of research and development, \$89.4 million. We did not cut out any of that, and they did not ask for any more than that.

For the Navy, \$493 million was requested. We allowed that amount.

For Navy activities supporting research and development of facilities to make these newly designed implements of war, we provided \$134.2 million.

The Air Force, for research and development, asked for and obtained \$610 million.

For Air Force activities supporting research and development, \$383 million, and for Air Force development, test and evaluation items—to test the new planes and various other items for our defense—the amount was \$1,731,000,000. We allowed those amounts, too.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Is that money to be spent in the future?

Mr. ELLENDER. In this fiscal year.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. How much has been spent in 1956 for research and development?

Mr. ELLENDER. In 1956 we spent \$3,769,000,000. In 1955 we spent \$3,391,000,000 and in 1957 it is proposed to spend \$5,194,000,000, which includes, as I said, development tests and evaluation procedures for all three of the armed services, together with the activities connected therewith.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. In the past year how much did the committee recommend for appropriation for research and development?

Mr. ELLENDER. I have just given the figures to the Senator.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Did they spend all of it?

Mr. ELLENDER. I do not know how much, if any, of those amounts was left

over—that is, how much represents unobligated balances. The problem of unobligated balances is of fairly recent origin. The Senator will recall that during the 80th Congress, our method of appropriating money was changed. Prior to that time, the departments were given the right to contract, and then after the contract was entered into and the work was completed, they came to us for appropriations to pay for the work performed under the contract. That method was changed in the 80th Congress, and as a result of the change we have to appropriate in advance all the money necessary to purchase new implements, new ships, new missiles, airplanes, and so forth. I presume that change accounts to a great extent for these unobligated funds. But the point I was trying to make a while ago was that these unobligated funds are, of course, in addition to those which have been obligated, amounting to billions of dollars. I have shown that in the statement which I have just had placed in the RECORD.

Since the Department of Defense is asking for more than it can possibly obligate in fiscal year 1957, if it needs any additional money to build B-52's, it can easily find money to pay for them by tapping some of the funds not yet obligated. But any such program must be determined in the light of the capability of our factories to produce. General LeMay asked for an accelerated program, but I doubt that we have the capacity to build the number of planes for which he is asking, unless we build more factories. That would entail millions of dollars more, as the Senator knows.

Personally, I am willing to trust the judgment of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. As was pointed out by the distinguished Senator from Florida, they are dedicated men. They have at hand facts which we do not have. They prepare and assign missions for the various services, and the various services are asked to meet them.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. The committee is recommending this year a very substantial increase for research and development, is it not?

Mr. ELLENDER. Oh, yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. They have awakened, then, to the fact that they have not been doing their duty in that field.

Mr. ELLENDER. I would not say that. I wish I could state some of the facts that are secret, and the Senator could well understand the delay. But I do not wish to divulge any military secrets. I will state that I have faith in those dedicated men. They should certainly know what they are doing, and I am willing to trust them.

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. They certainly realize at this time that they need more for research and development than they have been using in the past.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is true. That has been the case with the budget for airplanes and various other implements of war. We are bound to expect changes from time to time.

Here is another which was pointed out to us during the hearings. If we

were to give to General LeMay all he asks we might throw the missions of the Air Force and the other services out of balance—we would affect what the Navy might need or what the Army might require. We cannot depend entirely on superiority in strategic air bombing to win a war. We must depend on all the military services. Before the budget is made, the Air Force must consult with the Army and the Navy in order to dovetail all this work. If the Air Force budget is out of balance we may have so many airplanes that we cannot man them, and they will be on the ground like ducks for the enemy. The Department of Defense recommended to Congress what I would call a more or less balanced program. I was very much impressed with its presentation.

It is my belief that in the light of what General Twining may present when he returns from Moscow, we will be materially assisted in preparing the budget for fiscal year 1958.

Going back to the amount which was asked for by the Air Force, I stated a moment ago that of that entire amount, including money requested by General LeMay and by all others in the Air Force, a cut of only \$500 million was imposed by the Joint Chiefs. I return to the proposition that if that sum is necessary, it can be obtained by the Armed Services from prior-year appropriations as yet unobligated. I read from the hearings:

Senator SALTONSTALL. I hold up my hands on that one because it is my understanding that all but \$500 million of that \$2.8 billion was really found in that \$16.5 billion plus what this—

We were then discussing the entire amount which was originally asked by the Air Force for its 1957 budget.

General BOGART. I think, sir, the point is that all but \$500 million of that cut is identified against such things as reorder lead time, the financing adjustment. In other words, it either has no effect on program or is against program changes which were agreed. In other words, what it amounts to is that of that total cut \$500 million was arbitrary and we just absorb that. We don't know quite how. The other points we do have specified ways to absorb and it is for a specific reason.

The letter from General Bogart to which I referred earlier and which explains how this sum, the difference between what the Congress was asked to provide and what the Air Staff asked for, was well spelled out. The letter was addressed to the chairman, and reads:

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED  
STATES AIR FORCE,  
Washington, D. C., June 11, 1956.

CHAIRMAN,  
Department of Defense Subcommittee,  
Committee on Appropriations,  
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The following information is submitted in response to Senator SALTONSTALL's request for a breakdown of the differences between the \$19.392 billion Air Staff submission for the fiscal year 1957 budget and the \$16.8945 billion currently in the budget before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

The total decrease between the \$19.392 billion Air Staff estimate and the \$16.518

billion included in the President's budget was \$2.874 billion. Of this amount—

(a) Approximately \$1.560 billion was identified against reorder lead-time adjustments, financial adjustments (anticipated recoupments), price changes, and other factors not involving program modification.

(b) Approximately \$650 million was identified against program changes—primarily revised procurement estimates—which were recommended or agreed by the Air Force.

In other words, according to General Bogart, those two items, which aggregate more than \$2 billion, did not in any manner adversely affect the program which the Air Force presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) About \$157 million, including \$123 million in the "Aircraft and related procurement" appropriation, represents the net of a number of changes, both plus and minus, in many individual item programs. It is most difficult, in retrospect, to determine to what extent each of these individual changes stemmed from funding reductions. For the most part, I believe that these reductions were the type of staff adjustments which normally result from the detailed reviews and constitute the net of many minor disallowances, pricing forecasts, obligational capability judgments, and minor policy determinations. It is fair to state, I believe, that on balance there is no substantial adverse effect on the Air Force program by these reductions.

That is the information we received from General Bogart.

(d) About \$500 million were arbitrary reductions; that is, those based upon differences in judgment between the Air Staff and the review authorities. These reductions, to which I had previously referred, included \$404.9 million in "Operation and maintenance" and \$100 million in "Military construction." These were reductions not related to specific program changes or any of those factors which normally lead to adjustment during the review process.

Mr. President, we have the whole story in that letter. I do not think there is any doubt that the program which was originally presented by General LeMay, based upon the mission to be performed by him, has been fulfilled almost 100 percent.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would correct the Senator to this extent, if I may.

Mr. ELLENDER. I wish the Senator would do so.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The \$19.8 billion to which the Senator refers was the decision of the Air Force Advisory Committee, composed of their staff; it was not the decision of General LeMay. General LeMay, I think, submitted a somewhat higher figure for the SAC.

Mr. ELLENDER. But it was included in the prior amount submitted. Am I not correct?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Certainly.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I may state that there was some question as to who constituted the Air Force Budget Advisory Committee, so I requested their names and positions. The committee is composed of the following officers: Maj. Gen. Daniel F. Callahan, Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Hob-

son, Maj. Gen. Thomas P. Gerrity, Maj. Gen. William S. Stone, Col. W. L. Rogers, Maj. Gen. Frank A. Bogart, and Maj. Gen. William E. Hall.

I have not read the titles of these officers, so, with the permission of the Senator from Louisiana, I ask unanimous consent that the complete list of the Air Force Budget Advisory Committee and their positions be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AIR FORCE BUDGET ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
Maj. Gen. Daniel F. Callahan, Assistant for Programming, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Director of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Hobson, Director of Manpower and Organization, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations.

Maj. Gen. Thomas P. Gerrity, Assistant for Production Programming, Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel.

Maj. Gen. William S. Stone, Director of Personnel Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel.

Col. W. L. Rogers, Assistant for Development Programming, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development.

Maj. Gen. Frank A. Bogart, Director of Budget, Deputy Chief of Staff, Controller.

Maj. Gen. William E. Hall, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Office of the Chief of Staff, USAF.

Advisory: Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) or his designated representative, Lyle S. Garlock.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, the Air Force Budget Advisory Committee were members of the Air Force in uniform, who were holding very responsible positions in the Air Force, and certainly ought to have known its overall requirements.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I wish to call this passage, in particular, to the attention of the Senate—Senator SALTONSTALL was still addressing General Twining:

Now, as Chief of Staff, I trust it is a fair question to ask you if this committee determined to increase the budget allowance over and above the estimates of the Secretary of Defense and the President this year, say \$500 million, where would you believe that could be best spent? If we decided to increase it by \$1 billion, where, as Chief of Staff, would you decide that could be best spent?

In other words, what is your highest priority today in your opinion as Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

General TWINING. I think first, including the present supplemental, that our aircraft program is satisfactory.

That was General Twining's answer. I continue:

If I had the money, I would put it on air bases and do something to keep those people in the service, like better housing, and things like that. I consider the aircraft program satisfactory.

At first, according to his testimony in the hearings, General Twining said that he would stress experienced trained personnel, then airbases, but that aircraft production was satisfactory. A few minutes later he corrected this by stating he would place research and development ahead of aircraft production. I am certain my good friend from Massa-

chusetts will agree that there is enough in the budget, according to the witnesses who appeared before us, to handle all the research the military deems necessary during the coming fiscal year.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think, to be absolutely accurate, General Twining stated as his third priority that he believed he could use from \$150 million to \$200 million more for research.

Mr. ELLENDER. But he did not express dissatisfaction with the amount the committee provided. He said that in the event the amount were increased and the money were made available, he could spend it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. But he did not complain about the amount which we were providing.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. No.

Mr. ELLENDER. He did not complain about the budget; on the contrary, he said it was satisfactory.

In presenting the budget, General LeMay had this to say in his presentation before the committee:

It was apparent that the procurement of such a force within this time period was very improbable, but of more concern was the likelihood that even if we were provided such a force we would be unable to man and support it properly. In other words, we could not absorb it without emergency procedures. Consequently, we have been focusing our attention on the force structure which we and industry can support, which the Air Force and the Nation can produce and absorb without emergency measures and which will give us the greatest deterrent capability practical for the time period.

(Discussion off the record.)

That was General LeMay talking about the budget which he submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is true that General LeMay made a personal plea for what he thought should be done. Let me read from page 1250 of the hearings:

I think you will find that all military men will agree that no military task can be undertaken in these modern days until you have air superiority—until you have won the airpower battle. No military task can be undertaken until that is accomplished. Therefore, we should buy first things first and put into the hands of the military the weapons that will win this airpower battle. It is going to be of very short duration. If you win it, then you can go on and do whatever else is necessary and have plenty of time to build those forces and build them up. If you lose it, those other forces will do you no good if you have them.

In other words, Mr. President, it is his belief that only SAC can win the war, should it come.

He is sold on that idea. He thinks that if SAC is properly equipped, we can end a war shortly after it begins. He is very much impressed with that. I am not disagreeing with him, because I do not know, but I do say that the Joint Chiefs disagreed with him, and I am willing to accept their judgment.

General LeMay made his budget estimate; he took into consideration the task which had been set before him, and stated that task could be accomplished in accord with the capability of our Nation to produce and absorb



without emergency measures, without having to build extra plants which would cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The Senator from Louisiana will admit, will he not, that General LeMay is the head of the Strategic Air Command?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.

Mr. CHAVEZ. So General LeMay is a military officer charged with the defense of the country and the security of the country. In this particular instance General LeMay, as the head of Strategic Air Command, has the responsibility of trying to do everything he can for the security of the country and for the national defense.

Mr. ELLENDER. There is no question about that.

Mr. CHAVEZ. There is no question about that.

Mr. ELLENDER. General Taylor is charged with the same thing, and Admiral Burke is charged with the same thing.

Mr. CHAVEZ. So is General Partridge.

Mr. ELLENDER. So is General Partridge, and so are all of them.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Is it not a fact that General LeMay recommended, for his own Strategic Air Command functions, \$3,800,000,000?

Mr. ELLENDER. Three billion eight hundred million dollars represented his original budget.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Let me say to my good friend that what General LeMay said was in agreement with General Twining's testimony as to how the extra appropriation was to be spent, and it was not all to be for airplanes. He put airplanes in the third category.

Mr. CHAVEZ. Certainly. He wanted manpower.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes. That is the problem, not airplanes. That is why, as I shall point out in a few moments, I am opposed to the provisions of the bill which provide \$800 million for aircraft procurement and—

Mr. CHAVEZ. Let me assure the Senator from Louisiana that no one has greater respect for his intellectual integrity than I have.

Mr. ELLENDER. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I know the Senator from Louisiana is opposed to that proposal; but, after General LeMay gave his testimony, and as brought out by the Senator from Louisiana when he read the report, the committee, at the instance of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], instead of allowing \$3,800,000,000 thought that production could be kept up by providing \$1,160,000,000, or one-third of what General LeMay asked for. Is not that correct?

Mr. ELLENDER. I beg to differ on that point, because General LeMay stated, as I understood him, that if there was an increase in the production of B-52's, emergency measures would have to be taken. It would mean a broadening of our plant structure, the erection

of more plants, and other expensive expansions. That is the way I understood it.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I am sure the Senator understood it that way.

In this morning's press, and even in the afternoon or the early editions of the afternoon press, we have seen published statements from General Twining, who also testified, and who called the budget estimates austere. That means tight, or not enough. Anyone who has a simple understanding of the word "austerity" knows that is exactly what it means—not enough. General Twining made that statement. The morning press and the afternoon press tell us what type of airplanes or aircraft he was shown in Soviet Russia.

I do not care a thing about what Secretary Wilson thinks of the Senator from Louisiana or myself—

Mr. ELLENDER. I do not, either.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The only justification for the increase is that we are taking seriously the idea of national security and defense.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am taking it very seriously. I was convinced by the testimony I heard, and the testimony I read, that we are now providing all that it is within our capability to produce, and which the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel is necessary. I would not be at all surprised if, by the time the year is ended, the B-52 became obsolete, just as the B-36 did.

Mr. CHAVEZ. But for the moment the B-52 is the best we have.

Mr. ELLENDER. I have never opposed requests for any amount which could economically be used for research and development. The Senator knows that to be so.

Mr. CHAVEZ. That is true. The committee reduced the recommendation of General LeMay for research and development from \$200 million to \$100 million. The Senator knows that. Now, if we do not take seriously this situation of national security and defense, then every cent requested should be refused. But, if we do take this question seriously, we should not look at the dollars and cents alone, because the chairman of the subcommittee is convinced that the American people are more interested in national security and defense than they are in the dollars and cents involved.

Has the Senator from Louisiana heard from one of his constituents, or from one of my constituents, or from anyone anywhere in the country, that this is too much for national security?

Mr. ELLENDER. When I explain to them that Congress has already provided so much money that the funds appropriated could not even be obligated—and this year the Defense Department is ending up with over \$12 billion that could not even be obligated—I am sure they will agree with me that we should not appropriate another billion dollars. That is my answer to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I understand that.

Mr. ELLENDER. In the same vein, General LeMay took this position and said this in answer to the question of the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ],

and I quote the Senator from New Mexico:

May I interrupt at this point? That is what we can build. Is that what we should build or should we have some more?

General LeMay. We could build more, but it does no good to build just airplanes unless you have bases, people, and support to adequately operate them and take care of them.

That is the situation.

As I shall point out, of the \$1 billion being requested, \$800 billion is to build new airplanes, for which General LeMay says we shall not have a sufficient number of people to operate.

Now, going back to the amendment itself, let us look at the various appropriations involved in the suggested increase of \$1,160,000,000—which, by the way, is in the bill at present. We have \$200 million recommended for military construction. The only explanation offered by the committee for this is the following which I quote from the committee report:

The committee recommends an appropriation at this time of \$200 million for "Military construction, Air Force," in order to provide needed funds for bases so as to make larger aircraft operational. Total military construction requests for 1957 for the Air Force amount to \$1,228,000,000, and have not yet been acted upon by the Congress. In recommending an immediate appropriation of \$200 million the committee acts on the assumption that a like amount will be deducted from the appropriation request for military construction in the supplemental appropriation bill, 1957.

I ask my colleagues, why should we now provide the \$200 million appropriation when we have not as yet passed on the authorization? Even if we should vote for the \$200 million, a start could not be made until the military public works bill is passed by the Senate. I say we are getting ahead of ourselves. We ought to wait until the military public works bill comes before us, and then put in a supplemental appropriation bill not only the \$200 million which is requested, but any amount necessary and which may be justified by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I frankly do not understand what would be gained by appropriating the \$200 million at this time. The total \$1,228,000,000 for Air Force construction is expected to be before the appropriations committee for action within the next week or 2. The funds involved cannot be used prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year. At most, therefore, we might make these funds available a few days earlier than would otherwise be the case if we followed orderly procedures and considered all military public works at one time.

Next, it is recommended that money for "Operation and maintenance" be increased by \$40 million over the amount requested. The only explanation offered by the committee is that—

An additional \$40 million has been added to the bill to support the increased operational and force buildup.

We have no evidence to enable us to determine whether that amount is sufficient or whether it is too large or too small.

In this connection, we may recall that the amount requested in the budget for this appropriation item was approximately \$400 million less than the amount originally recommended by the air staff. As the House Appropriations Committee pointed out, however, even this amount involved an increase of more than \$608 million, or 19.2 percent, over the amount available in 1956. Since there is little indication that the level of Air Force activity in 1957 is to be some 20 percent above that of the current year, the amounts requested in the budget should certainly be adequate without the further increase of \$40 million recommended by the committee.

Mr. President, all afternoon we have heard debate about the bases we have built in Iceland and the bases we have built in North Africa, and it has been stated that they are in danger of being lost. Yet General LeMay and others have recommended that many more be built throughout the world.

It seems to me that before we undertake a building program of that kind, we should evaluate the present situation. As I have previously stated, we have many bases in north Africa. I visited all of them. We also have bases in Japan and in Formosa, and we are building some in Spain. I believe that before we consider constructing more bases of this sort, we should determine the extent to which we can save the ones we have there now, because such bases cost large sums of money. As I recall, the amount spent for these bases alone was almost \$3 billion. So, Mr. President, before we undertake to build more overseas bases, we certainly should look into the feasibility of trying to make our present bases more secure, of having our bases built on property which we can rest assured will continue to be available for our use.

Next, Mr. President, \$20 million is recommended for "Military personnel." Again, the committee report merely states:

The increase of \$20 million is provided for additional personnel needed to implement an augmented Air Force.

Apparently, Mr. President, this implies that the number of Air Force military personnel is to be increased by some 4,900 from the 963,000 requested in the budget and recommended by the Air Force itself. This is particularly confusing, since the various Air Force witnesses testified that their problem was to get and to retain experienced technical personnel, rather than to increase the total numbers involved. Furthermore, this strength of 936,000 was recommended by the Air Force itself, as against an approved manpower ceiling of 975,000, and undoubtedly represents the best judgment of the Air Force as to the numbers of men it needs and can obtain next year.

Mr. President, General LeMay, as well as General Twining and other witnesses, assigned top priority to the funds necessary in order to obtain good technicians, men who can take care of the aircraft and can fly them. They say the way

to do that is to increase pay scales; undoubtedly some of the three-billion-and-some-odd-thousand dollars which General LeMay recommends is to be used for that purpose, and also to provide more fringe benefits, and so forth.

I return to the point that General Twining listed the construction of aircraft as fourth in priority; and General LeMay classified it as third. The rest of the money requested was for research and development, for better housing and better pay, so as to retain the needed technical personnel.

Next, Mr. President, an increase of \$100 million is recommended by the committee for Research and Development, over the amount requested for 1957. Again, only a generalized statement is offered to explain this increase, namely:

The added funds are provided in order to expedite the research and development program of the Air Force.

Of course, research and development should be given high priority. However, there is a definite limit to the amount of profitable research which can be carried on. The President's budget request for \$610 million for Air Force research and development is \$40 million more than the amount available in 1956. Furthermore, the emergency fund of the Secretary of Defense contains \$135 million which can be transferred to the military departments for research and development; it is reasonable to assume that the Air Force would receive from this source substantial amounts to augment the \$610 million requested directly for the Air Force.

Mr. President, I note that the committee has recommended in section 635 language which would make the appropriations which are available for major procurement of aircraft and missiles also available to cover the expenses of development. This will certainly add measurably to the funds available for research and development, without the additional \$100 million proposed by the committee.

Finally, Mr. President, the committee has recommended adding \$800 million for aircraft and related procurement, over the \$6,048,500,000 requested for this purpose in the budget. The committee report states:

These additional funds are to be used primarily for increasing the production of heavy bombers for the Strategic Air Command. At the same time, should it be deemed advisable, part of these added appropriations are available for increased production of fighter aircraft for the continental defense.

Mr. President, I do not consider myself qualified to discuss in any detail the question of whether we should continue procuring more and more aircraft of types which may be partially obsolete by the time they are delivered or which may be superseded by guided missiles; or the question of whether the Air Force could, in fact, actually absorb such additional aircraft. Again, I simply refer to page 1278 of the printed hearings, where General Twining responded to the questions ably put to him by the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] concerning the priorities

he would assign if the committee determined to increase the budget allowance over the estimates presented to the Congress. General Twining replied without qualification as follows:

I think, first, including the present supplemental, that our aircraft program is satisfactory. If I had the money—

And, Mr. President, let me say here that all the armed services want more money; we cannot find any of them that could not spend more money somewhere—

I would put it on airbases and do something to keep these people in the service, like better housing and things like that. I consider the aircraft program is satisfactory.

Mr. President, in view of the above-mentioned facts, I do not believe that the committee's recommendations to increase the Air Force appropriations above the amounts requested in the budget can be justified. On the same basis, there is no particular justification for the amendment to increase the amount by \$500 million. The only virtue I can find in the latter proposal is that it is less than the amount the committee has recommended.

Mr. President, that concludes my presentation.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a tabulation and explanation entitled "Activities Supporting the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program in the Department of Defense," to which I referred earlier in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LAIRD in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION PROGRAM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The introduction of improved weapons and military equipment into the combat and combat support forces of the Army, Navy and Air Force is a complicated process covering many different, although related, activities which must be completed before a new weapon or item of military equipment can be considered as fully developed in a military sense. From a military standpoint, a new item cannot be considered as fully developed until it is capable of performing an assigned combat mission, and has been assigned for operational use by the combat or combat support forces. The lines between research, development, and procurement cannot be drawn precisely, particularly in areas of rapidly advancing technology. For purposes of budgetary presentation, a narrowly construed definition has been used for research and development, which does not give the full measure of our research, development, test, and evaluation effort. Thus, while the fiscal year 1957 budget requests a total of over \$1.6 billion for the category specifically identified as research and development, it can reasonably be estimated from currently available data that the funds for research and development plus funds for activities directly supporting the research, development, test and evaluation program aggregate about \$5.2 billion for fiscal year 1957. This may be compared with an estimated \$3.4 billion in fiscal year 1955 and \$3.8 billion in fiscal year 1956 for the same purposes. The estimates of funds programed for research, development, test, and evaluation in fiscal



year 1955, fiscal year 1956, and fiscal year 1957 are derived as follows:

1. New obligational authority, research and development appropriations:

[Millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957
Army.....	\$366.3	\$421.3	\$410
Navy.....	434.4	474.2	493
Air Force.....	420.4	598.0	610
Emergency fund.....	(1)	(1)	135
Total.....	1,221.1	1,493.5	1,648

<sup>1</sup> Transfers included in Army, Navy, and Air Force figures.

<sup>2</sup> Includes \$50 million transfer authority.

2. Supporting activities directly related to research and development: Certain of the requirements in direct support of the research and development program are not included in the research and development appropriations, but are included in other appropriations which provide the same general type of support for all military programs. These include military construction, industrial facilities financed under procurement appropriations and the pay and allowances of military personnel. On the basis of detailed program data, the amounts in these appropriations that are directly related to the activities financed under the research and development appropriations are estimated as follows:

[Millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957
(a) Military construction:			
Army.....	1.9	8.0	43.1
Navy.....	9.7	63.0	55.9
Air Force.....	109.3	98.5	224.9
Subtotal.....	120.9	169.5	323.9
(b) Industrial facilities:			
Army.....			34.5
Navy.....			52.7
Air Force.....	45.2	88.1	
Subtotal.....	45.2	88.1	87.2
(c) Military personnel:			
Army.....	35.9	40.7	46.3
Navy.....	41.5	43.4	43.8
Air Force.....	100.8	103.8	106.2
Subtotal.....	178.2	187.9	196.3
(d) Department of Defense total:			
Military construction.....	120.9	169.5	323.9
Industrial facilities.....	45.2	88.1	87.2
Military personnel.....	178.2	187.9	196.3
Total.....	344.3	445.5	607.4
Army.....	37.8	48.7	89.4
Navy.....	51.2	106.4	134.2
Air Force.....	255.3	290.4	383.8

3. Items under development, test, and evaluation: Many of the programs for developing new weapons and military equipment have, as the result of previous years research efforts, reached a stage where it is necessary to procure preliminary production items in limited quantities for test and evaluation as to:

(a) The soundness of the engineering design;

(b) The feasibility of the production design; and

(c) The operational suitability of weapons or equipment from a military standpoint, prior to standardization for operational use and large scale production for issue or inventory.

Major engineering changes and improvements must be made in new developments, provisionally accepted for limited production and use, to satisfy the need for achieving

early operational capabilities with the most modern weapons attainable in support of national security policy. All procurement items which have been standardized or otherwise approved for service use within the military departments have been excluded from the following estimates. Procurement items which are not standardized, to the extent they can be identified at this time, are considered as being under development and are estimated as follows:

[Millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957
(a) Aircraft:			
Army.....	60.4	10.9	305.8
Navy.....	755.3	152.4	216.1
Air Force.....			
Subtotal.....	815.7	163.3	521.9
(b) Guided missiles:			
Army.....	168.7	83.0	453.0
Navy.....	70.0	104.3	146.5
Air Force.....	418.4	810.9	1,266.2
Subtotal.....	657.1	998.2	1,865.7
(c) Ships:			
Army.....			
Navy.....	41.7	177.6	153.6
Air Force.....			
Subtotal.....	41.7	177.6	153.6
(d) Other:			
Army.....	39.7	165.2	100.0
Navy.....	26.0	33.1	48.9
Air Force.....	246.2	292.7	249.1
Subtotal.....	311.9	491.0	398.0
(e) Department of Defense total:			
Aircraft.....	815.7	163.3	521.9
Guided missiles.....	657.1	998.2	1,865.7
Ships.....	41.7	177.6	153.6
Other.....	311.9	491.0	398.0
Total.....	1,826.4	1,830.1	2,939.2
Army.....	208.4	248.2	553.0
Navy.....	198.1	325.9	654.8
Air Force.....	1,419.9	1,256.0	1,731.4

4. Summary: The identifiable amounts programmed in the fiscal year 1957 budget for research and development, and in support of the research, development, test, and evaluation program can be summarized as follows:

[Millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957
(a) Army:			
Research and development.....	366.3	421.3	410.0
Activities supporting research and development.....	37.8	48.7	89.4
Development, test, and evaluation items.....	208.4	248.2	553.0
Subtotal.....	612.5	718.2	1,052.4
(b) Navy:			
Research and development.....	434.4	474.2	493.0
Activities supporting research and development.....	51.2	106.4	134.2
Development, test, and evaluation items.....	198.1	325.9	654.8
Subtotal.....	683.7	906.5	1,282.0
(c) Air Force:			
Research and development.....	420.4	598.0	610.0
Activities supporting research and development.....	255.3	290.4	383.8
Development, test, and evaluation items.....	1,419.9	1,256.0	1,731.4
Subtotal.....	2,095.6	2,144.4	2,725.2
(d) Interservice (emergency fund).....			135.0

[Millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1955	Fiscal year 1956	Fiscal year 1957
(e) Department of Defense total:			
Research and development.....	1,221.1	1,493.5	1,648.0
Activities supporting research and development.....	344.3	445.5	607.4
Development, test, and evaluation items.....	1,826.4	1,830.1	2,939.2
Total.....	3,391.8	3,769.1	5,194.6
Army.....	612.5	718.2	1,052.4
Navy.....	683.7	906.5	1,282.0
Air Force.....	2,095.6	2,144.4	2,725.2
Interservice (emergency fund).....			135.0

5. Items not estimated: In addition to the above program items which could be identified from data presently available, there are other activities of the Department of Defense and the three military departments which provide significant support to the research and development programs, but which have not been included because the amounts applicable to the research and development program cannot be readily identified. These items include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Departmental administrative costs.

(b) The regular operating and maintenance cost of military ships, aircraft, and troop units used in conducting tests.

(c) The pay and allowances of military personnel attached to regular military units used in conducting tests other than specific operational evaluation organizations.

(d) Costs which are part of production contracts required for the further development of standardized items which must be adapted to other uses or improved in performance.

(e) The regular military costs, associated with operational and training units, required in the process of phasing out obsolete weapons and phasing in improved weapons, such as the changeover from propeller driven aircraft to turbojet aircraft.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield for a brief statement?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. First, let me commend the Senator from Louisiana upon the care with which he has built up his argument, for his faithful attendance upon the committee's hearings, and for his knowledge of the subject.

The Senator from Louisiana has made a statement about the proposed increase in the amount of \$500 million. As one who advocated that amendment, let me say that I agree with the Senator from Louisiana that the budget as a whole is carefully worked out, and is the budget of the administration.

In the Department of Defense, particularly in the Air Force, there are a number of persons who say that additional funds can reasonably be spent for research. There is ample testimony on that point.

Then there is the question of funds for maintenance and operation. The funds available for that purpose may run short during the year. So there is some justification for the appropriation for that purpose of an additional amount of \$30 million.

In the case of personnel, we wish to build up the strength of our technical personnel; all of us agree on that point.

So the issue resolves itself to the procurement of aircraft and whether the procurement of more aircraft should be provided for in this year's budget.

According to my view of the matter, although in that case the budget itself will provide for procurement of the aircraft the Air Force says it needs and says it can get along with, even though General LeMay and General Partridge feel they could use more—and probably they could use more—yet General Twining and Secretary Quarles say they are satisfied.

It is an austere budget, and the funds available for aircraft production must be figured very closely. Therefore, if we appropriate an additional \$350 million, there will be a certain degree of flexibility which will allow the Air Force a little more leeway in building B-52's, if that is the thing to do, or in building aircraft of other types, if that is the thing to do. At any rate, such an additional appropriation will give the Air Force a little more flexibility from the present very austere budget, from a banking point of view, in paying for aircraft procurement. In my view, that is the argument in favor of making an increase of \$500 million, instead of an increase of \$1,162,000,000, as recommended by a majority of the committee.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, if the President of the United States and the Joint Chiefs of Staff present us with a new budget estimate for such an additional amount—and let me say that I assume that when General Twining returns from Russia, he will have a great deal to say—then it may be necessary to increase the budget. But I do not see the necessity for increasing the budget at this time, in view of the fact—as I have pointed out—that even with amounts recommended by the military, there will be more than \$12 billion of unobligated funds at the end of the next fiscal year.

The only thing an increase in the budget would achieve, may I say to my good friend from Massachusetts, would be further to increase the amounts of unobligated year-end balances. The Senator knows that I have constantly taken the position that the armed services should not come before us and ask for more money than they can spend. As I have pointed out on many occasions, the fact that they have so much money to spend leads to the purchase of a great many supplies that are far beyond the capacity of our armed services to use.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. ELLENDER. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator speaks about the unobligated balances. About \$2½ billion of the unobligated balance is in the 1957 budget. In other words, in round figures, they are asking for \$36.8 billion, and they are adding \$2.5 billion, which makes a total of \$38.8 billion, in round figures.

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes; but if we add to that amount the unobligated balances from the previous year we will end the year for which we are appropriating money, as I pointed out, with almost \$12 billion unobligated. Nine billion dollars of it is actual cash on hand, so to speak,

and the remainder is to be earned from the sale of hardware through MDAP.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. When the figure goes below \$10 billion of unobligated balances in the entire Department of Defense, we get down to a position which is estimated to be about as low as it should get. In other words, that figure represents the bank balance. How much they can go below \$10 billion is a question which has not been determined.

Mr. ELLENDER. Secretary Wilson stated to us last year that he intended to continue whittling away at the figure until he got it down to \$5 billion or \$6 billion.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think that is a little low.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am sure that an amount of that size would be far more than the amount really necessary to carry as unobligated.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think he now estimates that \$8 billion or \$9 billion would be the appropriate figure, rather than \$5 billion or \$6 billion.

#### EXTENSION OF DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 9852) to extend the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and for other purposes, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments, agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. FREAR, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. BENNETT, and Mr. BUSH conferees on the part of the Senate.

#### EXTENSION OF EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1949

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives announcing its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 9052) to amend the Export Control Act of 1949 to continue for an additional period of 2 years the authority provided thereunder for the regulation of exports, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I move that the Senate insist upon its amendments, agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. FREAR, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. BENNETT, and Mr. BUSH conferees on the part of the Senate.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, legislation authorizing Federal aid for school construction has been pending before the Senate and the Congress since the first days of 1955. We have had 2 sets of proposals from the administration—1 impossible and 1 just inadequate. Other legislative formulations have also been pending on the same subject both in the House and the Senate.

I am myself deeply committed to the general proposition of Federal aid for school construction. I believe in it with all my heart and I am, indeed, a co-sponsor of a legislative formulation introduced last year by the distinguished senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], who is chairman of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, which has jurisdiction over legislation on this subject.

Last year that committee, of which I am proud to be a member, held extensive hearings on all the legislative proposals on this matter that were before us. The Education and Labor Committee of the House has even more recently held extensive hearings on the same subject. The House committee has reported a bill, and the Rules Committee has granted a rule. Consideration of this legislation in the House is scheduled to begin this week.

It has taken 2 years to move this legislation to even this point of consideration. We here all know—although I doubt whether the general public knows—why this legislation has moved so slowly and hesitantly, despite the fact that it is "must" legislation, so labeled by the President of the United States and the majority leadership of both the House and the Senate.

The reason for the delay and hesitation on legislation for Federal aid for school construction, despite the great need and the overwhelming public support for it, has been the fear in both the House and Senate of confronting an antisegregation amendment.

The fear has been commonly expressed that if such an amendment is offered, it will set off an explosive debate and a filibuster in the Senate, and will interfere with the rest of the legislative program in the Senate. I am afraid that there may have been other and less worthy motives involved, too.

Mr. President, I favor an antisegregation amendment quite as much as I favor the basic legislation itself—and I have been a supporter of Federal aid for education and have fought for it ever since I became a Member of the Senate and for many years before that.

As soon as the question was raised last year I announced that I would support an antisegregation amendment and that I would, in fact, submit one and do my best to insure that such an amendment comes to a vote in the Senate.



On numerous occasions since then I have said the same thing, on the floor of the Senate, to the press and in public speeches. I gave my pledge that I would submit such an amendment, would support it, and fight for it.

That is my intention still and, indeed, my determination, as we face the prospect and the necessity of considering and debating school aid legislation in the days and weeks ahead.

But at this point, Mr. President, I feel that it is desirable to let the Senate know exactly what is in my mind—speaking only for myself—when I refer to an antisegregation amendment. Many different versions of such an amendment, representing radically different approaches and even radically different concepts, have been suggested during the past 2 years. Indeed, there has been a progressive evolution of thinking in regard to this amendment on my part and on the part of others to whom this subject has been of primary concern.

These developments in approach and concept have followed, in a general way, the developing pattern of compliance with and resistance to the Supreme Court decision and decree in the school segregation cases.

This pattern has now taken definite shape, in its broad outlines, although changes in detail are occurring in different parts of the country almost every day.

The amendment which I have worked out is designed to meet the situation as it has actually developed, and as it is expected to continue to develop in the months ahead. I do not claim perfection of language for my amendment. But I do submit it as my contribution to our thinking on this crucial subject.

It is my impression that the public generally and even the Senate has a mistaken impression of what most of us mean today—and certainly of what I mean—in referring to an antisegregation amendment. The general impression is that we mean an amendment to the school aid bill that would undertake to force desegregation or at the least, compliance with the Supreme Court decision and decree.

Mr. President, deeply as I desire to see total desegregation come about without a moment's needless delay, I doubt whether the school-aid bill is an appropriate vehicle to enforce this purpose. Nor do I believe it would be possible to draft an amendment to the school-aid bill which would of itself achieve this result. It would be like trying to stop a rampaging bull elephant with a bean-shooter.

No, Mr. President, I do not propose, in this measure, that we try to prohibit segregation or enforce the decision of the Supreme Court.

That has been shown to be far too complex and immeasurably difficult a matter to be handled so casually and simply.

What I propose, Mr. President, is simply to restrain the Federal Government from aiding and abetting segregation and from helping to deepen the segregation pattern which so many States are trying in such a herculean manner to eradicate.

I propose, Mr. President—and I shall go into some further detail in a mo-

ment—a legislative formula which will permit the Federal Government to aid those States which are making these efforts, in some cases against stubborn local defiance, and those localities which are making such efforts, in some cases against the opposition of the State administrations. My purpose, in essence, is to see to it that the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government should not work in opposition to the mandate of the Constitution and the direction being charted by the Supreme Court and being followed by the lower courts in bringing about compliance with the basic law of the land.

I propose a law-and-order amendment, not to enforce law and order, and observance of the Constitution, but to prevent the Federal Government from being an accomplice in the violation of law and order and of the Constitution.

Strongly as I feel on the subject, I shall not even begin to undertake, in the course of these remarks today, to make the arguments for the Constitution, for the Supreme Court decision, for the observance of law and order, for desegregation and against the present practices in certain States and localities in maintaining segregated schools and defying the law of the land. These I will make at another time.

My purpose today is to set forth my concept of what an appropriate anti-segregation amendment should be, rather than to give the reasons why my amendment should be adopted. I will leave the major arguments for its adoption to that day when I offer and call up my amendment.

I know that among the opponents of such an amendment are people of good will who are fundamentally committed to the cause of law and order and the Constitution, who recognize and accept the decision of the Supreme Court in the school segregation cases and even some who are strongly opposed on both moral and legal grounds to the practice of segregation.

Their opposition is mainly directed toward the offering of an antisegregation amendment. They feel that such an amendment threatens the legislative prospects of the school-aid bill itself. They fear a filibuster in the Senate. They fear finally that such an amendment will be supported by the opponents of any school-aid legislation in order to induce a filibuster and stop the school-aid bill.

Mr. President, I do not think anyone can accuse me of being less than wholehearted in my support of school-aid legislation. I doubt whether any member of the Senate has supported the cause of Federal aid to education more consistently, and more strongly, than I. I agree as to the high importance of this legislation, for the sake of our children and for the sake of the Nation.

But, Mr. President, I feel that the cause of law and order represents an even higher principle. I believe, moreover, that it is morally reprehensible for the Federal Government, in its efforts to improve the level of education by building more school facilities to aid and abet the defiance of law and order, and to help

educate more children in the illegal practice of segregation.

Mr. President, I do not fear a filibuster. I am not sure a filibuster will develop. I think we are going to have a very high level, if somewhat prolonged, debate on this subject when this bill reaches the floor of the Senate, after which I hope we shall be able to proceed to a vote.

I have formulated an amendment which is, in my judgment, the height of reasonableness, containing what I feel to be the minimal requirements—and they are very mild ones indeed—governing the payment by the Federal Government to the States and localities of school-construction money which is raised by the taxation of all the people, regardless of race, color, or creed.

The State of New York and its people pay about 20 percent of the taxes which will be devoted to this program of Federal grants to the 48 States. The people of my State will not willingly pay such taxes if their money is to be used to deepen a segregation pattern that is both violative of the Constitution and repugnant to their sense of moral values.

As I have said, I do not fear a filibuster on this amendment. I think the Senate can force a vote on this legislation, if there is the will to do so. And I believe there is the will to do so, both in the Senate and in the country at large.

Mr. President, the lower courts are handling the matter of compliance with the Supreme Court decision and decree in the letter and spirit of that decision and that decree. It will admittedly be a long and drawn-out process to bring about completely the end of segregation in the schools. Scores of different legal devices have been improvised and still more are undoubtedly going to be improvised in efforts to evade and avoid compliance.

A jungle of laws and executive orders has already sprung up in some of the Southern States designed actively to prevent, evade, and even penalize compliance. On the other hand, some States are doing nothing but watching and waiting, letting their localities do what they will about desegregation. Still other State administrations are moving actively to desegregate their schools. And some of these are meeting strong opposition on the part of some localities.

Perhaps it would be desirable to enact comprehensive legislation to supplement the efforts of the Court in enforcing the law and in meeting the varied and variable situations which have arisen and will yet arise. Obviously, the situation is very complex and changes from day to day, and any legislation to implement and enforce the pertinent prohibition of the 14th amendment would have to be most carefully drawn and carefully considered.

I do not have such a bill in mind even in its general outlines, although I think it would be good idea. I want to emphasize that the amendment I am talking about today has no such intent and purpose. And until such comprehensive legislation is drafted and enacted, the courts must continue to bear their present burden of responsibility for effectuating the intent of the Constitution.

The President of the United States, and the executive branch, also have a major responsibility in this regard. It is the President's duty to enforce the laws of the United States. Thus far there has been no move by the President to discharge this responsibility and perform this duty, in regard to the Constitution and its prohibition against segregated schools.

It has been suggested that the President might very properly take into consideration, in disbursing the moneys we expect to vote for school construction, his sworn duty to support the Constitution and enforce the laws of the land. But I have seen no indication, despite repeated representations made to him on this score, that he intends to discharge his responsibility and duty in this connection.

It must be conceded that it would be very difficult for the President or his commissioner of education to determine, with regard to every school district in the land, whether each one is, in fact, proceeding in good faith and with deliberate speed to undertake the process of desegregation, in accordance with the constitutional and Supreme Court mandate. It must be conceded that this would require a vast investigative, adjudicative and administrative machinery to gather the facts, assess them and act on the basis of them, in awarding the grants to be provided under the Federal aid legislation.

I think my amendment would avoid this difficulty. It would provide a guide and a standard for the President and the commissioner of education and would make it unnecessary for the executive branch to duplicate the work of the courts in this regard.

It is to be remembered—and emphasized—that the whole school aid program is an emergency program. It is a 2-year program, a one-shot program. Once the money authorized is expended in the form of grants, the program will be finished. Except under the very special circumstances of clear violation of the terms of the agreements to be entered into between the Federal Government and the States, there will be no way of recapturing the money granted.

So, Mr. President, it is vital that the conditions for receiving the money in the first place be clearly stipulated. And the school-aid legislation we will be considering already sets forth many such conditions and requirements, all of which are to be included, in the case of each State, in a State plan, which is to be subject to the approval of the Federal Commissioner of Education.

My amendment, Mr. President, very simply includes among the conditions and requirements to be set forth in the State plan by the designated State agency which is to handle the program in each State, a certification that the money granted will be used in projects in conformity with the Constitution and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court prohibiting discrimination based on race and color.

This requirement does not go beyond the Supreme Court decision, thus involving only a certification of what the Court defined as good faith efforts, with de-

liberate speed, to desegregate, in regard to the schools to be built or improved with the funds authorized by this legislation.

My amendment does not propose judgment or the assessment of past policies or practices in regard to segregation, but only those designed for application to the schools which would be improved or built with the Federal funds now proposed to be paid to the States and the local school districts.

If the designated State agency could not or would not make such a certification, the funds which would otherwise be allocated to that State would be held in escrow until such a certification could be and was made.

To meet the case of States where some localities are proceeding in good faith to desegregate and some are refusing or are resisting, my amendment provides that the designated State agency can enter a certification for those localities which are moving in good faith, with the appropriate speed, in a lawful direction, and which can receive an appropriate grant. In such cases, the remaining money that would otherwise be allocated to defiant school districts in that State would be kept in escrow until the proper certification can be made for those districts, too.

The third and final provision in my amendment is designed to meet the situation where the State agency refuses or is unwilling or unable to make the required certification for any school district in the State, but where there are individual school districts which are themselves willing and able to make such a certification. In these cases, the school districts in question could submit a certification directly to the Federal Government, together with a fulfillment of other requirements of the law, and if they submit a plan which is otherwise acceptable, they will be eligible to receive proportionate grants. In such a case the remainder of the money for that State would be held in escrow until the State agency is ready and willing to submit a certification and a plan.

Mr. President, that is all there is to my amendment. It is simple. It is narrowed to its absolute essentials. It is mild. It is not punitive, repressive, onerous or coercive. I believe it should be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Southern States, as well as to the North.

I hope my amendment will be carefully scrutinized and discussed by my colleagues. I hope that if they have constructive suggestions as to either language or terminology, they will make such suggestions to me, in anticipation of the time when this measure will come before us in the Senate.

This amendment is drafted in relation to S. 5, the bill introduced by the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL] and a number of cosponsors, including myself. It may be that the House bill or some entirely different version will be before us when we finally take up, for debate and vote, this subject matter. If so, at that time, my amendment will be modified accordingly, in form, although not in principle or in substance, and also in consideration of any con-

structive suggestions which may be made between now and then.

I wish to emphasize again that the argument over whether it is desirable to offer an amendment on this subject at all is academic. I give notice now, as I have so frequently in the past, that I am going to offer this amendment, or a modified version thereof, if I am here when the basic legislation is called up for consideration.

I continue to reserve for future decision, depending upon parliamentary and strategic considerations, the question of whether I will offer this amendment in the Labor Committee, of which I am a member, or on the floor when the bill is called up.

I want to make sure that this amendment comes to a vote. It is a simple amendment and all who wish to do so may study it between now and when this bill comes before us.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment about which I have been talking, in its tentative form as to language, be printed in the record at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, appropriately referred, and printed; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the amendment was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On page 5, after line 2, insert the following as paragraph (3) and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

"Contain a certification that all school facilities intended to be provided in whole or in part thereunder will be used in conformity with the Constitution of the United States and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to discriminations based upon race or color. In the event that the State agency is unable to include as part of the State plan such a certification with respect to every local school agency within its jurisdiction applying for a project under the provisions of this act, within the time limit prescribed by the Commissioner for the submission of such plans, then only the projects of the State and such local school agencies as to which such certification is made shall be considered as part of any State plan. In the event that the State agency does not include any certification as part of the State plan within the time limit prescribed by the Commissioner for the submission of such plans, the Commissioner is authorized, with regard to any local school agency, within such State, which is able to submit such certification on its own behalf, and is otherwise qualified to receive payments under this act, upon application and appropriate certification, to regard such local school agency as a State agency and the separate local school agency plans as State plans, subject otherwise to the pertinent requirements of this section and such other requirements as the Commissioner, by regulation, may prescribe. Upon approval of such local school agency plans, allotments in such amounts as the Commissioner may determine as being fair proportionate shares of the amount that would otherwise be allotted to the State whereof the local school district is a part shall be made to such local school agency under the formulae prescribed in section 4 of this act, so far as may be applicable. In the event that any State fails to qualify, under the terms of this paragraph, for such payments in whole or in part, to which it would otherwise be entitled under the provisions of this



act, the sum or sums which would otherwise have been paid to the State shall be retained in a special fund in the Treasury, until such time as the disqualified State on its own behalf or on behalf of the disqualified local school agencies within the State is able to make the certification required by this paragraph, unless or until Congress shall otherwise dispose."

On page 8, line 2, insert after the word "thereof" the following: "or any separable part thereof as provided in paragraph (3) of subsection 5 (a)."

On page 8, line 4, insert after the word "thereof" the following: "or part thereof as provided in paragraph (3) of subsection 5 (a)."

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield for a question?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. First, I congratulate the Senator from New York upon his devotion to the principle of nondiscrimination in American life, his assistance, and his ingenuity. For what it is worth, I may say that it is my intention to support the amendment offered by the Senator from New York when it is offered.

There is one question, however, I should like to ask about the technical details of the amendment which the Senator is proposing. Suppose a State certifies that it is following the decisions of the Supreme Court in this matter—decisions which, as we all know, do not require immediate desegregation, but merely progress toward desegregation—but, in fact, the State is not doing so. What powers, if any, would the Federal agency concerned—presumably the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—have in such a case?

Mr. LEHMAN. I should say it would have exactly the same powers which it now has in many similar situations in other fields. Before a State can receive financial aid for relief, for medical care, for rehabilitation, or for aid to the crippled and the blind, and similar programs, it must submit a plan to the Federal Government, as is proposed by my amendment.

The Federal Government will study the plan carefully and will either approve or disapprove it. If it approves the plan, it does so, of course, with the understanding that the plan will be carried out loyally, honestly, and fairly by the State which has entered into an agreement with the Federal Government. If the State does not carry out the plan—and this has happened in the past—the Federal Government can decide that the provisions of the agreement have not been carried out or have not been observed by the State, and can merely cut off all aid. That practice has been followed in a great many instances, as I feel certain my distinguished colleague from Illinois knows. During the time I was Governor of my State, there were some cases in which the Federal Government questioned whether the plan which had been mutually agreed to by the Federal Government and the State for Federal aid and assistance had been properly and adequately carried out.

In some instances, it was found that the plan had not been carried out by the State of New York. In that situation, steps were taken promptly to remedy the condition. But if the State had not

taken such steps, the Federal Government would have been completely within its right to have cut off—and it would have had the power to do so—the Federal aid which had been agreed to in accordance with the legislation and under a plan which had been mutually approved by the State and the Federal Government.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator from New York. I suppose it is true that in the vast majority of cases the States which did not intend to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court would not agree to certification, and therefore, in a sense, would deny themselves the Federal aid. Is not that true?

Mr. LEHMAN. I think that is absolutely true.

Mr. DOUGLAS. So the amendment which the Senator from New York has submitted is in a sense self-enforcing.

Mr. LEHMAN. It is self-enforcing, except that if there is a certification, either from the State or the school districts, which is not carried out, the Federal Government can clamp down and refuse to provide assistance.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes. Then, I should say, it is partially self-enforcing.

Mr. LEHMAN. My amendment seems to me to be a very simple one. It has three parts. In the first class, as I have briefly outlined the amendment, are the States which simply will not make any certification at all. In such instances, of course, the Federal Government will not make payments to those States under any legislation which is passed by Congress. But the States will not for all time forfeit such assistance. The money will be held in escrow for the States, and will be paid to them when it has been established that they are abiding by the law of the land.

The second class is composed of the States—and there are a number of them—in which some districts have complied while other districts have refused to comply. In that event, a State can simply certify to the Federal Government the districts which have complied with the law, and those districts will receive the money. The other districts will not be for all time deprived of their money. Their money simply will be placed in escrow.

Finally, there may be States which will refuse to do anything about making certification. Yet within the boundaries of that State there may be districts which feel that they will want to desegregate and that they are entitled to the Federal aid. In those cases, the individual districts concerned can make certification to the Federal Government, which will recognize them and make payments to them.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I thank the Senator from New York.

#### FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC "REPORT ON BLACKLISTING: RADIO-TELEVISION"

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, the papers today are filled with news reports and comments on a rather amazing release which has come out under the imprimatur of the Fund for the Republic.

This release is in the nature of a report which has been under study for some time by a grant from the Fund for the Republic, and the report is in the nature of an attack on America's radio, television, and motion-picture industries, and also against the Congress of the United States, some of its committees, and, strangely enough, against some individual American businessmen. The attack is directed against these various targets because this report of the Fund for the Republic alleges they have been engaging in what the Fund terms "blacklisting" activities against Communists and Communist sympathizers and associates in the entertainment and advertising business.

It appears that the Fund for the Republic is rapidly endeavoring to deserve the designation of being the ugly duckling hatched from an egg laid by the Ford Foundation.

I think it is exceedingly regretful that the name of Henry Ford, a great American, and of the Ford Motor Co., a great American motorcar institution and the producer of a great automobile, and of Henry Ford II should be linked to the Fund for the Republic by virtue of the fact that its funds came from the Ford Foundation.

I can think of nothing more American than the rise of the Ford Motor Co. in our American life, or the contribution made by Henry Ford and his distinguished sons in carrying on this great private automobile company, which recently became a publicly owned automobile company by virtue of its stock being available on the stock exchange. But it is extraordinarily disquieting to realize that funds which have been accumulated through that private-enterprise system are being employed by the Fund for the Republic, a creature of the Ford Foundation, to discredit those who are engaged in trying to free Americans from the danger of the Communist menace.

So I am disturbed no end when I read that still another effort is being made today by the Fund for the Republic to give aid and comfort to the Communists both in this country and abroad.

I was impressed, however, by the splendid reporting job done by Frederick Woltman, whose reputation needs no enhancement by the present speaker, because he is recognized as one of the Nation's great reporters. Mr. Woltman, writing for the Scripps-Howard chain, has a commentary in today's Washington News, and I presume in all the other Scripps-Howard papers, relating to this report coming over the wires today from the Fund for the Republic.

He points out, in three succinct paragraphs, some of the deficiencies engaged in by the fund's report.

The first reason, as he states, is:

It can only throw confusion on a major problem of the industry which already has been straightening itself out.

He refers to the radio, television, and motion-picture industry.

That is, what to do with the actors, writers, and directors who are Communist backers or who have aided the communist cause in the past without clearing their records?

Certainly Mr. Woltman is right when he says that the fund's strange report today does add confusion to a very difficult problem.

I am happy to report, in that connection, that the radio, television, and motion-picture industry has been making very important strides in the field of cleaning up its own house. They have taken salutary action to rid the entertainment world of Communist agents. They deserve the commendation of all patriotic Americans for their efforts.

Well over 15 years ago, in the House of Representatives, I was a member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which at that time was conducting hearings in California. I went to California on one trip with the committee in conjunction with hearings which the committee was holding. We had a great many so-called Hollywood people before our committee at that time. The American Motion Picture Producers Association was vitally interested in the problem. The American Motion Picture Producers Association was not only interested, but helpful, in correcting a situation which was at that time subjecting the American people to a whole field of pictures and programs in which the actors, actresses, and script writers, frequently were Communists, and in which Communist-slanted lines were frequently found in the productions themselves.

Actually, it was because of the concern that the Hollywood producers showed for this problem, and their desire to do something about it, that what came to be known as the Mundt-Nixon bill was born. I remember the conference in my office in which Mr. Eric Johnston, who then, as now, was president of the American Motion Pictures Producers' Association, discussed with me the problems the producers had in Hollywood when it was disclosed that one of their actors or actresses or playwrights or script writers was an agent of communism. They still could not take any direct or summary corrective action, because those who were summarily fired were able to collect damages against producers who fired them. He pointed out that if it were possible, some way or other, to have appointed a board or commission which had the power to determine what a Communist was in this country, it would then be easy for Hollywood, television companies, radio stations, advertising agencies, and anybody employing entertainment talent in America to include in the contract an abrogation clause which would make it possible to abrogate a contract once it was established that a contracting party was a Communist.

It was out of that discussion, and with the splendid cooperation of Eric Johnston, that I prepared the first draft of what ultimately became known as the Mundt-Nixon bill, a bill which passed the House and, I am happy to say, passed the Senate, and which is to be found in the legislation of the land as the first 17 sections of the Internal Security Act, which is the law of the land, despite the unsuccessful veto of President Truman.

So I recognize that many Hollywood producers have tried to clean communism out of Hollywood as best they could.

To a lesser degree, but to a substantial degree, the radio and television industry has been trying to do something constructive about this problem. The industry has taken out of radio studios and from television screens some notorious Communist agents, supervisors, and propagandists. It has been helped in that effort by the work of the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Internal Security Committee of the Senate, the FBI, the American Legion, by its publication of *The Firing Line*, which has made available to the American public the names and positions of Communists in the entertainment world, by Counterattack which has done the same thing, and which brought the problem to a focal point, by its publication of *Red Channels*, a book listing the names of subversives in the entertainment business.

It is disquieting and disillusioning, therefore, when the Fund for the Republic now levels the guns of its vast tax-exempt funds against the efforts to keep Communists out of the entertainment world.

The second point Mr. Woltman makes is as follows:

By the use of loaded expressions throughout and the selection and grouping of some facts and the omission of more salient facts, it gives a distorted and often false picture.

Certainly an organization which claims to be objective, such as the Fund for the Republic, should sue Mr. Woltman for libel if his accusations are false. I think it becomes clear from the report by the Fund for the Republic that the accusations made by Mr. Woltman are on the side of gentleness and tenderness rather than on the side of exaggeration.

Mr. Woltman's third statement is:

Because its author, John Cogley, rubber-stamps the basic philosophy of the fund's president, Robert M. Hutchins, the entire slant of the report runs counter to the mainstream of American thought today.

In my opinion, candidly and honestly, I am sure that Mr. Woltman is right when he says the mainstream of American thought today is against communism at home as well as abroad. I think it is equally proper and equally accurate to say that today the mainstream of American thought is opposed to the employment of Communists in the entertainment world.

Mr. Woltman makes some other rather interesting observations in the course of his article which is published in today's issues of the Scripps-Howard newspapers. He points out, for example, that a series of "falsifications by omission," as he calls them, occur throughout the report by the Fund for the Republic; that apparently the whole objection of the Fund for the Republic to these blacklisting techniques stems from the fact that throughout its report it refers to the "political affiliations" of organizations or to the "past political associations" of individuals, and refers to "political blacklistings," and refers to "highly controversial political views."

Mr. President, I am sure not one Member of the Senate believes that Communist activity is political activity, or

that the American Communist Party is a political party. Even the Supreme Court—yes, even the present Supreme Court—has held that communism is a conspiracy, not a political party, not entitled to be considered as a political party, and not subjected, by virtue of its own existence, to the laws and regulations which govern political parties in America.

Under the Mundt-Nixon Act, we provided under special legislation that the Communist Party must report the source of its funds and how it spends them, and must publish its propaganda under the imprimatur of the Communist Party. But in this case, it has to do that as a result of the passage of the Internal Security Act, not because it was felt that the Communist Party is a political party.

But now we find that the \$127,000 grant from the Fund for the Republic is used to misguide and mislead Americans, by referring to Communist activity as "political activity," and by referring to the Communist Party as a "political party," and by referring to the attempt of decent Americans to rid the entertainment world of communism as an attempt to blacklist people because of their "political affiliations" or "past political associations" or "highly controversial political views."

Mr. President, for the enlightenment of the Congress and the country, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks the entire article, written so commendably by Frederick Woltman, and published today in the Scripps-Howard newspapers.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### REPORT TREATS REDS LIGHTLY

(By Frederick Woltman)

NEW YORK, June 25.—The entire radio-TV industry took a shellacking today in the Fund for the Republic's first real test on the issue of communism. That is its report on blacklisting, radio-television.

While in nowise pro-Communist, the report cannot help but bring joy and comfort to the Communists.

#### CONCLUSION

A careful reading of the 287-page report, issued by the controversial \$15 million fund created by the Ford Foundation, leaves these conclusions:

It can only throw confusion on a major problem of the industry which already has been straightening itself out. That is, what to do with the actors, writers, and directors who are Communist backers or who have aided the Communist cause in the past without clearing their records.

By the use of loaded expressions throughout and the selection and grouping of some facts and the omission of more salient facts, it gives a distorted and often false picture.

Because its author, John Cogley, rubber-stamps the basic philosophy of the fund's president, Robert M. Hutchins, the entire slant of the report runs counter to the mainstream of American thought today.

For Mr. Hutchins accepts the Communist Party as a legitimate political party, not a criminal conspiracy. He has said he would not hesitate to hire a present-day party member to work for the fund if qualified.

So why should the billion-dollar radio-TV industry?

Consequently, so far as the report's concerned, communism is a minor issue.



## IMPRESSION

The reader's overall impression is that of a ruthless, industrywide blacklisting operation. And its principal victims are liberals, Progressives, leftwingers, New Dealers, innocent dupes, and just plain, outspoken, independent thinkers.

Nothing could be further from the truth, according to a survey this writer made last August.

There have been injustices and stupidities in the past. But radio-TV's main concern was to avoid pushing into the living rooms of the American public people who had established records of helping the cause of communism, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean war. This, the report virtually ignores.

## SAMPLE

Here is a sample of falsification-by-omission that runs through it:

The report tells of a leftwing commentator forced off the air by outside pressure. It permits him to describe himself as an Eisenhower Republican, formerly a Roosevelt Democrat.

The leftwing commentator was Johannes Steel, one of radio's chief pro-Soviet propagandists of the 1940's. This writer in 1946 described him as an all-out defender of Stalin's policies, with a special bent for Soviet worship. Mr. Steel never objected. And evidently the Fund's researchers didn't care.

"There is little evidence of Communist activity in the radio-TV field," says the report. Nor is there any evidence whatsoever in the report itself that the Cogley staff ever made a study of this question.

To dodge the main issue, whether the industry is obliged to ignore Communist records, the report resorts to a tricky device. Throughout, it talks about political affiliations, past political associations, political blacklistings, highly controversial political views.

## QUESTIONNAIRE

In April 1955, in fact, the Cogley staff blanketed the industry with a questionnaire that went to the broadcasting networks, packagers, advertising agencies, sponsors, and talent agencies. The first question was: "Does your organization hold that certain political criteria should be met?"

This could only obscure the issue. Actually, no question of political views or political activities was involved. The question was Communist activities.

Release of the Cogley report today disclosed as incredible policy that the Fund for the Republic has adopted. In all of its project reports on communism and civil liberties, the Fund disclaims any responsibility for what they say.

It vouches for the integrity of the authors and for the importance of their studies. But for the record, the Fund announced that it does not take responsibility for their selection of facts or for the accuracy of their statements.

## REFERENCES

This unusual policy was brought to this writer's attention. The Cogley report makes two references to this writer, both false.

A chapter called Clearance builds up the picture of a ring of clearance men who give affidavits to get suspected TV and radio artists off the hook. It lists George Sokolsky, the columnist; Victor Riesel, the labor columnist who was recently blinded by an acid-throwing thug, and this writer.

As described, the alleged practice has all the aspects of a racket. "These chief clearance men," says the report, "are often the same persons who make the damning indictment and have the power to wound and the power to heal the wound."

This writer has never given any such affidavit.

The Fund's sole authority is an unnamed public-relations expert who is quoted at

length, contrary to the Fund's own firm stand against the unnamed informer.

## FEATURE

In a second reference, the report states that an advertising agency executive arranged for this reporter to write a commendatory feature story about Radio Comedian Henry Morgan when the latter was in a jam in 1952.

This, too, is entirely false. This reporter wrote a piece about a radio actors' union meeting in which Mr. Morgan blasted the Reds. It was a legitimate news story. There was no arrangement, which, of course, implies some side consideration other than news value.

A telegram was sent promptly to Mr. Hutchins, asking the name of the unknown public-relations expert, in view of your well-known antipathy to nameless informers; and also for the basis of the other assertions.

Mr. Hutchins' reply quoted the Fund's disavowal of responsibility for the accuracy of any statements in the Cogley report.

"Your questions should have been directed to Mr. Cogley," the Fund's president said. "I shall be glad to transmit them to him when he returns to New York on Monday."

MR. MUNDT. Mr. President, I should like to point out another serious deficiency in the Fund for the Republic report, as it is carried by the wire services today, and as it appears in the Washington Post under a staff reporter article written by Warren Unna. In listing the various things included in this amazing document published today by the use of certain Americans' tax-exempt money, camouflaged into the Fund for the Republic, Mr. Unna says that a part of the Fund's attack is directed against a man by the name of Laurence A. Johnson, a Syracuse, N. Y., grocery-chain owner. It points out that the Fund for the Republic attacks Mr. Laurence A. Johnson, of Syracuse, N. Y., because he "takes action when a controversial person does appear" on the radio or on television; that Mr. Johnson "not only lends credence to the economic argument for blacklisting," but that, "generally speaking, he is the argument."

Mr. President, I can throw a little light on that matter, because I have had a long line or series of correspondence exchanges with Mr. Johnson. I first heard of him when I was addressing an annual membership meeting of the Syracuse Chamber of Commerce. In the course of my remarks, I had something to say about Communist activities in the United States and about the necessity that people in private life make certain that they do nothing to support Communist causes or Communist projects or Communist agents. During the open-forum discussion which followed my remarks, someone in the audience rose and asked, "What do you think of Mr. Johnson, of our city?"

I replied, "I do not know him. What am I supposed to think of him? Who is he? What has he done?"

Then I was told about this unique entrepreneur, Mr. Laurence A. Johnson, who began as a grocer, and who, in true American style, expanded his operations to 2 stores, and then to 3 stores, and finally became a grocery-chain owner and operator. However, the unique thing about Mr. Johnson is that a number of years ago he decided that none of the money spent in his stores, by his customers, would be used to build or extend

the Communist apparatus in America. So he advertised in the newspapers and by means of placards placed in his stores that, to the best of his ability, he would not spend any of his money to buy food products publicized or propagandized by Communists or their agents; that whenever he heard or learned of some television show or radio broadcast or motion picture or some other advertising medium or some advertising agency which was utilizing Communist talent in urging the public to eat a certain product or to drink a certain product or to chew a certain product or to mix a certain product, he would immediately discontinue handling that particular product or brand of merchandise, and would not publicize it through the medium of his stores or by putting it on the counters in his stores; that he would not urge his particular customers to buy it; that, instead, that he would tell the people of Syracuse, N. Y., that to the best of his ability to determine such things, he would sell in his stores only the products which were made, publicized, and advertised by good Americans; that no other products would be sold in his stores.

That took some courage, Mr. President, because many advertising agencies have permitted a good many Communist sympathizers to creep into their talent positions and into other areas of publicity. But Mr. Johnson is a courageous American who believes that patriotism, like charity, begins at home. He believes also that, as a good American to whom the country has been good as he has expanded his activities, he has the obligation of doing what he can decently and rightfully to help discourage Communists from getting jobs in advertising agencies and to help discourage the use of Communist actors and Communist actresses on television and radio programs, as part of the advertising process in America.

To his satisfaction, and perhaps to his surprise, his stores gained customers, instead of losing them, and expanded to such extent that he has become a very important element in the grocery business of northern New York, and has become a very impressive and successful merchant in his own right.

So, Mr. President, the Ford Foundation is correct when it says that Mr. Laurence Johnson "not only lends credence to the economic argument for blacklisting" but that, "generally speaking, he is the argument," because he continues to point out that Americans should refuse to purchase products advertised by Communists. Instead of attacking him for that, however, the Ford Fund for the Republic should have praised him for it.

Mr. President, you and I could do the same if we refused, as good Americans still have the right to do, to buy automobiles advertised by Communist agencies, or refused to buy a particular kind of hardware or aluminum or brass product publicized by subversives, and simply used our own good American discretion to refuse to purchase items whose producers are so insensible to the dangers of the time that they do not pay any attention as to whether they employ Communists or good Americans among the advertising agencies and the talent which

make presentations of their product to the public.

So, Mr. President, I take a moment to salute Mr. Laurence A. Johnson. I hope his trade continues to grow. I hope it continues to expand. I hope other Americans will follow his example by refusing to sell and refusing to buy and refusing to publicize products which are publicized on the radio and television by people who are un-American, who use, to undermine the American program, the money they receive.

Mr. President, the report issued by the Fund for the Republic makes another grievous error: It seeks to defend the 10 Hollywood writers—the so-called "Hollywood 10"—who went to the Federal penitentiary because of their Communist affiliations. It proposes to defend them on the basis that none of the 159 motion pictures with which they were associated contained any important Communist propaganda.

Mr. President, I do not know what the estate of Henry Ford is giving money to the Fund for the Republic for, to spend in studying 159 old motion pictures. But they have a perfect right to do that; and if they find that there is no notorious propaganda of the Communists in those motion pictures, all well and good. But so what? They miss the point. The "Hollywood Ten" had their pockets lined with the money of Americans, by being employed in the production or the writing of the 159 motion pictures. They had their incomes expanded. They were given the wherewithall and the means and the dollars with which they could join Communist organizations and support Communist causes and employ Communist agents and help undermine freedom in America. It is not enough merely to say, "This Communist, in selling this particular automobile, did not try to sell a part of the Communist line." If, in selling the particular automobile, he received a good fee from some particular advertising employer, and used that money to help the Communist Party in New York secure agents with which to penetrate the Government and carry secrets off to Moscow to undermine our defense, that is an important danger for good Americans to try to eliminate.

It is a strange line that the Fund for the Republic asks us to buy by trying to dodge the whole issue on the theory that there is nothing particularly or notoriously bad in scripts performed by the "Hollywood Ten" in these 159 films.

I have always been curious to know how certain propaganda agencies obtained tax exemption, and certain others do not. I know that the Bureau of Internal Revenue has a difficult decision to make many times. Sometimes they seem to reject a request for tax exemption with respect to organizations which people might feel are engaged in purely educational, noncontroversial, nonpolitical activities. At other times they grant tax exemptions to organizations which some people accuse of engaging in such activities.

In an endeavor to obtain a little information I wrote a letter today to Mr. Russell C. Harrington, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in Washington, D. C., asking for the Bureau's reaction as to

the tax-exempt status of the Fund for the Republic, in lieu of its notoriously consistent record of propaganda.

Whether or not the Fund for the Republic is entitled to tax exemption, I do not know, but I assume that the tax exemption screen through which it passes should be subject to the old American axiom that "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander."

I know of certain organizations which were refused a tax-exempt status. I do not know whether the Fund for the Republic is at present being screened or scrutinized by the Bureau. If it is not, I think it should be, and I think a decision should be forthcoming. I think we should have a pretty clear-cut set of consistent standards to apply to organizations, because if the type of propaganda and the type of controversial activity engaged in by the Fund for the Republic is to be considered acceptable for a tax-exempt status, we are opening the door for the formation of a great many such organizations.

Consider the case of Mr. Johnson, of Syracuse, N. Y., for example. He is a taxpayer. I assume that if the Fund for the Republic enjoys the tax-exempt privilege to criticize him, to attack him, and to discourage customers from coming to his doors, so as to reduce the size of his economic activity, Mr. Johnson should have the right to organize a "Johnson fund" to defend himself, a "Johnson fund for freedom of entrepreneurship," perhaps—a Johnson fund with which to answer charges made by the tax-exempt Funds for the Republic.

I shall be curious to know what Mr. Harrington reports. I hope he will report promptly. I believe he has a difficult problem to resolve, but it should be resolved without delay, because this is a curious situation in which we find ourselves. Taxpayers are attacked by tax-exempt fund organizations. Obviously such taxpayers cannot defend themselves if they must spend tax dollars; but if they are free to charge off such expenses, as the Fund for the Republic uses tax-exempt money in such activities, then we have a different situation.

Good Americans are not without recourse, even under this situation. Millions of Americans want their children to see television shows and hear radio programs conducted by good Americans. Millions of Americans would like to see the motion picture industry complete its job—because it is still unfinished business—of cleaning the Reds out of Hollywood. There are millions of Americans who would like to realize that the children in their homes are not being subjected to Communist propaganda, and that the nickels, quarters, and half dollars which they pass through motion picture ticket windows will not be used further to finance Communist agents and Communist projects.

So I salute this afternoon the American Legion, which has done a grand and courageous job of exposing Communist operatives in the entertainment industry. Every week or two it publishes a periodical called the Firing Line. For the Record, let it be said that this publication is prepared and distributed by the national Americanism commission of

the American Legion, post office box 1055, Indianapolis, Ind., and that any good American can subscribe to it. Any good American, for \$3 a year, can subscribe to this publication and have it delivered to his home, or to a high-school library, or to any good American program committee of a women's club, a Legion post, or Rotary Club, a Sunday school class, or a chamber of commerce which is desirous of acquainting its neighbors with what is going on in the entertainment world. The subscription price is \$3 a year. I quote from the American Legion Firing Line, issue of November 1, 1955. It points out that the American Legion, at its 37th annual national convention, held in Miami, Fla., last year, adopted a resolution which said in part:

Whereas certain moving picture theaters, legitimate stage, radio, and television industries continue to employ members of the entertainment field who have never disavowed their association with Communist organizations;

Therefore be it resolved by the American Legion in the 37th annual national convention assembled in Miami, Fla., October 10-13 1955, That the American Legion instruct the Americanism commission to continue its drive to rid the field of entertainment of all Red propaganda and those who support it, and to do its utmost to inform the American public that records of those in the entertainment field who have aided and abetted subversion are available in the various congressional hearings which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents in Washington, D. C.; and be it further

Resolved, That the American Legion urge the American public to refuse to support at the box office these entertainers who have never made a clean break from their communistic associations; and be it further

Resolved, That the American Legion urge American business firms to provide in their contracts with such persons or with their employment agency that such contracts may be terminated when evidence is discovered of this continuing affiliation with such organization.

It discourages Americans from purchasing products either made by Communists or publicized or advertised by Communists. In this issue, in compliance with the convention mandate, are listed the names of those who were found to be Communists, Communist agents, or Communist dupes who were trying to foist their wares on the American people.

I ask unanimous consent to have the list, as it appears in the November 1, 1955, issue of the American Legion publication the Firing Line printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

In compliance with this Convention Mandate, the National Americanism Commission has prepared and consolidated the following list of some individuals in the entertainment industry who have been identified as members of the Communist Party before the House Committee on Un-American Activities:

Albert, Sam (musician): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A and B).  
Alexander, Harmon (Hy) (radio writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); and Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B).



Allen, Louis (Allan, Lewis) (playwright): Identified by Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Altman, Mischa (musician): Identified by David Raksin, 1951 (A).

Ames, Robert (craft worker): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Amster, Lou (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Urcel Daniel, 1952 (A).

Babb, Sonora (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A) and George Bassman, 1952 (A).

Backus, Georgia (Mrs. Hy Alexander) (actress): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); Roy Erwin, 1953 (B).

Barrie, Lee (singer): Identified by Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Barzman, Ben (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); George Glass, 1952 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Barzman, Sol (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Beard, Cecil (cartoonist): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Becker, Leon (musician): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Bein, Albert (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Bela, Nicholas (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Eve Ettinger, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Bengal, Ben (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A) and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Bennett, Seymour (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Bercovici, Leonardo (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A) and Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A).

Berry, John (Jack) (director): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); and Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A).

Bessie, Alvah (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); William Blowitz, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Biberman, Edward (artist): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernyce Fleury, 1951 (B); Zachary Schwartz, 1953 (B); Harold Hecht, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Biberman, Herbert (director): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David Raksin, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B); Danny Dare, 1953 (B); Harold Hecht, 1953 (B); Gertrude Purcell, 1953 (B); and Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Blache, Herbert (actor): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A).

Blankfort, Henry (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B).

Boretz, Allen (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A) and David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Brand, Phoebe (Mrs. Morris Carnovsky) (actress): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Eliz Kazan, 1952 (A); Clifford Odets, 1952 (A); and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Bright, John (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); Harold Hecht, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B).

Buchman, Harold (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Anne Ray Frank, 1951 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B).

Buchman, Sidney (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Burke, Libby (dancer): (Investigation identifying Libby Burke as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public); (B).

Burns, Georgia (actress): Identified by Harold Hecht, 1953 (B).

Burns, Jessie (studio reader): Identified by Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); and Danny Dare, 1953 (B); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Burnstein, Russell William (studio engineer): Identified by Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Burton, Val (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A).

Butler, Hugo (writer): Identified by Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Butler, Jean (Mrs. Hugo Butler) (writer): Identified by Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A).

Carlisle, Harry (writer): Identified by Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); and Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); Roy Erwin, 1953 (B); and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Carnovsky, Morris (actor): Marc Lawrence, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Elia Kazan, 1952 (A); Larry Parks, 1951 (B); Lee J. Cobb, 1951 (B).

Chamberlin, Howland (actor): Investigation identifying Mr. Chamberlin as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public. (A); Anne Kinney, 1952 (B).

Chapman, Tom (studio reader): Identified by Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Chodorov, Edward (producer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Jerome Robbins, 1953 (B); and Silvia Richards, 1953 (B).

Chodorov, Jerome (writer): Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Clark, Maurice (writer): Identified by Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); Bart Lytton, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Cole, Lester (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Marc Lawrence, 1951 (A); Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); William Blowitz, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Melvin Levy, 1952 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Comingore, Dorothy (actress): Identified by Max Silver, 1952 (A); and David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Cooper, Bert (member, radio group, Communist Party): Identified by Roy Erwin, 1953 (B).

Corey, George (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A).

Corey, Jeff (actor): Identified by Marc Lawrence, 1951 (A); Paul Marion, 1952 (A); and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Curtis, Paul (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

D'Ambarey, Leona (studio secretary): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

DaSilva, Howard (actor): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Dassin, Julius (Julius) (director): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); and Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A).

Dimsdale, Howard (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Silvia Richards, 1953 (B).

Donath, Ludwig (actor): Identified by Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Drdlik, Frank (set designer): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Dreher, Carl (technician): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

D'Usseau, Arnaud (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A).

Eastman, Philip Day (artist and writer): Identified by Bernyce Polifka Fleury, 1953 (B).

Elisku, Edward (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Ellis, Dave (radio actor and writer): Identified by Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Endfield, Cyril (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A) and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Endore, Guy (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Faragoh, Francis (writer): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); and Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Farmer, Mary Virginia (actress): Identified by Mildred Ashe, 1951 (A) and Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Fiske, Dick (movie studio): Identified by Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A).

Foreman, Carl (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Melvin Levy, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Fuller, Lester (writer): Identified by Eve Ettinger, 1951 (A); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Geer, Will (actor): Identified by Harold Ashe, 1951 (A).

Gilbert, Ed (set designer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Gilbert, Jody (actress): Identified by Harvey Narcisenfeld, 1952 (B).

Gold, Lee (writer): Identified by Silvia Richards, 1953 (B).

Goldman, Harold (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Gordon, Donald (assistant editor, studio story department): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Gordon, Michael (director): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); and Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Gorney, Jay (song writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); George Glass, 1952 (A).

Gough, Lloyd (actor): Identified by Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Larry Parks, 1951 (B); and Jerome Robbins, 1953 (B).

Graff, Fred (actor): Investigation identifying Mr. Graff as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public (A).

Grant, Carl (in theater branch of Communist Party): Identified by Anne Kinney, 1953 (B).

Grant, Morton (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); William Blowitz, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Grennard, Elliot (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A).

Gruen, Margaret (Peggy) (writer): Identified by Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); and Paul Marion, 1952 (A).

Hammer, Alvin (real name: Irving Dratler): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A) (actor).

Hammett, Dashiell (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Harper, Annette (actress): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B); and Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B).

Harris, Lou (publicity man): Identified by Harold Ashe, 1951 (A); Mildred Ashe, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); and Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B).

Hellgren, George (studio employee): Identified by Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Hellman, Lillian (playwright): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Henry, Milton (president, Hollywood Studio Branch, Communist Party): Identified in Communist Party publication introduced into the records during testimony of Anne Kinney, 1952 (B).

Hentschel, Irving Paul (crafts worker): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Hilberman, David (motion-picture layout artist): Identified by Eugene Fleury, 1951 (A); and Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B); Bernyce Fleury, 1951 (A).

Hobart, Rose (actress): Identified by Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Hopkins, Pauline (radio writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); Roy Erwin, 1953 (B); and Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B).

Hovey, Tamara (writer): Identified by Silvia Richards, 1953 (B).

Howard, Maurice (business agent, Screen Cartoonist Guild): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Howe, Ann (former executive secretary of Contemporary Theatre): Identified by Anne Kinney, 1952 (B).

Hubley, John (cartoonist): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Huebsch, Edward (writer): Identified by Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Melvin Levy, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); and David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Hunter, Ian McLellan (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Ivens, Joris (documentary films): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

James, Daniel Lewis (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Bart Lytton, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

James, Lillian (Mrs. Dan James) (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Bart Lytton, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Jarrico, Paul (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David Rakins, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Ann Ray Frank, 1951 (A); Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Max Benoff, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Kahn, Gordon (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Marc Lawrence, 1951 (A); Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); George Glass, 1952 (A); Anne Ray Frank, 1951 (A); Harold Hecht, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Max Benoff, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Kaplan, Sol (musician and composer): Investigation identifying Mr. Kaplan as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public (B).

Killian, Victor (actor): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Larry Parks, 1951 (B); Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Klein, Phil (member of Cartoonist Group, Communist Party): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Klowden, Nina (radio actress): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B); Ray Erwin, 1953 (B); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B).

Koenig, Lester (associate producer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Kraber, Tony (actor): Identified by Elia Kazan, 1952 (A); Clifford Odets, 1952 (A).

Kraft, Hyman Solomon (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Kromberger, Joe (studio electrician): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Lagerfin, Pauline (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Lampbell, Millard (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B).

Lardner, Ring, Jr. (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); George Glass, 1952 (A); Anne Ray Frank, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Max Benoff, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Lawson, John Howard (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Edward Dymtryk, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Anne Ray Frank, 1951 (A); Harold Ashe, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); William Blowitz, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); David Rakins, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); Danny Dare, 1953 (B); Harold Hecht, 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Max Benoff, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Larry Parks, 1951 (B); Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B); Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B); Bart Lytton, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Lazarus, Simon M. (owner of Independent Productions Corp.): Investigation identifying Mr. Lazarus as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public (B).

Lees, Robert (writer): Identified by Sterling Hayden, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A).

Leonard, Charles (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Lerner, Tillie (writer): Identified by Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A).

Leverett, Lewis (actor): Identified by Elia Kazan, 1952 (A); Clifford Odets, 1952 (A).

Levitt, Alfred (studio reader and writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Melvin Levy, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Lewitzky, Bella (dancer): Identified by Anne Kinney, 1952 (B). (Mrs. Newell Reynolds).

Lieberman, Irwin (writer): Identified by Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A).

Lindeman, Mitchell (director): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Losey, Joseph (director): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A).

Lyon, Peter (radio writer, New York): Identified by Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Maddow, Ben (screen writer): Identified by Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Maltz, Albert (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Anne Ray Frank, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); Harold Hecht, 1953 (B); Max Benoff, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Manoff, Arnold (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Mildred Ashe, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Martin, Henriette (Henrietta) (writer): Identified by David A. Long, 1953 (B), and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Matthews, Allen (actor): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A).

McElroy, Walter (writer): Identified by Mildred Ashe, 1951 (A).

McGrew, John (cartoon animator): Identified by Eugene Fleury, 1951 (A).

McVey, Paul (radio actor): Identified by Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B); Roy Erwin, 1953 (B); and Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B).

Meyers, Henry (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); George Glass, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Miller, John (actor): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Miller, Paula (Mrs. Lee Strasberg) (actress): Identified by Elia Kazan, 1952 (A).

Mindlin, Eunice (secretary, member Communist Party writer's group, Hollywood): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Mischel, Josef (TV story writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Moore, Sam (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B); Roy Erwin, 1953 (B); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Morley, Karen (actress): Identified by Sterling Hayden, 1951 (A); Marc Lawrence, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Roy Erwin, 1953 (B); Larry Parks, 1953 (B).

Moss, Carelton (writer): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A).

Mullen, Mrs. Virginia (actress): Investigation identifying Mrs. Mullen as a Communist Party member has not been made public (B).

Murray, Donald (actor): Identified by Anne Kinney, 1952 (B).

Offner, Mortimer (TV work, ex-screen writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Melvin Levy, 1952 (A).

Oliver, William E. (drama critic): Identified by Alice Bennett, 1952 (B) and Urcel Daniel, 1952 (B).

Ornitz, Samuel (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Page, Charles (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Morris Appelman, 1952 (B).

Parker, Dorothy (Mrs. Alan Campbell) (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Pearson, Rose (member, Federal theater unit of Communist Party, New York): Identified by Harold Hecht, 1953 (B).

Peck, Trudy (member, Federal theater unit of Communist Party, New York): Identified by Harold Hecht, 1953 (B).



Perlin, Paul (studio worker): Identified by Max Silver, 1952 (A) and Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Peterson, Henry (studio carpenter): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Peterson, Hjalmar (studio carpenter): Identified by Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B).

Pettus, Ken (radio writer): Identified by Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Polin, Ben (photographer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A) and Roy Erwin, 1953 (B).

Polonsky, Abraham Lincoln (director-writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Sterling Hayden, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (B); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); and Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Pomerance, Mortimer William (Screen Writers' Guild, former executive secretary): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Berneice Fleury, 1951 (A) and Eugene Fleury, 1951 (A); Charlotte Darling Adams, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Rapf, Maurice (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A).

Revere, Ann (actress): Identified by Larry Parks, 1951 (B) and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Reynolds, Bella Lewitzky (dancer): See Bela Lewitzky.

Richards, Robert L. (writer): Identified by Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Rinaldo, Fred (writer): Identified by Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

River, W. L. (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Roberts, Bob (producer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Roberts, Marguerite (Mrs. John Sanford) (writer): Identified by Leroy Herndon, Jr., 1953 (B); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B); and Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Robinson, Jack (radio writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); and Roy Erwin, 1953 (B).

Robinson, Mary (radio writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); and Roy Erwin, 1953 (B).

Rolfe, Ed (writer): Identified by Silvia Richards, 1953 (B).

Ronka, Wayne (musician): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Rosenfeld, Paul (attorney for Music Corporation of America): Identified by Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Rousseau, Louise (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Ruskin, Shimen (actor): Identified by Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Sabinsin, Lee (Broadway producer): Identified by Eve Ettinger, 1951 (A); and Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Sage, Frances (actress): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Salemson, Harold (in charge of press department, Douglas Fairbanks, New York office): Identified by Sol Shor, 1953 (B).

Salt, Waldo (writer): Identified by Richard Collins, 1951 (A); Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Budd Schulberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David Raksin, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); Roland W. Kibbee, 1953 (B); Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Scotfield, Louis (actor, writer): Identified by Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Scott, Adrian (producer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Shapiro, Art (radio writer or publicist): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A).

Shapiro, Victor (publicist): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); George Bassman, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Shaw, Robert (writer): Identified by Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Ship, Reuben (radio and screen writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Shore, Wilma (Mrs. Lou Solomon) (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Shore, Viola Brothers (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Sklar, George (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Sloan, Robert (member, Federal theater unit of Communist Party, New York): Identified by Harold Hecht, 1953 (B).

Smith, Art (actor): Identified by Elia Kazan, 1952 (A); and Clifford Odets, 1952 (A).

Smith, Ralph (set designer): Identified by Harold Ashe, 1951 (A).

Solomon, Lou (Louis) (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Sondergaard, Gale (actress): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); Larry Parks, 1951 (B); and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Spencer, Ray (writer): Identified by Danny Dare, 1953 (B).

Stander, Lione (actor): Identified by Marc Lawrence, 1951 (A); Harold Ashe, 1951 (A); Mildred Ashe, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Stanford, John (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Stevenson, Philip Edward (writer): Identified by Roy Huggins, 1952 (A); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Stewart, Donald Ogden (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Stone, Eugene R. (radio writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Strawn, Arthur (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Sullivan, Elliott (actor): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B); and Jerome Robbins, 1953 (B).

Taffel, Bess (writer): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); and Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B).

Tarloff, Frank (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B) and Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Terkel, Louis (actor): Identified by Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Trabulis, Paul (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B).

Traube, Shepard (theater director and producer): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A).

Tree, Dorothy (Mrs. Michael Uris) (actress): Identified by Larry Parks, 1953 (B) and Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B).

Trivers, Paul (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Roland Kibbee, 1953 (B).

Trumbo, Dalton, (writer): Identified by Martin Berkeley 1951 (A); Anne Ray Frank,

1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Charles Daggett, 1952 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Max Benoff, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Tyne, George (actor): Identified by Lee J. Cobb, 1953 (B). (Also known as Buddy Yarus.)

Uerkvitz, Herta (studio research department): Identified by Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); and Elizabeth Wilson, 1951 (A).

Uris, Dorothy Tree (Mrs. Michel Uris) (actress): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); and Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A).

Uris, Michael (writer): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Vorhaus, Bernard (director): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Frank Tuttle, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Stanley Roberts, 1952 (A); Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Wachsman, Robert (publicist): Identified by Charles Daggett, 1952 (B).

Wagner, Esther Jerry (radio announcer): Identified by Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Waldman, Herman (Aka David Wolf) (radio actor): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); and Roy Erwin, 1953 (B).

Waxman, Stanley, (radio actor): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); and Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Weber, John (agent): Identified by Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); and Martin Berkeley 1951 (A).

Wexley, John (writer): Identified by Edward Dmytryk, 1951 (A); Leo Townsend, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B); Bart Lytton, 1953 (B); and Robert Rossen, 1953 (B).

Whitney, Lynn (actress): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); Owen Vinson, 1952 (A); Dwight Hauser, 1953 (B); and Roy Erwin, 1953 (B); Carin Kinzel, 1953 (B).

Wilenchick, Clement (artist and actor): Investigation identifying Mr. Wilenchick as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public (B).

Willner, Geore (writers' agent): Identified by Meta Reis Rosenberg, 1951 (A); Martin Berkeley, 1951 (A); Melvin Levy, 1952 (A); Isobel Lennart, 1952 (A); Silvia Richards, 1953 (B); Leopold Atlas, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Wilson, Michael (writer): Identified by Bernard Schoenfeld, 1952 (A); David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Sol Shor, 1953 (B); and Babbette Lang, 1953 (B).

Wolff, William (radio writer): Identified by Paul Marion, 1952 (A); and Owen Vinson, 1952 (A).

Young, Ned (actor and writer): Investigation identifying Mr. Young as a member of the Communist Party has not been made public (B).

Zimet, Julian (writer): Identified by David A. Lang, 1953 (B); Pauline S. Townsend, 1953 (B).

Key: (A) Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities for the year 1952. (B) Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities for the year 1953.

Mr. MUNDT. I also salute the Veterans of Foreign Wars for their courageous job in this field and their effort to persuade individual Americans to do something about Communists—not merely to write a letter to their Senator or Representative saying, "I am against communism"; not merely to deliver a

speech about it somewhere; certainly not to form vigilante committees, because we do not want those. However, Americans can individually decline to buy what Communists publicize. They can decline to attend plays which Communists write or in which they participate. They can decline to support motion-picture producers who support Communists. They can refuse to buy what Communists produce. They can carry their trade elsewhere and support good Americans.

I do not believe that is blacklisting any more than it is blacklisting for the British to display signs reading "Buy British." That is publicizing things in which they believe. I do not believe it is blacklisting any more than it is blacklisting on the part of South Dakota farmers who carry on their automobiles signs reading "Watch your curves; buy beef." That is good advice for ladies who must watch their avoirdupois. It is not blacklisting lobsters. It is simply publicizing beef.

I am glad that some Americans are beginning to assume individual responsibility. This is something in which we must engage as individuals by an appropriate American type of activity. Certainly nothing is more American than the proposition that a man who has a dollar has the right to spend it where he wants to spend it and to decline to spend his dollar with those he happens to dislike.

I salute also the All-American Conference To Combat Communism, which is an affiliation of 51 great American organizations which unite on one particular point of view, and that is that they are opposed to communism. They publish a periodical called Freedom's Facts Against Communism. This is also available to anyone who wishes to subscribe to it. It also costs \$3 a year. Subscriptions may be sent to 917 15th Street NW., Washington, D. C. The publication is issued about every 2 weeks. The article in the issue which I have before me, for January 1956, was sponsored by the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, a member of the All-American Conference To Combat Communism.

I salute Catholic organizations such as the League of Decency, which pretty well wiped nauseating sex from American films. Having done that, they are doing something about Communists. They are apprising their people as to some of the Communist films, and some of the producers in Hollywood who slip in a Communist film now and then, or who employ Communist actors and try to give them a mantle of respectability by putting them in films with some good Americans. They say, "We will not go to see films put out by such producers, regardless of whether or not any particular one is communistic. We will patronize those who have seen the light. We are proudly American, and proudly anti-Communist. We will patronize only other good Americans."

While passing out the orchids, Mr. President, I wish to present a few to the Daughters of the American Revolution who, certainly, have been valiant in this fight for many years, who have had the courage to name names, and who have refused to purchase products from big

American companies who permit the advertising agencies they employ to utilize Communist talent in the business of promoting advertising programs.

More Americans should do that, Mr. President. If they would, they could clean this thing up.

Mr. President, I salute the Elks organization, which so frequently, in its monthly magazine, publishes anti-Communist articles, so proudly displays the emblem of America, and recognizes the dangers of communism to our freedom of thought.

I salute Counterattack. This publication costs a little more than most of us can afford—\$24 a year. It is published weekly in New York City by former agents of the FBI, and has the courage to name names.

Mr. President, it is interesting that the publication of names so seldom, if ever, brings about a suit for libel. It is said, "Here is a man who is a Communist and who is appearing in a play," or "Here is a man who is a Communist and who is employed by certain advertising agencies on television."

What a wonderful chance for a libel suit. Why do they not sue the Firing Line or Counterattack? One of their fair-haired boys made that mistake once. The story has been recounted on this floor, and I shall not go into the details again, but Alger Hiss went to the Federal penitentiary because he made the mistake of suing for libel. When it got to the point where he had to put up or shut up, he could not put up. So, he was shut in, instead—shut in a cell in one of our Federal penitentiaries.

So these fakers whose names appear in the lists published by Counterattack, the Firing Line, and other publications, may make a lot of noise, but they do not go to court, because if they were to lose the suit it is a pretty clear-cut indication that they have been properly labeled as Communists, and they might lose their lush advertising contracts as talented individuals who somehow or other lack the convictions of Americanism to make proper citizens.

Mr. President, I salute the Scripps-Howard newspapers. They have kept the flag flying. I salute them for keeping Freddy Woltman's shoulder to the wheel. He did a grand job for the New York World-Telegram. He demonstrated a national reputation and capacity to ferret out this underground conspiracy known as communism. I am glad Scripps-Howard keeps him at the job.

I also salute, Mr. President, the Hearst newspapers and its great newspapers which have never pulled down the flag. I salute the Chicago Tribune, which has never been afraid to call a spade a spade in this battle for America.

I salute the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Internal Security Committee of the Senate, and the FBI for their continuing and continuous job of bringing to the attention of Americans those individuals within our midst who would employ the dollars they get from honest Americans to support Communist activities and to destroy the whole framework of our freedom.

I hope that individual Americans everywhere will reexamine their consciences and ask themselves, "What can I do individually to strike a blow for freedom? What can I do to make sure that none of the money I spend goes to help support a Communist agency or a Communist cause, either by directly going into the box office of a theater offering a Communist play, or indirectly to the manufacturers of products which in turn are publicized on television or on radio by Communists?"

Mr. President, if we could only activate the wholesome conscience and the innate resistance of 25 percent of the good Americans of this country and awaken them to their responsibility and opportunity in this field, we could break up very quickly the Communist movement in America, because we would take from it the source of some of its great income which enables it to operate as effectively as it has against our body politic.

This is a challenge which each individual American must accept or reject for himself, Mr. President. Acting as an individual, every citizen who has the necessary convictions and courage can become a towering force in the battle against Godless communism despite the disparaging criticisms of the Fund for the Republic. Every American can refuse to patronize or purchase a Communist play or a Communist product. He can refuse to purchase a product advertised on radio and television by a Communist employed by some advertising agency or some projection studio. He can write the manufacturer of that product and tell him why he will no longer purchase its products. He can express himself to his friends and neighbors. He can become a worker in the vineyard of freedom and a fighter in the battle against communism without ever joining a committee or an organization of any kind. Once Americans alert themselves to the dangers of communism to the point where they activate themselves to do something to weaken and curtail it, we shall be well along on our road to victory over this malicious and malignant conspiracy of evil.

#### SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1956—AMENDMENT

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I wish to submit an amendment intended to be proposed by me to H. R. 7225, to amend the Social Security Act. My amendment would correct what I believe is an unintended inequity in the bill as reported out by the Finance Committee. The bill provides for Federal matching for medical payments under the various public-assistance programs, up to \$8 per month for each adult and \$4 for each child. The purpose of this provision of the bill, which I heartily support, is to encourage the States to broaden their medical programs for the recipients of public assistance. However, a number of States have already set up medical-care programs which average more than \$8 per month for each individual, using Federal matching funds available to them for cash payments, as they are permitted to do under the present law. The



bill separates medical payments from cash payments and limits Federal matching to one-half of \$8. It would thus force States to curtail their medical-care programs to the \$8 limit, and to give larger cash payments in order to receive the maximum Federal matching.

My amendment would permit all States to continue to use matching funds available for cash payments for medical-care programs if they wished to do so, and to take advantage of the new medical-care provisions of the bill without having to curtail their existing programs. I hope this amendment will be accepted so that existing programs may continue.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed and that it lie at the desk so that other Senators, some of whom have already expressed an interest in the amendment, may have the opportunity to cosponsor it if they desire to do so.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** The amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the desk, as requested by the Senator from Illinois.

#### STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BY CULTURAL AND ATHLETIC EXCHANGES AND PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL FAIRS AND FESTIVALS

Mr. HUMPHREY of Minnesota. Mr. President, many of us have been deeply disturbed by the timidity, hesitancy and cowardice exhibited by certain agencies in failing to implement the clear words of the President and Vice President of the United States. We have heard a good deal lately about the importance of "people to people" contacts, a wider exchange of persons, taking advantage of any breach in the Iron Curtain, and utilizing every opportunity to demonstrate our free way of life.

On the congressional side there have been heartening endorsements of these general principles. These endorsements have taken concrete form. One among many examples is the passage by the Senate in March of S. 3116, a bill to strengthen international relations through cultural and athletic exchanges and participation in international fairs and festivals.

I have been delighted to learn that this bill has just been favorably reported to the House by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and I am hopeful for early House approval.

Mr. President, at the same time such encouraging things are happening in Congress, the executive agencies are not only unimaginative but cowardly. The recent behavior of the United States Information Agency in withdrawing sponsorship from one of the most important cultural exhibits ever planned for use abroad is symptomatic of this discouraging, unimaginative approach. This particular incident has been a source of considerable disappointment and bitterness among groups who have been trying to cooperate with the administration in the development of a bold new cultural program abroad. This reaction is apparent in the news articles covering the announcement of the

USIA's withdrawal from sponsoring the art exhibit.

Two such articles are typical. One of them by Anthony Lewis appeared in the New York Times on June 20, 1956, and another appeared in the Washington Post and Times Herald on June 22, 1956. I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times of June 20, 1956]  
RED ISSUE BLOCKS EUROPE ART TOUR—UNITED STATES INFORMATION UNIT FEARS 10 PAINTERS IN SHOW MAY BE CALLED PRO-COMMUNIST—ACTION CALLED A FIASCO—ASSISTING MUSEUMS REFUSE TO USE A POLITICAL CRITERION—SEE UNITED STATES CULTURE HURT

(By Anthony Lewis)

WASHINGTON, June 20.—The United States Information Agency is withdrawing from sponsorship of what had been planned as one of the most important exhibits of American paintings ever sent abroad.

It has done so because of a fear that some of the artists included in the show may be accused of pro-Communist leanings.

This is the third flurry within the USIA in recent months over "subversive art," and it is regarded as the most significant. A number of leading American art institutions had cooperated in getting up this show, and had considered it an ambitious step in international cultural exchange.

The reaction now among these art groups is one of bitterness and disappointment. They call the affair a fiasco and say it will end by damaging the cultural standing of the United States abroad.

The projected show was to have included major works of 100 American artists of the 20th century. To get the pictures together, the information agency had called on the American Federation of Arts, a nonprofit organization with headquarters in New York.

#### PAINTINGS

The federation's choice of artists was made by John I. H. Bauer, curator of the Whitney Museum in New York, and by Dwight Kirsch of the Des Moines, Iowa, Art Center. Paintings were borrowed from museums, galleries and private collectors over the country. More than half the works have been brought to New York, ready for the European tour.

Then, some weeks ago, a USIA representative informed the federation that about 10 of the artists on the list were "unacceptable" for political reasons. The phrase "social hazards" was used.

Rejecting any political tests for its artists, the federation's 42 trustees voted unanimously on May 23 not to participate in the show if any paintings were barred by the Government.

The federation told the Information Agency it did not want to know the names of the 10 suspected artists, because it did not want to participate in circulating any possibly libelous charges against them.

The federation cited a resolution by its trustees in October 1954 that art "should be judged on its merits as a work of art and not by the political or social views of the artist." It also mentioned a statement made that same month by President Eisenhower, which said in part:

"Freedom of the arts is a basic freedom, one of the pillars of liberty in our land \* \* \*. Our people must have unimpaired opportunity to see, to understand, to profit from our artists' work \* \* \*."

"But, my friends, how different it is in tyranny. When artists are made the slaves and the tools of the state, when artists become the chief propagandists of a cause,

progress is arrested and creation and genius are destroyed."

#### WIDE RANGE OF ARTISTS

Painters selected for the show ranged from such sometime realists as John Sloan, George Bellows, Thomas Hart Benton, Grant Wood, Ivan Albright, and Reginald Marsh to such expressionists as Max Weber, John Marin, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, and Ben Shahn and numerous examples of the surrealist and abstract. (This list was chosen at random from 100 painters and has no relation to charges of procommunism.)

The Information Agency has not finally rejected the show or canceled its sponsorship. But it has made clear that it feels it cannot go ahead unless some kind of political test for the artists is accepted. Efforts are under way to arrange a private sponsor.

The federation has planned many shows for the USIA in the last few years and has never run into difficulty on anything but contemporary American works. The two major previous episodes involving Communist charges were these:

The USIA canceled plans to send to Australia an exhibit called "Sport in Art," which had been sent around the country by the magazine Sports Illustrated. The Agency dropped out because some group called the Dallas County Patriotic Council had made political charges against some of the artists when the show went to Dallas, Tex.

The Agency raised objections to an art collection from American university and college galleries that was going overseas because it included a picture by Pablo Picasso. The artist is a member of the French Communist Party. This tangle was eventually ironed out.

The Agency declined to comment today on the reasons for its stand on the art matters. But it is known that fear of congressional criticism has played an important part.

[From the Washington Post and Times Herald of June 22, 1956]

#### USIA QUILTS FOURTH OVERSEA SHOW

The United States Information Agency apparently is withdrawing from the sponsorship overseas of a major American art exhibit because some of the represented artists are unacceptable for political reasons.

When questioned about the report, USIA Director Theodore C. Streibert offered a terse "No comment."

USIA apparently is pulling out of the long-planned project because 10 of the 100 artists may be accused of pro-Communist tendencies.

It marks the fourth time in recent months that USIA or the State Department has become involved in an imbroglio of this nature. USIA canceled plans to send to Australia an exhibit called Sport in Art after a group called the Dallas (Tex.) County Patriotic Council made political charges against some of the artists.

USIA objected to an art collection from American colleges going abroad on the grounds it included a picture by Pablo Picasso, a member of the French Communist Party.

A State Department-sponsored tour of Southeast Asia by Toscanini's former NBC Symphony of the Air was canceled, mainly because 4 fiddlers in the 101-man orchestra allegedly had pro-Communist sympathies.

The most recent incident concerns the planned exhibition of the 20th century American art. USIA had asked the American Federation of Arts, a nonprofit organization, to get the pictures together.

Among the noted art experts assigned to select the pictures was John Walker, chief curator of the National Gallery of Art. The pictures were borrowed from art institutions all over the country and more than half

are already in New York City, ready for the planned European tour.

Recently a USIA representative told the federation that 10 of the artists were unacceptable for political reasons. On May 23 the federation's 42 trustees voted unanimously not to participate in the exhibit if the artists were to be subjected to such political tests.

The federation told USIA it did not want to know the names of the 10 suspected painters. It cited a resolution adopted by its trustees in October 1954, that art "should be judged on its merits as a work of art and not by the political or social views of the artist."

Among the painters whose work was chosen for the exhibit are George Bellows, John Sloan, Grant Wood, Thomas Hart Benton, Reginald Marsh, Ivan Albright, Max Weber, John Marin, Ben Shahn, and Yasuo Kuniyoshi.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Minnesota. Mr. President, the editorial comments on this withdrawal have been as courageous as the USIA has been timid. An editorial in the New York Times of June 20, 1956, described the USIA decision as "spineless." An editorial in the Washington Post and Times Herald of June 23, 1956, described the USIA action as something itself which "does serious damage to American prestige abroad." I ask unanimous consent that these two editorials be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times of June 20, 1956]

#### PEOPLE TO PEOPLE

With President Eisenhower's expressed hope for furtherance of "people-to-people contacts . . . to create understanding" among the civilized nations of the world there can be no serious disagreement. The public and private exchange programs under which foreigners come to this country and establish direct and personal communication with Americans, and vice versa, constitute one of the most effective of all methods of building up mutual comprehension and goodwill.

The President's support of these programs makes all the more puzzling the fact that the State Department asked this year for actually less money than last year for educational exchanges. It requested \$22 million last year for the educational program and \$20 million this year. Considering the importance of the program and the moral weight the President rightly ascribes to it, this is a paltry figure, especially when compared with a sum 7 times as great for the governmental exchange of technicians under a different program and also compared with an appropriation of more than \$100 million for propaganda of dubious effectiveness put out by the United States Information Agency. While everybody from the President down seems to believe that educational exchange is wonderful, the Agency under which it is administered is treated something like a stepchild in the State Department, with no top-ranking departmental official showing really vital interest in it.

But this is not the only puzzling feature about the working out of "people-to-people contacts" with governmental encouragement. What could be more important in this area of activity than contact with foreigners along cultural lines—through the theater, music, art, and the like? Yet it almost seems that every time an effort is made to establish such serious contact some spineless official in Washington becomes frightened by the Communist bugaboo and the enterprise is called

off, to the great detriment of American prestige abroad.

The Symphony of the Air, with a record behind it as one of the best American propaganda agencies ever sent to the Far East, lost a scheduled trip to the Middle East presumably for this reason, if it can be called a reason. An exhibition of American sporting pictures, to be sent to Australia, was withdrawn on the complaint of a small group of fanatics that some of the artists had un-American associations. One of the finest plays on Broadway will not be sent to the International Theater Festival this year because someone in Washington cannot understand that real art appeals to people, even though it may offend a diplomat or two.

We are glad the President plans to have a conference in Washington to encourage "people-to-people contacts," and we hope some of the Government officials who have done so much in their official capacity to alienate these contacts will be invited.

[From the Washington Post and Times Herald of June 23, 1956]

#### CONTROVERSIAL ARTISTS

The United States Information Agency seems determined to represent the United States as a country in which art is judged in terms of its propaganda value and artists are rated in accordance with their political orthodoxy. This is an untrue picture of the United States. It is also a picture which does serious damage to American prestige abroad. It is, essentially, the very picture of America which Soviet propagandists have tried to paint.

The USIA appears to be withdrawing its sponsorship of a show which was to have included major works of 100 contemporary American artists selected by the American Federation of Arts, a nonprofit organization embracing many of the leading American art institutions. The show was regarded as an important effort toward international cultural understanding and recognition of the United States as a land hospitable to the arts. The USIA now threatens to withdraw its sponsorship because 10 of the artists in the show were considered "unacceptable" for political reasons and because the federation's 42 trustees voted unanimously not to participate in the show if any paintings were barred by the Government.

Artists are, by nature, nonconformists. They would not be artists if they did not see things differently from ordinary men. To judge their work on the basis of the conventionality of their private lives and their political opinions would be to select, inevitably, the commonplace instead of the original; it would end in choosing illustrators, instead of artists. The trustees of the American Federation of Arts are quite right in saying that art "should be judged on its merits as a work of art and not by the political or social views of the artist." And they aptly quote President Eisenhower's observation:

"Freedom of the arts is a basic freedom, one of the pillars of liberty in our land. . . . But, my friends, how different it is in tyranny. When artists are made the slaves and the tools of the state, when artists become the chief propagandists of a cause, progress is arrested and creation and genius are destroyed."

Behind the USIA's timorousness lies a fear that Congress would deny funds to the Agency if it sponsored work by controversial artists. We are inclined to think that this libels Congress. In any case, it is a shabby rationalization. USIA is false to its own trust when it uses funds for the misrepresentation of America abroad.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Minnesota. Mr. President, I am sure that most thoughtful Members of Congress are disappoint-

ed by the action of the USIA in this instance, and I am hopeful that one of these days timidity will be replaced with boldness, not only in words but in deeds as well.

One of the things which might bolster the confidence of the USIA as well as assure congressional support and cooperation with the information program would be the adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 161, a resolution which I introduced on April 11, 1956, which would carry out the recommendations of the United States Advisory Committee on Information by creating a Joint Committee on Information.

This joint committee would be empowered to study the extent and effectiveness of all United States international information programs, study the techniques, special characteristics, and extent of all types of Communist propaganda including methods used to penetrate information media of the free world with such propaganda, inquire into the extent to which scientific research and development in the field of mass communications have progressed in the United States and the degree to which such scientific advances are utilized by the United States international information programs, and provide a continuous, cooperative relationship between Congress and the United States international information programs.

Mr. President, the recent appointment of Mr. Shepilov, the editor of Pravda, as the new Soviet Foreign Minister should provide us with ample additional warning, if we need any, of what we are up against in the struggle for the minds of men all over the world, when ideas become bullets and words become bombs.

This new Soviet move should awaken us more than ever to the urgent necessity for a more concentrated and effective effort to keep the world informed of the real spirit of American democracy. Adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 161 should help in this endeavor. In addition to reassuring our friends abroad, the adoption of this resolution apparently might even serve to reassure the USIA and encourage them, on occasion, to be brave, or at least to be stalwart.

In reference to the action of the USIA, I should like to comment about one instance which is referred to by the New York Times, a case in which the USIA turned down an exhibit. It canceled a plan to send to Australia an exhibit called "Sport in Art," which had been sent all around this country by the magazine called Sports Illustrated. I believe the Sports Illustrated, if I am not mistaken, is published by the publishers of Time, Life, and Fortune. It is a splendid magazine.

I read from the Times article:

The Agency dropped out because some group called the Dallas County Patriotic Council had made political charges against some of the artists when the show went to Dallas, Tex.

The Agency raised objections to an art collection from American university and college galleries that was going overseas because it included a picture by Pablo Picasso. The artist is a member of the French Communist Party. This tangle was eventually ironed out.



The Agency declined to comment today on the reasons for its stand on the art matters. But it is known that fear of congressional criticism has played an important part.

I might say that if the people of the United States can be subjected to a sort of roving tour of art in the field of sports activities, such as that which was sponsored by Sports Illustrated, I should imagine that the people of Australia might have sufficient moral fiber to endure the same kind of exhibition.

I want to know why the USIA does not follow the mandate of the President. Or are we to assume that the President makes speeches merely to please some persons, and that the Government he is supposed to preside over and administer pays no attention to the attitudes and expressions of philosophy by the President of the United States?

I remind the Senate that the President said that freedom of the arts is a basic freedom; it is one of the pillars of liberty in our land. I suggest that in the light of what we have heard, we might contemplate that expression of philosophy by the President.

The recent withdrawal of Sports Illustrated by the USIA, according to the New York Times article and all other press reports, is due to the fact that the USIA is withdrawing from the sponsorship of what had been planned as one of the most important exhibitions of American painting ever to have been sent abroad.

I read from Mr. Anthony Lewis' article in the New York Times of June 20, 1956:

It has done so because of a fear that some of the artists included in the show may be accused of pro-Communist leanings.

This is the third flurry within the USIA in recent months over "subversive art," and it is regarded as the most significant. A number of leading American art institutions had cooperated in getting up this show, and had considered it an ambitious step in international cultural exchange.

The reaction now among these art groups is one of bitterness and disappointment. Call the affair a "fiasco" and say it will end by damaging the cultural standing of the United States abroad.

The projected show was to have included major works of 100 American artists of the 20th century. To get the pictures together, the Information Agency had called on the American Federation of Arts, a nonprofit organization with headquarters in New York.

I hope the officers of the USIA will study the situation carefully. I noted while I was home during the past weekend that the Minneapolis Morning Tribune had published a blistering editorial relating to this subject matter, and had called to the attention of its readers the fact that the USIA had bowed down to social and political pressures and had demonstrated anything else but integrity and courage in this particular matter. That is all the more reason, it seems to me, why we need in Congress a joint committee on information programs.

The New York Times editorial to which I referred earlier contains one statement which I think is rather apropos, and which I shall read:

Yet it almost seems that every time an effort is made to establish such serious con-

tact some spineless official in Washington becomes frightened by the Communist bugaboo and the enterprise is called off, to the great detriment of American prestige abroad.

The Symphony of the Air, with a record behind it as one of the best American propaganda agencies ever sent to the Far East, lost a scheduled trip to the Middle East presumably for this reason, if it can be called a reason.

It is interesting to note that Symphony of the Air went to the Far East, where the problems are serious; but that when it was scheduled to go to the Middle East, some objection was raised, and this symphonic orchestra, which has been the delight of millions of people, had its program called off.

Mr. President, if that is the kind of attitude which is going to prevail in this country, what is the United States doing in an international convention on the possible uses of atomic energy? Why did the President permit General Twining to go to the Soviet Union? What will happen in this country if some Soviet doctor discovers a new cure for a disease? Are we supposed to die because a Communist discovers a cure?

What will happen if General Twining learns of some new development in Soviet planes? Are we supposed to say that we would rather lose a war than to benefit by an advancement in Soviet engineering which might be incorporated in our own planes?

Mr. President, we can become so blind that we can throw ourselves over the precipice of disaster. There is such a thing as common enlightenment and horse sense.

I observe that the majority leader has come to the floor. A statement which he made was quoted recently in a magazine article. It more or less underscores what I am trying to say. I can only paraphrase it. He said something to the effect that his beloved father had once told him that "Some people are awfully smart, but they haven't got any sense."

Sometimes one can be awfully smart, but simply not have any judgment. I think what America needs now is some very good judgment.

I think we had better be deciding whether we are going to stand in mortal fear of a little Communist activity, or are going to demonstrate that we have strength, faith, and courage, and are going to put our best foot forward. We should be proud of American art, culture, and industry; and this United States Senator wants to say now that he is for challenging the Soviet Union in every conceivable area of life, by using every talent at our command to do it. There is no room for timidity, for fear, for floundering, for the kind of administrative ambivalence which seems to be plaguing the Government. We are coming in no longer on a slow freight; we are even missing the train.

I am of the opinion we had better make up our minds that we are in a war for keeps. This is a world series having only one game. Either we will win the first game, or we will not be in the series at all. One of the things we must do to win in this great world series competition between the Soviet Union and the

free world is to get out in front and stay there.

We are being outmaneuvered in the Middle East while the American people are being deluded into believing everything is fine and dandy. Day after day, in area after area of the world, we are being outmaneuvered and outcounted through the propaganda of the Soviet Union.

The United States is a great country, which is proud of its merchandizing and proud of its advertising; it points with pride to its skill in communications. But for some reason we seem to have become paralyzed when it comes to international competition.

I hope the suggestion made with reference to the United States Information Agency at the time the appropriation bill was under consideration will be followed up. I think the whole program needs to be examined. I have had some feelings in the past that we were making progress, but when some Senators stand on the floor and undertake to say that the USIA may be doing something which appears to be a little to the left of Grant or McKinley, then the USIA stands like it has been stunned and immobilized.

I suggest that it should be a little more interested in pursuing a program which will be designed through the cooperation of the best minds in this country, and by persons of talent and resourcefulness.

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, pursuant to the order previously entered, I move that the Senate stand adjourned until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 1 minute p. m.) the Senate adjourned, the adjournment being, under the order previously entered, until Tuesday, June 26, 1956, at 12 o'clock meridian.

#### CONFIRMATION

Executive nomination confirmed by the Senate June 25, legislative day of June 22, 1956.

#### SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

James Cunningham Sargent, of New York, to be a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission for the term expiring June 5, 1961.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 1956

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, may we now come unto Thee in a truly prayerful spirit, humbly acknowledging how much we need Thee and also confidently realizing that Thou art able and willing to supply all our needs.

Grant that in the midst of the miseries and mysteries, the confusions and changes of life, we may have the patience